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This thesis critically examines the extent to which low carbon and equitable transitions are 
being achieved within urban areas in advanced economies. It draws on Nottingham as a 
single case study of a pioneering transition city in the UK context, with strong ambitions to 
become the UK’s first carbon neutral city by 2028. Nottingham is a compelling example for 
examining what can be achieved in practice by an English unitary authority, and what 
constraints are experienced by local actors that inhibit urban sustainable trajectories.  
Using a qualitative research design, I examine the key governing actors involved and their 
agency, the barriers and tensions encountered in their pursuits, and the approaches and 
pathways undertaken for progressing low carbon and equitable urban transitions. This thesis 
critically engages with academic ideas and political debate on sustainable transitions. 
Specifically, I use a multi-scalar perspective to investigate the actors involved in low carbon 
transitions, and by doing so, I draw upon multiple theories and perspectives to examine the 
governance of sustainable transitions (e.g. Avelino & Wittmayer, 2016; Geels, 2005; Kern 
& Alber, 2009). Whilst analysing urban transition processes particularly in the context of 
neoliberal austerity (e.g. Hodson & Marvin, 2015; Peck, 2012), I constructively engage with 
literature surrounding just transitions, and the ways in which sustainable pathways are also 
inclusive and equitable, focusing on the concepts of energy and transport justice (e.g.  
Jenkins et al. 2017; McCauley & Heffron, 2018; Mullen & Marsden, 2016). In this research 
I turn to the concepts of path-dependency, path creation and lock-in to analyse the 
approaches and pathways taken by urban actors for implementing low carbon and inclusive 
transitions, and to further explain past, present and future sustainable urban trajectories (e.g. 
MacKinnon et al. 2019; Unruh, 2000).  
Beginning with a multi-level policy analysis, I reflect that climate change targets are weak, 
inconsistent and have omitted attention to social equity issues. As a result, low carbon and 
just transitions are insufficiently addressed in international policy, which in turn has 
constrained implementing national and local level climate change policy. From a national 
level, there are inconsistent and disruptive policy environments which are hindering low 
carbon urban just transitions, and I draw upon the context of national austerity, ambivalence 
of inclusive climate change policy and ineffective regulation. Barriers are also emerging 
because of local level contestation and demonstrate the more context-specific and spatial 
nature of urban transitions. Finally, I attend to the Nottingham example to reveal how agency 
and political capacity are particularly influenced by the type and size of local authority and 
actors in power. Lastly, I argue that the municipal ownership of energy and transport systems 
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1.0. INTRODUCTION  
The climate emergency is undoubtedly the single greatest global threat of the twenty-first 
century, and the shift to a decarbonised and equitable energy system has been subject to 
much debate across academic and political arenas. Particularly within recent years, there has 
been a spatial turn in transitions thinking which, in part, has led to an increased focus on the 
role of cities in implementing sustainable trajectories; primarily because of the high energy 
consumption, population growth and economic activity within urban areas, and the political 
(municipal) level which is closest to many citizens (e.g. Bridge et al. 2013; Bulkeley et al. 
2014). In conjunction with this, the governance of sustainable urban transitions has attracted 
attention to investigating the plurality of actors involved in the implementation of low carbon 
societies (e.g. Becker et al. 2015; Rutherford & Coutard, 2014). Due to the pressing need to 
shift to more sustainable forms of living, the main purpose of this thesis is to critically 
examine the ways in which low carbon and equitable transitions are being achieved and 
constrained within urban areas in advanced economies.   
This thesis is concerned with investigating contemporary sustainable and inclusive 
transitions in urban areas in practice. To achieve this, I examine the key governing actors 
involved and their agency, the barriers and tensions encountered in their pursuits, and the 
approaches and pathways undertaken for progressing low carbon and equitable urban 
transitions. In particular, I contribute to key academic and policy debates surrounding the 
multi-level governance of sustainable transitions and the array of actors involved in these 
processes across different scales (e.g. Avelino & Wittmayer, 2016; Geels, 2005; Hodson & 
Marvin, 2012). Additionally, I examine the processes involved, and especially pay attention 
to the role of lock-in, path creation and path-dependency in influencing cities’ sustainable 
trajectories (e.g. MacKinnon et al. 2019; Unruh, 2000).  
In this research I engage constructively with academic discourse on sustainable urban 




carbon and equitable urban transitions in the United Kingdom (UK). As a pioneering 
transition city with strong ambitions to become the UK’s first carbon neutral city by 2028, 
Nottingham is a compelling example for examining what can be achieved in practice by an 
English unitary authority and what constraints are experienced that inhibit urban sustainable 
trajectories. Notably, I offer new insights for understanding the political capacity and agency 
of local government actors in low carbon and sustainable transitions, particularly in the 
context of current conjunctures such as national austerity (e.g. Hannon & Bolton, 2015; 
Hodson & Marvin, 2015; Peck, 2012) and ambivalence to inclusive climate change policy 
(e.g. Fankhauser et al. 2018; Gillard, 2016; Lockwood, 2013).  
This chapter offers an introduction to the thesis as a whole and is divided into four sections. 
In the first section I provide a background to the research context by introducing the global 
climate emergency, the synergistic relationship between climate change and inequalities, and 
the governance of urban low carbon and equitable transitions, particularly in the UK. In the 
second section I outline the research aim and objectives, and in the third section I present 
the main contributions of this research. Finally, I outline the structure of the thesis by 
presenting a summary of each of the seven chapters that comprise this thesis.  
1.1. RESEARCH CONTEXT 
1.1.1. Declaring a Global Climate Emergency  
As of December 2020, global atmospheric carbon dioxide levels measured 415 parts per 
million, the highest recordings in human history (NASA, 2020). The scientific evidence of 
climate change is overwhelming – the source of these emissions is undoubtedly a result of 
anthropogenic activity, particularly since the latter half of the 18th century following the 
Industrial Revolution and the continuous large-scale burning of fossil fuels, such as coal, oil 
and gas. The rise of emissions and subsequent increase in global temperature pose significant 
environmental, social and economic challenges, many of which have already had, and 
continue to have, long-lasting and devastating global impacts, such as rising sea levels, 
irreversible changes in ocean currents, the hydrological cycle and fragile ecosystems, and 
more extreme weather events (UN, 2020).  
Nevertheless, despite the abundant supporting scientific evidence validating the causes of 




continued unabated (IEA, 2020a). Limiting global warming to (a conservative estimate of) 
1.5 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels would reduce the challenging impacts on 
ecological systems, human health and well-being. There is an urgency to do this, with the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) stating that global warming must be 
limited by 2030 to avoid irreversible and catastrophic damage affecting people, ecosystems, 
and livelihoods all around the world (IPCC, 2018).  
Tackling such unprecedented levels of atmospheric greenhouse gases is indeed a formidable 
task, although not insurmountable. Put simply, it involves a dramatic and spatial 
restructuring of social, political, technical and institutional systems that sustain everyday 
life, such as energy, mobility, water and waste (Bulkeley et al. 2014). This includes a large-
scale reorganisation of the ways in which societies produce and consume energy, and a shift 
to incorporate more efficient, carbon-saving technologies and non-fossil fuel energy sources 
such as renewable energy systems, which do not have detrimental implications for present 
and future generations. Such long-term shifts are commonly known as sustainable 
transitions1. This thesis is positioned to examine more closely the large-scale transitions to 
more sustainable shifts of energy systems at the urban level.  
1.1.2. The Nexus Between Climate Change and Inequalities 
The global landscape is deeply unequal, with a rising trend in social and economic inequality 
for more than 70 per cent of the world’s population (UN, 2020).  Human-induced climate 
change involves the production of injustices which are socially and spatially uneven, and 
such injustices disproportionately affect the poorest and most vulnerable groups which have 
contributed the least to the issue (Bickerstaff et al. 2013). This is because the nature of 
inequality results in an increased exposure of vulnerable and disadvantaged groups to 
climate hazards and their ability to cope with pressures (UN, 2020). The World Bank (2020) 
estimates that climate impacts will perpetuate the existing global humanitarian crisis by 
pushing an additional 100 million people into poverty by 2030.  
In conjunction with a transition to low carbon practices, the persistent and rising levels of 
social inequality on international, national and local levels which are exacerbated by climate 
change has raised the importance of social justice dimensions and the need for a 
                                                 





transformation that is inclusive, equitable and ethical. The concept of a ‘Just Transition’ 
originated alongside the environmental justice movement and trade union groups in North 
America during the 1980s in a response to protect jobs in vulnerable, carbon-intensive 
industries (Holifield et al. 2017; Newell & Mulvaney, 2013). Even though today there is no 
universally-accepted definition of a ‘just transition’2, social inequality and climate change 
are becoming increasingly recognised not only as two separate issues, but instead are 
intertwined and need to be addressed simultaneously to benefit all members of society (e.g. 
McCauley & Heffron, 2018). The current global pandemic of Covid-193 and its detrimental 
effects on humanity reinforces the critical sense of a need to tackle inequalities as part of a 
broader social-ecological understanding. A low carbon future must therefore not produce 
nor exacerbate inequalities, but instead should address these inequalities in order to progress 
a truly sustainable society, and hence is an important consideration underpinning this thesis.  
1.1.3. Multi-Scalar Governance and Sustainable Urban Transitions  
The transition to a decarbonised and just society is not simply confined to technical changes, 
but also requires political and institutional changes and is therefore undeniably a governance 
issue which is entangled with contestation and disagreement (e.g. Castan Broto & Bulkeley, 
2013). Governance not only comprises state actors who have a key role in enabling low 
carbon transitions, but equally involves cooperation with non-state actors, for example non-
governmental organisations, civil society and private enterprises; all of which have powerful 
competing interests at stake (e.g. Khan, 2013; Rutherford & Coutard, 2014). The 
collaboration of these actors across international, national and local scales, commonly 
referred to as multi-scalar or multi-level governance, is paramount for achieving 
decarbonisation. The signing of the legally-binding Paris Agreement (Conference of Parties 
[COP21]) in December 2015 – a commitment to limit global warming to well below 2 
degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels – was considered a pivotal moment for the 
international governance of climate change. 
                                                 
2 For the purposes of this research, I use the term ‘just transition’ interchangeably with inclusive, fair and 
equitable transitions. 
3 ‘Covid-19’ refers to the infectious coronavirus disease which has resulted in 2.1 million deaths globally as of 
January 2021 (WHO, 2021). The effects of this disease (generally and specifically to this research) are 




Particularly within recent years, cities4 have become a focal point for governing low carbon 
and equitable transitions. Urban areas are home to more than half of the world’s population 
and consequently account for 60 to 80 per cent of global energy consumption and 75 per 
cent of carbon emissions (Bulkeley, 2015; UN, 2020). By 2050, it is projected that more 
than two-thirds of the world’s population will live in urban areas, putting even greater 
pressure on existing urban areas and services.  
The current fossil-fuel based system that powers the world at large is at present 
economically, technically, socially, and geographically embedded (or ‘locked-in’) within 
society and its practices. This has resulted in an entanglement of corporate power with 
climate change which has been driven by free market-based logics within neoliberal 
ideology and policy (e.g. Ciplet & Timmons Roberts, 2017; Klein, 2014; Leitner et al. 2007). 
The fact that governments continue to allocate subsidies to fossil fuel industries, with a one-
third increase since 2014 to more than $400 billion in 2019, despite the compelling evidence 
of climate change aptly illustrates this entanglement and incumbent embeddedness (IEA, 
2020a; Klein, 2014). Such governance must in turn overcome this incumbent system which 
is particularly challenging in the context of actors with forceful and competing political and 
economic interests which operate on large profit margins and would suffer economically 
from such shifts (Rosenbloom et al. 2019; Unruh, 2000).  
In parallel with this, the dominant political response to the 2008 financial crisis sparked a 
range of austerity measures and cuts to public spending which in turn have made, and 
continue to make, it increasingly challenging for governments and businesses alike to argue 
for such large-scale transformations, leading to a lock-in of existing technologies (Bigger & 
Millington, 2019; Peck, 2012). The financial implications of impacts are difficult to 
calculate, and many impacts such as the loss of human lives and biodiversity loss are 
problematic to value and monetise, which can further reinforce and entrench neoliberal 
logics and the marginalisation of social and environmental issues (Featherstone, 2013). 
However, by 2030, it is projected that climate change could cost the global economy $70-
$100 billion annually (The World Bank, 2011). Therefore, in order to mitigate climate 
change impacts, current mainstream business models and forms of organisation need to be 
                                                 
4 The concept of the ‘city’ is contested and I discuss my conceptualisation of the ‘city’ in more detail in Chapter 




reconfigured and replaced to incorporate a massive reallocation of capital for sustainable 
systems, which have long-term perspectives that ensure social, environmental and economic 
benefits are achieved in a low carbon economy5 (Fankhauser & Jotzo, 2017).  
Consequently, it is increasingly acknowledged that all levels of government, particularly at 
the municipal level, are key actors in contributing to emissions reductions and have a central 
responsibility in tackling climate change (Bulkeley et al. 2013). In this context, municipal 
state and non-state actors (e.g. third sector, private sector, and civil society) have a 
fundamental ‘agency’ (broadly defined as one’s ability to think, act, manage and intervene 
in a given process and situation6) in mitigating climate change, through their individual and 
collective capacity (Gibbs & Krueger, 2005). This is already demonstrated by the recent and 
growing number of cities across the world declaring climate emergencies and subsequently 
adopting new climate policies and mandating for further political action (Climate Emergency 
Declaration, 2020). In many cases, cities are actively going against the status quo of their 
national governments by declaring a climate crisis and moving towards sustainability 
governance and ‘green growth’ agendas, particularly during challenges of austerity 
(Featherstone et al. 2012; Gibbs & Lintz, 2016). The demonstration of cities is an apt 
illustration of recent local government climate activism, for example in the USA following 
President Trump’s announcement to withdraw from the Paris Agreement in 2017, and in the 
UK in 2019 (Climate Emergency Declaration, 2020; Watts, 2017). This is in parallel with 
the cohort of citizens who are engaged in climate activism, particularly since 2019, such as 
Extinction Rebellion and Global Youth Strike movements, for example, Fridays for Future 
(Fisher, 2019).  
The role of cities, and the governance and management of climate change occurring on a 
city-level is therefore a vital consideration in leading post-carbon transitions. The main 
purpose of this thesis is to examine the ways in which low carbon and equitable transitions 
                                                 
5 The ‘low carbon economy’ can be considered as a narrower conceptualisation of the ‘green’ economy which 
has a general motivation to encourage growth in income and employment whilst also addressing concerns over 
enhanced global warming, climatic change and sea level rise (Gibbs & O’Neill, 2015). It is acknowledged that 
there are multiple and fluid discourses of the green economy, e.g. see overview provided by O’Neill & Gibbs 
(2016) and Krueger et al. (2017), however for the purposes of this thesis, these terms are used interchangeably.  
6 Agency is a concept which has been subject to much debate, particularly in social theory (e.g. Chouniard, 
2008). It is understood here as concerning who makes decisions and on behalf of whom, and encompasses 




are being addressed across sectors in urban areas by governing actors, and explores their 
agency in this pursuit, particularly in the context of neoliberal austerity.   
1.1.4. Urban Low Carbon and Inclusive Transitions in the UK 
Like many developed countries, the UK has made initial efforts to tackle climate change and 
social inequality on a national level. Whilst there has been a notable decline in greenhouse 
gas emissions (e.g. between 1990-2017, greenhouse gas emissions fell by 43%), the shift to 
a decarbonised society on a national level has been challenging due to competing and 
changing political objectives and subsequent inconsistent approach (Jennings et al. 2019).  
Nottingham has been chosen for this thesis because it represents one of the most important 
examples of low carbon transitions in a city in contemporary Britain. Located in the East 
Midlands of the UK, Nottingham is an exemplar of a medium-sized city with prevailing 
social issues and it is not unique in this regard. While there have been improvements since 
2007 and 2010, the city has persistently high levels of deprivation. According to the Indices 
of Multiple Deprivation (IMD), Nottingham ranks 11th out of the 317 districts in England, 
and approximately one third of Lower Super Output Areas in the city are in the worst 10 per 
cent nationally (Nottingham Insight, 2019a). This is concerning for the city in terms of 
overall well-being, but also in terms of environmental sustainability with poor levels of air 
quality, and an established 5.9 per cent of adult mortality (equivalent to 127 deaths) being 
due to exposure to human-made air pollution in the city in 2014. Access to low-cost heating 
and sustainable transport is therefore paramount to Nottingham since it has high levels of 
fuel poverty7 (14.6 per cent) and low levels of car ownership, with 56.3 per cent of all 
households having at least one car in 2011 compared to 74.2 per cent in England 
(Nottingham Insight, 2019a).  
City actors in Nottingham recognise these environmental and social challenges and as such 
have made laudable attempts at managing a low carbon and equitable transition within recent 
years. In January 2020, Nottingham City Council made headlines in the UK by committing 
to becoming the first carbon neutral city in the UK by 2028 (Nottingham City Council, 
2020a; Ogden, 2019). Not only is this target ambitious and commendable, but it is also 
                                                 
7  Similar to the concepts of energy poverty and energy vulnerability which capture problems of energy 
inaccessibility, fuel poverty (as per definitions used in England) refers to households as fuel poor if required 
energy costs are higher than that of the nationwide median, whilst pushing them below the official poverty line 




distinctive in the UK by setting the city apart from others in terms of their climate goals. The 
purpose of this thesis is to develop a comprehensive understanding of the initiatives taken 
by an array of actors to address these inequalities whilst also progressing low carbon 
transitions, using the case study of Nottingham.  
This thesis critically engages with political and academic debate on sustainable transitions. 
Specifically, I use a multi-scalar perspective to investigate the actors involved in low carbon 
transitions, and in doing so, I draw upon multiple theories and perspectives to examine the 
ways in which sustainable transitions are governed on local, national and international scales 
(e.g. Avelino & Wittmayer, 2016; Geels, 2005; Kern & Alber, 2009). Whilst analysing urban 
transition processes particularly in the context of neoliberal austerity (e.g. Hodson & Marvin, 
2015; Peck, 2012), I critically engage with the notion of ‘just transitions’, and the ways in 
which sustainable pathways are also inclusive and equitable, focusing on the concepts of 
energy and transport justice (e.g. Jenkins et al. 2017; McCauley & Heffron, 2018; Mullen & 
Marsden, 2016). In this research I turn to the concepts of path-dependency, path creation and 
lock-in to analyse the approaches and pathways taken by urban actors for implementing low 
carbon and inclusive transitions, and to further explain past, present and future sustainable 
urban trajectories (e.g. MacKinnon et al. 2019; Unruh, 2000).  
1.2. RESEARCH AIM AND OBJECTIVES 
The aim of this thesis is to investigate the governance of low carbon and equitable transitions 
within cities in advanced economies. To achieve this overarching aim, I seek to answer the 
following four broad research objectives:  
1. To identify the key governing actors (state and non-state actors) engaging with low 
carbon and equitable urban transitions. 
2. To investigate the main tensions and barriers which are encountered by multiple 
actors in the pursuit of low carbon and equitable urban transitions.  
3. To explore the key factors (e.g. initiatives, measures, conditions) in Nottingham 





4. To examine the key policies on local, national and international levels which are 
progressing and hindering low carbon and equitable urban transitions. 
For the methodology of this thesis, I use Nottingham as a case study to investigate low 
carbon and equitable urban transitions in practice. I examine the strategies across the city as 
a whole, and therefore use an integrated approach (which includes the sectors of energy 
supply, housing and transport) which in turn challenges the often-siloed policy and 
governing arrangements that separates energy supply from demand and urban form from 
buildings and transport (Moloney & Horne, 2014). This research consists of an intensive 
qualitative study investigating the four research objectives through conducting 35 semi-
structured interviews with stakeholders within and out-with the city.  These actors are largely 
made up of sustainability advocates, or those working within the field of sustainable 
transitions on local and national levels. In addition, this is supported and triangulated by 
documentary sources, observational research and site-specific visits.  
1.3. THESIS CONTRIBUTION  
Given the urgency of mitigating the dangerous impacts of climate change, the production of 
this thesis is timely and significant. Through focussing on the aforementioned research aims 
and objectives, this research brings together wide-ranging discussions of sustainable urban 
transitions in advanced economies. Broadly, this thesis makes a number of valuable and 
original theoretical, empirical and critical policy contributions by exploring the governance 
of low carbon and equitable transitions in practice. In doing so, this research situates itself 
(but is not restricted to) the sub-fields of energy studies, sustainable transitions studies, 
development studies and urban studies, and is interdisciplinary in nature to complement the 
multiple disciplines across which low carbon and equitable transitions can be understood, 
such as engineering studies, geography, and business studies.  
This thesis responds to the urgency of climate change and adds to existing literature by 
providing a comprehensive understanding of low carbon transitions, particularly in urban 
areas, by answering critical questions of climate policy and governance. This is achieved by 
using in-depth qualitative methods to offer rich findings from a valid empirical urban case 
study, Nottingham in the UK. To date, the case study of Nottingham has been under-
researched. Therefore, through a critical assessment of Nottingham’s decarbonisation 




of equitable urban transitions in a medium-sized city in the UK, in contrast to the commonly 
studied ‘premium world cities’ which have received most attention within urban 
sustainability research (Hodson & Marvin, 2010).  
This research takes a critical approach to existing theoretical and conceptual frameworks and 
assumptions to highlight key literary contributions and identify gaps and limitations. In 
particular, it contributes to discussions surrounding issues of governance and transition 
pathways. Importantly, I explore sustainable transitions by including social justice 
dimensions, and include a focus on actors and their agency to offer new insights into low 
carbon and equitable urban transitions and the tensions and barriers encountered in practice. 
As such, I operationalise a multi-scalar governance perspective and in turn move on from 
certain weaknesses of existing frameworks e.g. Multi-actor Perspective (Avelino & 
Wittmayer, 2016) and Multi-Level Perspective of socio-technical transitions (Geels, 2005). 
By engaging with perspectives of lock-in, materiality, path creation and ownership, I 
interrogate the approaches and pathways to a decarbonised and equitable transitions. From 
my conclusions in Chapter 7, I enhance urban transition understandings and make a 
distinctive contribution to sustainable and just transitions research by bringing these 
literatures together in a particular urban sustainability transition context in a UK setting. 
Through the culmination of these concepts and avenues of research, I conceptualise 
sustainable transitions as embedded in a model of decarbonisation, but which are also 
importantly shaped, constrained and contested by political, economic and social processes, 
and which seek to transform current patterns of social inequality and exclusion. In addition, 
this thesis is particularly valuable by examining urban transitions across sectors in a single 
integrated city case study. By adopting a cross-sectoral approach, this research offers a 
holistic view of urban sustainability since empirical studies, to date, are often restricted to 
examining one specific sector or domain (e.g. De Laurentis, 2012; Durrant et al. 2018; 
Hodson & Marvin, 2012).  
1.4. THESIS STRUCTURE   
This thesis is comprised of seven chapters, each serving a contribution to achieving the 
overall aim and objectives of this research. In this introductory chapter, I have provided a 
background to the research context, that is, the governance of low carbon and just urban 




I then follow this with an introduction to the research aims and objectives, methodological 
approach, thesis contributions and thesis structure.  
In Chapter 2, I set out the conceptual framework underpinning this research by identifying 
key literary contributions and theoretical frameworks for understanding sustainable 
transitions, in addition to existing gaps and limitations within these which this research aims 
to fulfil. I have structured this chapter by critically discussing the four main themes in turn 
that comprise the conceptual framework: multi-level governance in sustainable transitions; 
cities in sustainable transitions; justice and inclusion in sustainable transitions; and 
approaches and pathways in sustainable transitions. I discuss the core concepts, each of 
which contribute to my conceptual framing and which I use to interrogate the empirical 
material of this research, and in doing so draw upon a wide range of academic literature.  
In Chapter 3, I detail the methodology of this thesis and set out the underpinning research 
philosophy which is predominantly from a pragmatic and interpretivist standpoint that seeks 
to understand the practice of sustainable urban trajectories through agents’ understandings 
and actions on the ground. It is pragmatic and interpretivist with the aim of understanding 
sustainable urban trajectories in practice by using combined methods. In this chapter, I 
introduce the rationale for the qualitative methodology through a single case study strategy 
using the city of Nottingham, and explain the different methods of data collection, such as 
interviews, secondary data sources and observational research and site-specific visits.  This 
is followed by a discussion of how I coded and analysed research using a grounded theory 
approach. In the next section, I consider the research ethics in addition to researcher 
subjectivity, positionality and reflectivity. Finally, I critically reflect upon the research 
design by providing an account of conducting research of sustainable transitions in practice.   
In Chapter 4, I provide the first empirical chapter for this research and utilise a multi-level 
perspective to discuss policy surrounding low carbon and equitable transitions, which also 
allows me to provide material as a contextual backdrop to the subsequent chapters. First, I 
offer an overview of developments in international policymaking, where I discuss in turn the 
uneven localisation of Sustainable Development Goals, weakness of legally-binding targets, 
and belated attention to justice elements. Second, I examine the national governance of 
climate change policy in the UK, then discuss the unsupportive and uncoordinated nature of 
this policy environment for achieving key targets, the lack of ambitious targets, and implicit 




policymaking in the UK, I focus in on Nottingham and examine the uneven climate policy 
between Nottingham’s local authorities, unequal climate policy within Nottinghamshire 
County Councils, and piecemeal reference to justice dimensions. I conclude that across 
multiple-levels (that is, international, national and local) climate policy, there is a weakness 
of targets and subsequent uneven and fragmented policy whilst having inadequate attention 
to justice.  
In Chapter 5, I present the second empirical chapter of this study and detail the ways in 
which sustainable transitions have been progressed in Nottingham. In this chapter, I first 
consider the type of local authority and subsequent political capacity of the local authority 
which is aiding Nottingham. Second, I examine the agency of local government actors for 
progressing sustainable urban transitions. Third, I pay attention to the role of path creation 
for governing urban trajectories in the Nottingham context. Finally, I explore the ways in 
which ownership has impacted local government capacity for shaping decarbonised and 
equitable transitions. Using a cross-sectoral approach, I identify initiatives and schemes 
which have been delivered on-the-ground, and which can be considered as facilitating low 
carbon and just transitions at the urban scale through municipal governance, leading to the 
provision of low carbon and affordable energy and transport. I conclude that from 
Nottingham’s case: firstly, the type of local authority of urban areas influences political 
capacity to enact transitions;  secondly, agency is highly contingent upon individual and 
collective local government actors; thirdly, path creation, lock-in and self-reinforcement has 
had a significant role in the implementation of low carbon urban equitable trajectories; and 
finally, municipal ownership of Nottingham’s assets has been imperative for political 
capacity and implementation of sustainable transitions.  
In Chapter 6, I provide the final empirical chapter for this research by focussing on the 
barriers which are experienced in practice when implementing low carbon and equitable 
transitions in Nottingham. Using a multi-actor and multi-level perspective, I first consider 
the barriers experienced by multiple actors that are arising from a national level which I 
contend are as a result of national austerity, ineffective regulation and government 
intervention, lack of direction and uncertainty, and government ineffectiveness in addressing 
social inequality. Next, I consider the barriers arising at the local level which are experienced 
by a host of actors and which impede effective urban governance. These obstacles are 
considered to be multi-faceted, that is, economic, political and cultural, due to competing 




behavioural change barriers. I conclude that agency and capacity of urban level actors can 
appropriately be categorised by firstly, national level barriers, which are predominantly 
economic, political, institutional and socio-economic, and dramatically impede urban actors 
at the local scale; and secondly local level barriers, which are more context-specific and 
highlight the localised day-to-day barriers experienced, such as economic, political, socio-
cultural and behavioural change barriers.  
In Chapter 7, I offer a concluding chapter to this thesis by providing a summary and synthesis 
of the main research findings and the ways in which the research questions have been 
answered. Furthermore, I provide some final reflections on the implications this research 
may have for policymaking regarding sustainable urban transitions.  
In this chapter, I have introduced the thesis as a whole by providing a background to the 
research context of the global climate emergency, the synergistic relationship between 
climate change and inequalities, and the governance of urban low carbon and equitable 
transitions, particularly in the UK. I have outlined the research aim and objectives, the main 
contributions of this research, and the thesis structure. This chapter has presented the 
background context which is important for understanding sustainable inclusive transitions, 






UNDERSTANDING SUSTAINABLE INCLUSIVE 
URBAN TRANSITIONS 
 
2.0. INTRODUCTION  
Sustainable transitions are above all an inherently political challenge and there has been a 
growth of debate surrounding who is responsible for their implementation, where sustainable 
transitions should occur, in what ways they should be equitable and inclusive, and the ways 
in which they should be delivered (e.g. Bulkeley et al. 2013; Haarstad, 2016; Hodson & 
Marvin, 2010). Such discourse has developed into a burgeoning field of research which 
argues for a more thorough examination of the governance of sustainable and equitable 
transitions and actor agency, the spatial dimensions of transitions, and the approaches and 
pathways used to achieve sustainable urban trajectories.  
This chapter details the overarching theoretical and conceptual themes for understanding 
low carbon and equitable urban transitions. In doing so, I establish the theoretical and 
conceptual framing which informs this thesis, and the ways in which it is useful for 
considering the empirical findings outlined in Chapters 4, 5 and 6. More specifically, I 
critically engage with debates on the multi-scalar governance of sustainable trajectories, 
urban transitions, discourse regarding the inclusivity of transitions, and approaches and 
pathways in practice. This is through a critical analysis of current sustainable transitions 
literature and the aforementioned themes which are helpful for understanding the 
Nottingham case study.  
This chapter is divided into five parts; I begin with introducing multi-level governance in 
sustainable transitions (the first core theme of this research). This has been subject to debate 
and within recent years there has been a shift to incorporate the different jurisdictional 
boundaries, the multiple levels of institutions, and the plurality of actors involved in 
sustainable transitions into theoretical frameworks (such as the Multi-Level Perspective of 
Socio-Technical Transitions by Geels (2005) and Multi-Actor Perspective by Avelino and 




their approaches to actors and agency, and therefore I provide a closer consideration of the 
conceptual themes of actors (such as state, non-state and network governance) alongside the 
concepts of agency and capacity.   
In the next section, I draw attention to the scale of transitions and consider arguments of 
where and at what scale sustainable transitions should occur (the second core theme of this 
research). In doing so, I highlight the ‘city’ as a space which has become a focus for 
managing sustainable transitions, ranging from informal and restrictive governance to 
strategic and purposive action by municipal actors in particular. By conceptualising the city 
as an inter-related, fluid and complex assemblage rather than a nested and bounded political 
territory, I emphasise the changeable nature of cities and the governance of municipal actors 
within this space (e.g. Bulkeley et al. 2013). I reflect upon economic measures imposed from 
the national level, such as austerity, and reiterate the importance of maintaining a multi-
scalar approach to urban transitions. In view of this, I examine the concept of austerity 
urbanism and its effect on sustainable trajectories in the contemporary setting.  
Following this, I explore justice and inclusion in sustainable transitions (the third core 
research theme). In this section, I argue the ways in which sustainable urban transitions can 
be equitable and facilitate more inclusive processes, particularly during times of growing 
socio-economic inequality more broadly. The consideration of justice and inclusion has been 
largely omitted from mainstream theoretical frameworks for sustainable transitions (e.g. 
Hodson & Marvin, 2012). In light of this, I examine the conceptual frameworks for 
advancing understandings of justice in sustainable transitions, such as energy justice and 
transport justice, and the ways in which they are constructive for analysing low carbon urban 
trajectories.  
In the fourth section, I focus on the processes and implementation of sustainable transitions 
in practice (the fourth core research theme). I examine the ways in which their trajectories 
can be supported or constrained by urban materiality, that is, the reciprocal and complex 
relationship between human and non-human agents. The main considerations which are 
useful for understanding these processes are the concepts of path-dependency, lock-in and 
path creation, which highlight the temporal aspects of agency and the place-based legacies 
of complex infrastructural systems on managing present and future sustainable urban 




Finally, I offer a conclusion that by considering national austerity as a contextual backdrop, 
the examination of governance and urban actors is fundamental for considering sustainable 
and just transitions at the urban scale, which are exposed to elements of lock-in, path-
dependency and path creation and in turn can impede their progress.  
2.1. MULTI-LEVEL GOVERNANCE IN SUSTAINABLE 
TRANSITIONS  
The notion of climate change governance is broadly understood to be the range of actors 
(state and non-state) and forms (such as regulatory standards and carbon pricing) involved 
in climate change mitigation and adaptation (Meadowcroft, 2009). It is a key theme in 
sustainable transitions literature, yet remains highly contested with numerous meanings and 
implications through a variety of academic disciplines. To date, progress for the mitigation 
of climate change is considered to be insufficient on a global scale. With this in mind, 
scholars have drawn attention to novel, more integrated, progressive and effective 
governance 8  approaches to address present-day climate policy and action (Cole, 2015; 
Jordan et al. 2015). 
The notion of ‘multi-level governance’ is particularly significant in examining sustainable 
transitions and is therefore the first key theme of this research, as shown in Figure 2.1. The 
concept of multi-level governance (originally utilised in the context of the European Union 
[EU] to highlight multiple decision-making levels) has recently been drawn upon by scholars 
to examine sustainable transitions (Hickman et al. 2011). Broadly speaking, there are two 
types of multi-level governance which are adopted for sustainable transition thinking 
(Gustavsson et al. 2009).  
The first type of multi-level governance is associated with government as the central 
governing authority and differentiates between administrative units (structuration levels) and 
                                                 
8 Assessing the ‘effectiveness’ of climate governance has been subject to a proliferation of debate of the 
normative ideals of ‘good’ governance (e.g. Castan Broto & Westman, 2020; Dzebo, 2019; Mitchell, 2008). 
For the purposes of this thesis, the effectiveness of climate governance is generally understood as the extent to 
which initiatives, outputs and outcomes have contributed to reaching objectives, commonly referred to as goal 
attainment. This can be influenced by factors such as the behaviour of actors and their interests, the policies 
and performance of an initiative, the shaping of a system of rules and rule-making and the extent of 





is interested in the interaction between these levels. Such a view is considered ‘state-centric’ 
and useful for investigating state action, particularly the interaction and coordination 
between these levels, such as ‘vertical’ processes (which are structured by formal 
jurisdictions and hierarchical set of governance institutions), and ‘horizontal’ processes 
(which function between departments or institutions) (Haarstad, 2016).  
 
Figure 2.1: Conceptual Framework  
 
The second type of multi-level governance is a result of recent discourse that has emerged 
surrounding ‘new’ modes of governance arrangements, which are less hierarchical, less 
linear and less formal. Instead, such arrangements are dominated by networks between 
private and public actors across levels of social organisation (Gustavvson et al. 2009). In 




nation-states, this ‘new’ governance approach takes into consideration and gives importance 
to the diversity of actors, such as sub and non-state actors, which co-ordinate over and across 
various scales (Emelianoff, 2014; Hickman et al. 2017). These concepts are therefore 
important by highlighting a more nuanced and relational geography to governance, and 
emphasise that configurations are produced through the relationships which actors engage 
and negotiate from different contexts which they are embedded within (Bouzarovski & 
Haarstad, 2018). Importantly, the politics of scale is not fundamentally about scale itself, but 
scalar politics are instead constructed out of the wider processes and institutionalised 
practices, that are themselves differentially scaled and therefore subject to contestation 
between various social actors, movements and organisations. This continuous renegotiation 
and reterritorialization means that discourse, contentious politics and power are central to 
these processes (Bouzarovski & Haarstad, 2018; MacKinnon, 2001; Massey, 2007). In other 
words, the concept of scale is a helpful analytical tool for considering the level at which 
negotiations take place, for whom decisions are made, and the territories across which 
agency is being sought (Coe & Jordhus-Lier, 2010). 
Consequently, scholars (e.g. Avelino & Wittmayer, 2016; Geels, 2005) have sought to 
theorise the governance of sustainable transitions, and incorporate the different jurisdictional 
boundaries, the multiple levels of institutions and plurality of actors into theoretical 
frameworks. This has resulted in several different theoretical frameworks across multiple 
disciplines and it is not within the scope of this thesis to discuss each and every theoretical 
framework in turn9. Rather, there are two theoretical frameworks which I find particularly 
insightful for this research, the Multi-Level Perspective of Socio-Technical Systems and 
Multi-actor Perspective, as considered next.  
2.1.1. Theoretical Frameworks of Sustainable Transitions  
The Multi-Level Perspective of socio-technical transitions (MLP) is a well-established 
sustainable transitions framework that is particularly noteworthy. Firstly, this framework 
emphasises energy systems as complex arrangements of socio-technical systems which are 
comprised of, and co-produced by social and technical elements, which include technical 
systems, technology and materials, political and legal institutions, processes of design and 
                                                 
9 Markard et al. (2012) provide a useful overview of additional sustainable transition theoretical and conceptual 
frameworks which include Strategic Niche Management (e.g. Rip & Kemp, 1998), Transition Management 




social arrangements. Secondly, it seeks to conceptualise the overall dynamic of socio-
technical transitions through applying three different ‘levels’: technological niche (micro-
level), the socio-technical regime (meso-level), and the socio-technical landscape (macro-
level) (Geels, 2005), as shown in Figure 2.2. Through applying these concepts and levels, 
the non-linear process of transitions is highlighted and subsequently placed into a hierarchy. 
 
Figure 2.2:  Multi-Level Perspective on socio-technical transitions (Geels, 2012, p.474).  
 
To expand, the technological niche (micro) level is considered to comprise a space in which 
radical innovations or experimentation can develop (Markard et al. 2012). These places are 
considered to be less subject to market and regulation influences, dominant institutions and 
the status quo. As such, it allows for learning processes and social networks to evolve to 
support processes of innovation and radical alternatives (Gaziulusoy & Twomey, 2015; 
Whitmarsh, 2012). Pressures at the niche level gain momentum overtime and eventually 
compete with established technologies, build legitimacy for alternative environmental 




the regime and cause transitions to occur. According to Pesch (2015) and Geels and Schot 
(2007), human agency is most recognisable at the niche level than at any other level due to 
the level of influence it has (such as articulation of expectations and visions). This in turn 
has stimulated notions that niches (i.e. the space in which radical innovations or 
experimentation can develop) are regarded as the most probable way for stimulating 
transitions (Fudge et al. 2016; Pesch, 2015).  
The socio-technical regime is a level forming the dominant structure for which a technology 
is embedded, and which subsequently operates current practices, routines, rules, interests 
and belief systems (Geels & Schot, 2007). This (meso) level is a critical dimension in the 
development of the MLP theory, through acting as both an inhibiting factor reducing variety 
and deviations during the early stages of a transition, or acting as an enabling factor (Lawhon 
& Murphy, 2012).  
The landscape level is determined by the macro-level political, economic, cultural, 
environmental and social developments that take place in the context of the transition, by 
exerting pressure or stimulating transitions through creating windows of opportunity for 
novelties on existing regimes, thereby contributing to the socio-technical transition theory 
(Geels & Schot, 2007). According to Fischer and Newig (2016), actors at the landscape level 
are contentious, since such macro-level developments are not attributed to individuals 
directly, but rather external factors as a whole. Broadly speaking, relationships between 
actors, structures and working practices become more aggregated towards higher levels, 
which also have slower dynamics (Hecher et al. 2016). The influence of changes at the 
landscape level on actors’ role is therefore an important factor to consider.   
As a framework, the MLP has several merits and is valuable for this research because of: 
first, the emphasis on non-linearity of transitions; second, its incorporation of society which 
is lacking in some other frameworks, such as Technological Innovation Systems (Bergek et 
al. 2008; Carlsson & Stankiewiecz, 1991); and third, the landscape level within the 
framework allows for contingencies such as external shocks to be considered (Geels & 
Schot, 2007). As such, the MLP has proved to be valuable for empirical studies of low carbon 
urban transitions. 
For example, Whitmarsh (2012) investigates the functionality of the MLP to transport and 




stakeholder analysis, particularly since the MLP differentiates regime and niche actors who 
may behave differently. Whitmarsh et al. (2009) note in their research on mobility that niche 
actors were critical in reframing problems, ensured that alternatives to the status quo were 
considered within analysis and decision-making, and favoured modal shift and demand 
management policies. On the other hand, regime actors preferred technological innovation, 
and therefore these differences which can provide impetus to change the system, is a key 
insight.  
Moloney and Horne (2015) agree that the MLP is a useful framework for understanding 
socio-technical transitions, but add that it is most useful when it is supplemented with ideas 
of social change and governance processes, including the role of intermediaries (the role of 
intermediaries is discussed in greater detail in Section 2.1.3). Through assessing multi-level 
governance in Australia, Moloney and Horne (2015) find that low carbon urban transitions 
are characterised through ad-hoc, divergent actions, rather than a coherent multi-level 
governance approach. They assert that multi-spatial governance is emerging in a nascent 
form via coalitions of organisations and actors, which in turn are helping to drive changes at 
both the niche and regime scales through energy infrastructure projects and urban retrofitting 
(p.2450).  
Finally, Fudge et al. (2016) employ the MLP during their study of energy governance of 
local authorities in the UK. Whilst they consider that their empirical results demonstrate a 
more complex relationship between niche and regime level than what is represented by the 
MLP, local authorities mostly act as regime actors in transitions, meaning that some local 
authorities have challenged the dominant regime and become more active players in energy 
governance. Fudge et al. (2016) found that there are possibilities for local institutions to act 
as catalysts in sustainable transitions and develop as niches in certain areas, however barriers 
exist at the regime level for influencing energy agendas, for example, the lack of political 
influence and clear guidelines at the national government level, which is a particular issue 
in the contemporary UK context. These studies therefore highlight the multiple and varied 
agency of actors at niche and regime levels, and the ability of local institutions to progress 
transitions, thus clearly having a valuable contribution for understanding governance.   
However, the MLP has been critiqued as having a lack of attention to the role of agency with 
regard to different actors or social groups (Fischer & Newig, 2016; Pesch, 2015; Smith et al. 




who creates and benefits from these decisions, reinforces the notion that socio-political 
aspects of the MLP are particularly narrow (Lawhon & Murphy, 2012), and the wider 
exclusion of justice persists (as noted in Section 2.3.1).  Klitkou et al. (2015) criticise the 
framework in its approach to carbon lock-in (a concept used to describe the process of 
carbon-intensive, fossil fuel-based technological systems persisting over time, and discussed 
further in Section 2.4.3). Klitkou et al. (2015) argue that the MLP does not provide sufficient 
explanation of the specific mechanisms through which lock-ins become manifested, such as 
institutional or technological lock-in.  
A further criticism is that too much emphasis is placed on technological niches as the 
principal factor for regime change (Berkhout et al. in Elzen et al. 2004). Additionally, Foxon 
(2011, p.2261) commends the model for providing ‘many useful insights, [but] it tends to 
neglect economic variables that can significantly influence transitions and which are central 
to policy analyses’. Foxon (2011) therefore advocates for a co-evolutionary framework to 
be incorporated which would seek to account for both mutual stability and dynamic 
interactions between systems.  
The MLP theory is further critiqued for having a simplistic sense of scale, place and space. 
This can limit understandings of sustainable transitions and the conflicts and tensions 
experienced by the economic, institutional, social and cultural territories in which 
sustainable transitions pathways are embedded and manipulated (Coenen & Truffer, 2012; 
Gibbs & O'Neill, 2014; Smith et al. 2005; Smith et al. 2010). In addition, the language that 
is used in the MLP such as niche, regime and landscape can lead to issues with 
operationalising these key concepts and applying them empirically, especially when thinking 
of scale (e.g. Bouzarovski & Haarstad, 2018). In response to these critiques, Geels and Schot 
(2007) attempt to refine their model and consequently it has been evolving over recent years. 
Therefore, whilst this framework has been developed to aid the understanding of a wide 
range of historical and hypothetical transitions (Bolton & Foxon, 2010; Hoppe et al. 2016), 
the broad nature of this framework and lack of aforementioned themes are restrictive.  
Furthermore, Avelino and Wittmayer (2016) have developed the Multi-actor Perspective 
(MaP) to address the research gap for a systematic understanding of actors in transition 
processes. In this framework, the authors usefully clarify distinctions and levels of 
aggregations of actor categorisations of both individuals and organisations. In doing so, 




vs private, and profit vs. non-profit), as shown below in Figure 2.3, Figure 2.4 and Figure 
2.5.  
Particularly for this thesis, this heuristic framework is valuable by distinguishing the role of 
actors and their sectors, thereby addressing the complex and various range of actors into a 
clear and comprehensible framework. Despite the advantages of this framework, it can be 
argued that it oversimplifies the complex relationship between these actors by having a too 
rigid structure and is therefore limited in its approach for representing inter-actor dynamics. 
In light of this, it is important to examine the agency and capacity of actors more closely, as 
described next.  
Figure 2.3: Multi-actor Perspective: level of sectors (Avelino & Wittmayer, 2016, 













Figure 2.5: Multi-actor Perspective: levels of organisation (Avelino & Wittmayer, 2016, 
p.638).  
 
2.1.2. Actors, Agency and Capacity  
Whilst there are a number of theoretical frameworks which develop a whole-systems 
understanding of sustainable transitions, the role of actors has received insufficient attention 
within dominant concepts and frameworks (Pesch, 2015). As such, scholars (e.g. Avelino & 
Wittmayer, 2016; Geels, 2005) have utilised the multi-level approach to emphasise the 
multiplicity of actors governing transitions.  
There are numerous studies which focus on the types of actors (i.e. the individuals and 
collectives as participants in attempts to prevent, sustain, or generate change) and their 
agency (i.e. their behaviour) in isolation (Fischer & Newig, 2016). For the benefit of 




broadly categorised into three separate types: state actors, non-state actors, and networks and 
intermediaries, as examined in turn next.  
STATE ACTORS  
State actors can be categorised into those at various political levels, such as national, regional 
and local. The latter, i.e. local municipalities, have become a popular subject of analysis at 
the city scale and are widely recognised to have a key role in sustainable transitions (e.g. 
Bulkeley & Kern, 2006; Busch & McCormick, 2014). There is an established collection of 
studies which take into account local government roles in sustainable transitions and are 
therefore valuable for this research and the understanding of state agency and capacity.  
For example, local governments are considered to work as ‘nodes’ in the wider system of 
climate governance (e.g. Franzen, 2013). Recent work by Kern and Alber (2009) and 
Nagorny-Koring (2019) has usefully categorised climate mitigation activities enacted by 
municipalities into different modes: self-governing; governing through enabling; governing 
by provision; governing by authority (Kern & Alber, 2009); governing by numbers; 
governing by experiments and governing by diffusion (Nagorny-Koring, 2019). Such an 
analytical tool is helpful particularly for conducting comparisons between local governments 
and assessing their roles within climate governance.  
As well as identifying the practice of municipalities, the investigation of policy is an 
important component for identifying local government’s implementation of climate 
mitigation strategies. A recent international survey by Castan Broto and Bulkeley (2013) 
contends that urban actors are the most active participants in carbon governance with relation 
to experimenting with new policy responses, in comparison to national or international 
actors. Such findings demonstrate that a new urban energy governance is evident in some 
case studies at the local level, both through policy implementation and more practical forms 
of governance (Rutherford & Jaglin, 2015).  
Whilst such contributions are useful for understanding transitions, the existing categories of 
actors (e.g. ‘frontrunners’, ‘champions’, ‘policy entrepreneurs’, ‘green entrepreneurs’) are 
diverse. Although there has been a focus on developing typologies as opposed to 
investigating their transformation roles (O’Neill & Gibbs, 2016), there are to date no 
universally-recognised classifications of actors within the sustainable transitions literature, 




transitions. Furthermore, it is observed that local governments are heavily dependent on 
other levels of government, e.g. regional or national actors, and it is therefore important to 
include the investigation of these roles, in other words, using a multi-scalar lens.  
Interestingly, Franzen (2013) reflects that the hierarchy of jurisdictions are bound to 
geographical space, therefore cities are inhibited to take action outside their municipal areas. 
Such findings are significant for investigating urban low carbon transitions. First, this 
reinforces the importance of a multi-level governance approach to avoid a static image of 
agency and the neglect of other actors’ involvement in sustainable urban transitions, whilst 
second, this emphasises the ways in which political levels can impact on actor capacity for 
sustainable transitions. In addition, Coe and Jordhus-Lier (2010) importantly assert that 
agency not only refers to collective action, but also refers to individual action, which can be 
closely related and shaped by the spaces and scales that actors inhabit in an uneven and 
culturally differentiated world.  This fluid, varied agency of actors across multi-scalar levels 
is therefore related to and contested because of the broader and differentially scaled 
processes and institutionalised practices of such actors (MacKinnon, 2010), which is critical 
for understanding the governance of low carbon and equitable transitions.  
The empirical studies of actors and their agency at national levels is scarce within urban low 
carbon transitions10 (Fischer & Newig, 2016; Willis, 2017), with the focus predominantly 
on policy documents and plans with regard to national level implementation. An interesting 
contribution of this type of policy analysis is the study of visions and priorities which are 
‘translated’ through national policy and Hodson and Marvin (2010, 2012) examine whether 
this is in fact adopted and responded to on a city-level. Hodson and Marvin (2010, 2012) 
make useful contributions in terms of identifying national priorities around energy and 
climate change, by reflecting upon the messy politics of urban responses and the dominance 
of national and economic priorities for decarbonisation transitions in Manchester.  Cochrane 
(2019) reinforces the tensions between wider visions and more localised ambitions whilst 
discussing investments in transport infrastructure and affordable housing in the UK, and 
highlights the ways in which governing processes and existing local government boundaries 
are being reworked and redefined. Clearly, whilst these kinds of agency are on different 
                                                 
10 Although it is acknowledged that this may be difficult for empirical research due to the nature and feasibility 




political levels, they nonetheless can influence local actor agency and alter governance and 
subsequent urban transition pathways.   
Furthermore, while some progress has been made researching multi-level actors and their 
agency at the urban level, there remains confusion and diverging conceptions regarding the 
respective roles of national and local governments in terms of what leadership and regulation 
in the energy field should be, and how they should be coordinated. Notably, even when local 
agency has been created and provisions have been made to give local authorities capacity 
for shaping urban low carbon transitions, there are often dimensions on a national level (e.g. 
grid constraints, policy, funding constraints) which simply cannot be surpassed without the 
involvement and cooperation of national actors (Jaglin, 2013).  
It is important therefore to reconnect or re-embed notions of agency into wider spatial and 
scalar considerations, that is, the economic, political and societal systems which surround 
actors (Coe & Jordhus-Lier, 2010; Meadowcroft, 2011). This point is echoed by Amundsen 
et al. (2010) who demonstrate in their study of municipalities in Norway that a key barrier 
to climate change adaptation is the relationship between local and national governments. 
They argue for a framework whereby national government ‘gives a clear role to 
municipalities through setting goals, creating regulations, and financing adaptation 
processes for the local governments to implement’ (p.286). In addition, Fuchs and Hinderer 
(2014) take a critical stance and argue that sustainable energy transitions are not following 
a master-plan nor coordinated from a national level because existing plans do not state how 
and by whom and with what technologies renewable energy goals should be achieved. 
Instead, ‘upper political levels […] pose severe constraints for the implementation of local 
transition initiatives’ (p.4).  Such critiques are significant by highlighting the lack of capacity 
and support which limit delivering a multi-level approach in practice (Jaglin, 2003 in 
Rutherford & Coutard 2014). These contributions reiterate two important points. Firstly, it 
is important to consider the extent to which national governments are enabling or hindering 
low carbon transitions at urban scales, and the role of policy and strategy for delivering 
sustainable transitions. Second, attention should be given to the ways in which the agency 
of state actors across different political scales can be constrained. It is therefore valuable to 





Non-state actors (also used interchangeably with ‘civil society’) is not solely limited to 
individual, household and community-level organisations, but has become a term used to 
describe a wide array of non-governmental and not-for-profit organisations (commonly 
known as ‘third sector organisations’). Third sector organisations are generally separate 
entities to government and private bodies. They are interesting on the whole since they have 
a close proximity to citizens and offer unique opportunities for promoting behavioural 
change, policymaking and the potential to innovate. As such, there are a growing number of 
studies of the role of non-state actors in urban low carbon transitions (e.g. Buchs et al. 2012; 
Hall et al. 2015; Nasiritousi, 2016).  
A particularly valuable study for this research is that completed by Buchs et al. (2012) which 
provides a review of the role of third sector organisations with regard to pro-environmental 
behavioural change. Whilst acknowledging that behaviour change is difficult to observe and 
measure, the study does find evidence of positive changes in citizens’ day-to-day activities, 
for example recycling or energy-saving activities. Buchs (2014) develops this notion by 
comparing and contrasting the effects of direct and indirect involvement of environmental 
third sector organisations, particularly since a body of literature suggests that informal, 
voluntary behavioural change (as encouraged by environmental organisations) is potentially 
more effective long-term than changes that follow from formal government intervention 
(p.1003). Using the case study of the UK, Buchs (2014) confirms that direct forms of 
engagement with the public are effective in carbon-reducing behaviours. However, carbon-
reducing behaviours are not simply associated with the involvement of environmental 
organisations, but were also strongly correlated with indicators of social disadvantage e.g. 
low education, income and employment status. This is notable by illustrating that 
environmental organisations are engaging with those citizens who are sufficiently able to 
participate in high-carbon activities initially therefore raises a justice dimension as well. 
Nevertheless, this demonstrates that third sector organisations are fulfilling a necessary role 
by engaging with citizens at the local level to promote environmental behavioural change, 
though it is worth noting that different third sector organisations do this on different terms.  
In addition to the consideration of third sector organisations, the private sector (also referred 
to as market actors) is another significant actor to consider in sustainable transitions. The 




which has been subject to much debate surrounding governance (Pattberg & Stripple, 2008). 
This is particularly in response to the neoliberalisation of governance (i.e. the ‘hollowing 
out’ of the state in environmental protection), such as the privatisation of water and energy 
in many developed countries (Reed & Bruyneel, 2010). Such liberalisation and privatisation 
to date has left the energy market dominated by large multinational private corporations, 
which has led to the presence of incumbent actors and oligopolies, for example the ‘Big 
Six’11 energy companies in the UK which supply circa 95 per cent of domestic and 80 per 
cent of commercial consumers (Hall et al. 2015; Lockwood, 2013). This strong market-
oriented approach to energy was advocated for the perceived possibilities of broader 
improvements of services, greater investment in infrastructure assets, increased research and 
development, greater economic efficiency and lower energy prices, and socially optimal 
outcomes (Bolton & Foxon, 2015; Pond, 2006).  
However, the private sector’s involvement in the energy market and the legacy of 
privatisation on delivering sustainable transitions today is subject to much criticism. Chiefly, 
it is argued that energy privatisation has resulted in a lack of investment and research, 
development and innovation, and was orientated around profit-driven motives of a narrow 
set of financial and vested interests which consequently pushed costs onto consumers, 
increasing fuel poverty (Pollitt, 2012). Furthermore, Hall et al. (2015) criticise private 
energy companies and the inability of consumers to comment on how surplus profits are 
reinvested, which evokes justice considerations. They refer to this anti-democratic 
organisation as a ‘carbon web’, meaning ‘the set of legal, cultural, financial and government 
institutions that enable them and prevent democratic control’ (Hall et al. 2015, p.4) thereby 
linking in to discourse of lock-in, dependency and power relations (as discussed further in 
Section 2.5).  
Such studies not only highlight the importance of identifying the role of non-state, private 
actors in present-day sustainable transitions, but the ways in which past activity can 
influence future trajectories. Yet, the studies of private actors in energy transitions are 
generally in their infancy (Castan Broto & Westman, 2020). Whilst they shed light on the 
financial significance of private actors, they do not break away from the neoliberal framing 
of debates, nor investigate other roles of private actors, nor additional dimensions of their 
                                                 
11 The ‘Big Six’ are the UK’s largest energy suppliers which include Scottish and Southern Electric (SSE), 




agency (e.g. increased knowledge, skills, innovation), therefore revealing a substantial gap 
within low carbon transitions literature. The combination of state and non-state actors is an 
alternative form of governance for sustainable transitions, as described next.  
NETWORKS AND INTERMEDIARIES   
In the context of energy transitions, network governance can be understood as: 
a shift from traditional hierarchical governance where the state is the regulator, to 
looser forms of governance, where private actors such as businesses and NGOs, 
increasingly participate in policymaking (Khan, 2013, p.134).  
Network governance is often comprised of social exchanges and characterised by common 
aspirations. As such, it can be viewed as an example of a ‘new’ form of governance 
arrangement and configuration that is witnessed within sustainable transitions, whilst also 
relates to the different ways of considering the geographies through which governance 
operates.  
A particularly prominent example of network governance and ‘new’ forms of governance in 
the energy sector is the role of Energy Service Companies (ESCo). Using a UK perspective, 
Hannon and Bolton (2015) discuss the collaboration of local authorities, private sector and 
third sector organisations in the energy sector in the emerging form of ESCos, which are 
organisations which provide customers with energy services and relate to the physical 
benefit, utility or good that consumers derive from energy (Hannon & Bolton, 2015). 
Crucially, ESCos are heralded for having strong environmental, economic and social well-
being dimensions to their development (e.g. reducing the effects of fuel poverty) since the 
nature of some ESCo energy networks (e.g. combined heat and power) is often more energy 
efficient and low carbon than conventional market-led energy supply from private 
companies that exist in the UK.  
Notably, local authorities have been commended for pursuing an active governance in the 
ESCo network arrangement, and as such has engaged scholars to consider sustainability 
transitions from a governance perspective. Hannon and Bolton (2015) usefully highlight that 
there are three common forms of networks which have emerged within ESCo models, that 
is, 1) Local Authority-owned ‘arm’s length’ model (an example is shown in Figure 2.6); 2) 














Figure 2.6: Local authority ‘arm’s length’ Energy Service Company (Hannon & 
Bolton, 2015, p.203). 
 
Cumbers (2012 in Cumbers & Hanna 2019, p.3) evaluates the effectiveness of various forms 
of non-private (state and non-state) collective ownership in terms of tackling climate change, 
decision making, and social and ecological justice principles, as shown in Table 2.1. Whilst 
there are merits and limitations for each of these models (these discussions are out-with the 
scope of this thesis), they are generally merited by stakeholders for predominantly sharing 
risk and allowing for strategic and coordinated control across actors with different priorities 
and structures. Although this is not investigated within this study, the authors comment on 
the contribution of network arrangements such as ESCos in meeting urban sustainable 
transition targets. Crucially, Yildiz et al. (2015) use the example of energy co-operatives to 
illustrate their role in renewable energy projects, and emphasise the variable ownership 
structures in place, in that they can be completely owned by communities (and additional 
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Key: FSO (Full state ownership); RSO (regional state ownership); PSO (partial state ownership); 
LMO (local/municipal state ownership); PC (producer competitive); CC (consumer competitive); 
EO (employee ownership)  
+ positive effect; - negative effect; = neutral 
Table 2.1: Evaluating effectiveness of public ownership forms (Cumbers, 2012, p.165). 
 
In addition, ‘intermediaries’ have emerged as a line of empirical enquiry for low carbon 
transitions. As defined by Hodson et al. (2013), these are similar to networks in that they are 
comprised of:  
a wide variety of organisations that includes government or semi-government energy 
agencies working at different scales of governances, non-governmental 




Intermediaries are involved in a diverse range of services such as: energy advice centres; 
consultancy; energy audits; project initiation, management, financing and coordination; 
training; education; and network-building (p.1405). As such, the agency of intermediaries is 
varied by the relational work that they undertake, which is fundamentally shaped, contested 
and negotiated by the wider socio and political relations and contexts (Van Veelen, 2019).  
The role of intermediaries has been closely examined with relation to socio-technical 
transitions and niche development (e.g. Bird & Barnes, 2014; Bush et al. 2017). On a 
national level application, Bush et al. (2017) apply the notion of intermediaries to district 
heating in the UK and assert that intermediaries facilitate knowledge sharing and have the 
capacity to build wider networks and systems which support innovations. Using a multi-
level approach, Bush et al. (2017) find that national intermediaries can be separated into 
those that work solely with local authorities and those which work with other actors, such as 
hospital or university energy managers, demonstrating a wide range of governing partners, 
as shown in Figure 2.7.  
Figure 2.7: Illustration of local, regional and national intermediary relationships (Bush 
et al. 2017, p.143).  
 
Furthermore, Bird and Barnes (2014) consider the role of intermediaries in community 
energy and the role intermediary organisations have in scaling-up community activity, again 




authors produce a useful typology of the roles of intermediaries in niche development, to 
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 Table 2.2: Roles of intermediaries in niche development (Bird & Barnes, 2014, p.210).  
 
Using the case study of Bristol, Bird and Barnes (2014) add to this debate by asserting that 




includes the development of shared projects, and facilitate the sharing of wider benefits 
across local areas through increased participation. As they stress (2014, p.218) 
‘Intermediaries …[represent] community energy beyond those already involved, providing 
a focal point of access for new entrants […] and being a conduit through which outside actors 
can engage’. This is a significant finding which suggests a more central agency for coalitions 
that go beyond state and non-state individuals by representing a collective of individuals 
seeking community energy. 
Critically, it is argued that such intermediary organisations are seeking to develop capacity 
at the urban scale to mobilise energy transitions and consequently play a role in ordering and 
defining relationships, which is particularly vital due to the number of actors and diverging 
interests (Hodson et al. 2013). Whilst intermediaries are variable between each other, they 
can be generally characterised: for example, through their mediating functions between 
production and consumption; between different priorities (e.g. different funding and social 
interests); and between different levels (e.g. city and SMEs, or household and local 
government). As such, Hodson et al. (2013) present a typology of the mode of urban energy 
intermediation which mediate between alternating priorities, responses and scales, as shown 













Figure 2.8: Conceptualising four modes of urban energy intermediation (Hodson et al. 
2013, p.1410).  
 
Using the case studies of London and Manchester, they support their typology to compare 
and illustrate the role of intermediaries in cities, as summarised in Table 2.3 below. The 
authors assert that such a comparison highlights not only:  
differential capacity and capability to act, but also a lack of integration of these 
different intermediary functions both within London and Manchester; a lack of 
integration which was relatively more apparent in Greater Manchester (Hodson et al. 
2013 p.1420).  
This study therefore usefully draws attention to the disparities of roles of intermediaries and 
other actors between cities, in addition to their uneven impact within cities. As 
aforementioned, the roles of multiple actors across geographical space is an important and 








Table 2.3: Comparing intermediaries in London and Manchester (Hodson et al. 2013, 
p.1419).  
 
2.2. CITIES AND SUSTAINABLE TRANSITIONS  
Unpacking the multiple ways of understanding multi-level governance has raised important 
considerations of the specific roles of various actors and their individual and collective 
agency in sustainable trajectories. Yet, arguments remain of the absence of space and place 
in theoretical frameworks (Coenen & Truffer, 2012; Smith et al. 2010) and the absence of 
cities in the MLP theory (Hodson &  Marvin, 2010). Echoing these arguments, scholars (e.g. 
Bridge et al. 2013; Calvert, 2016; Coenen et al. 2010; Truffer et al. 2015) vitally highlight 
a need to take a spatial turn and examine low carbon and inclusive energy transitions as a 
geographical process, which is fundamentally subject to reconfigurations of current social 
and economic patterns and activity.  
It is important to use a spatial and contextual lens to consider not only who is responsible 
for governing, but at what scales and where sustainable transitions should occur, and to 
highlight the constellations of relations that impact on particular localities. As such, there 
have been a growing number of studies which examine energy transitions at local and 
regional levels (e.g. Hansen & Coenen, 2015; Mattes et al. 2015; Rutherford & Coutard, 
2014). The municipal (urban) level is widely considered to be the most appropriate scale at 
which governance of low carbon transitions should be enacted, therefore the city in 
transitions is the second theme of this research.  
The importance of cities in transitions is primarily for two reasons: first, due to high energy 
consumption and population growth, urban areas are recognised to have an increased 
urgency for change (Fuenfschilling et al. 2019); and second, due to recent urbanisation 
which is expected to increase globally, it is at this political (municipal) level which is closest 
to many citizens. As a result, there have been a proliferation of studies specifically 
examining low carbon transitions at the urban scale and the governance processes which 
London Intermediary function Manchester 
High Strategic overview of system 
change 
Low 
National exemplar – 
high degree of 
autonomy 
Interrelationships across scales of 
governance 
Test-bed: dependent on centre 
High Embedded capacity to act Low 




occur (e.g. Bulkeley & Kern, 2006; Busch & McCormick, 2014; Kern & Alber, 2009). 
However, it is important to understand how cities are conceptualised in sustainable 
transitions and the ways in which external shocks at the national level (such as austerity 
measures) can impact sustainable urban trajectories. Therefore, together the notion of multi-
level governance and a scalar lens reiterate the importance of avoiding one scale of politics, 
and the importance of not constructing the local in isolation, but instead the connections 
across geographical divisions (Featherstone et al. 2020), as explored next.   
2.2.1. Conceptualising the ‘City’ in Sustainable Transitions 
The notion of ‘the city’ and ‘the urban’ is particularly problematic for researchers, since their 
very complexity, function and inherent changeability has varied throughout history, and 
continues to vary significantly across the world (Robinson, 2015). As Table 2.4 highlights, 
cities are frequently conceptualised from having certain characteristics, for example 
population size and density, and the morphological aspects of the city, such as the form or 
structure of land use or built environment, which can help delineate urban areas for example 
by use of satellite imagery (Seto et al. 2017). The prevailing activities and functions 
occurring within urban areas also impact the classification of cities, for example the 
emergence of ‘world cities’ which are urban areas that are becoming global in character and 
considered to be political, financial, technical and cultural centres (Clark & Moonen, 2016). 
These are referred to as the city’s ‘functional boundaries’, which can become blurred 
according to connections or interactions such as economic activity, commuting zones or per 
capita income (Seto et al. 2017). Furthermore, cities are often conceptualised as a political 
and administrative boundary or territory, representing one set of political actors, such as the 
local authority within the local authority’s administrative boundaries (Bulkeley et al. 2013; 












Cities as places where spatial distances are smaller as compared to regions or 
countries (Boschma, 2005; Coenen et al. 2012; Raven et al. 2012) 
Multiscalar 
interaction 
Cities as being nested in and constituting of different spatial scales and 
networks. Scales as actively constructed and interacted with, in ways which 
support actors in achieving their goals (Coenen et al. 2012; Nevens et al. 
2012; Coenen and Truffer, 2012).  
Multidomain 
interaction 
Cities as places where changes in different domains (e.g. energy, mobility, 
social care) come together and interact (Nevens et al. 2013).  
Personal 
proximity 
Cities as living environments in which people have personal, emotional and 
social stakes, including socially embedded relations and a level of trust 
(Related to the concept of social proximity by Boschma, 2005). 
Institutional 
proximity 
Cities share formal and informal institutions, including laws and rules as well 
as cultural norms and habits (Boschma, 2005).  
Table 2.4: Characteristics of the urban context (Wittmayer & Loorbach, 2016, p. X in 
Loorbach et al. 2016). 
 
Whilst these conceptualisations offer understandings of the city from a geographical and 
political perspective, they are rather limited for sustainable transitions research. More recent 
conceptualisations of the city have shifted beyond the notion that cities are ‘self-enclosed 
political [territories] within a nested hierarchy of geographical arenas contained within each 
other like so many Russian dolls’ (Brenner et al. 2003, p.1. in Bulkeley et al. 2013). Taking 
into account the multi-level and multi-actor governance of cities, the city can be considered 
as more inter-related, interwoven and complex, particularly because of globalisation, 
whereby the increased flow of information, capital and people has resulted in cities 
becoming more globally connected (Bulkeley et al. 2013; Loorbach et al. 2016). This has 
implications for considering multi-level governance, and consequently, there has been a shift 
in considering the ‘urban’ and its actors as ‘nodes’ in a wider system of climate governance 
across space, with differing forms of governing agency amongst local, regional and national 
governments within sustainable transitions (Gibbs & Lintz, 2016; Gibbs & O’Neill, 2017).  
Moreover, social relations in urban areas are bound up and entwined in social roles and 
responsibilities, complex power structures, social interests, conflicts and tensions of all 
citizens which may in turn affect sustainable transitions in urban areas (Bridge et al. 2013; 
Coenen & Truffer, 2012).  As a result, a particularly noteworthy conceptualisation is the city 
as an (urban) assemblage of infrastructures, economies, politics, and communities (Bulkeley 
et al. 2013; McFarlane, 2011). This idea therefore moves beyond the notion of the city with 
nested boundaries within bounded cartographic locations and units, and instead takes into 




economic, political and cultural connections, which aligns with the consideration of 
governance in more networked ways.  
As such, multiple and diverse networks for human and non-human actants are included 
within assemblages (Gailing & Moss, 2016) and both energy transitions and urban areas 
shape each other in co-evolutionary processes. Whilst there have been critiques with regard 
to the use of the term ‘assemblage’ within urban studies (Brenner et al. 2011), it nonetheless 
highlights: the complexity and fluidity of cities as a space and place which are shaped by 
human and non-human actants; historical contexts; and the presence of unequal structures of 
power, capital, discourse and groups (McFarlane, 2011). Therefore, these multiple 
conceptualisations of the city as a fluid, inter-related and complex area are essential for 
considering sustainable urban transitions, by emphasising the transient nature which is open 
to contestation and manipulation over time by a multitude of actors, all of whom have 
varying and complex processes and institutionalised practices operating over different scales 
(MacKinnon, 2010).   
2.2.2. The Role of the City in Sustainable Transitions  
The examination of cities in transitions has contributed to multi-level governance 
understandings of socio-technical systems, and Geels (2011, in Bulkeley et al. 2011) argues 
that cities can have three roles in technological transitions at the national scale. The first role 
is that cities and city governments can be viewed as primary actors; the second idea is that 
cities act as seedbeds and sites for innovations and early phases of transitions; and the third 
notion is that cities have a limited role in radical transitions, but are instead more focused on 
transformations of existing systems. Such understandings of cities having a role in low 
carbon transitions are useful by firstly, reiterating the degree of agency from actors. 
Secondly, this brings forth questions of the extent to which city actors are collectively able 
to strategically manage, reshape and change trajectories (Castan Broto, 2017; Fuenfschilling 
et al. 2019; Naess & Vogel, 2012). Thirdly, this opens up debate that cities not only have 
agency in sustainable transitions but that this can be variable, and therefore there can be a 
degree of diversity between urban sites (Gibbs & Lintz, 2016). Hodson and Marvin (2010, 
2012) emphasise the more strategic and purposive orientation of cities mitigating against 
climate change, and pose questions of the capacity of cities to shape or be shaped by 




An example of this is ‘municipal voluntarism’ and ‘strategic, low carbon urbanism’ as 
deemed by Bulkeley (2013 in Stewart et al. 2013). To expand, municipal voluntarism refers 
to voluntary (and potentially informal) activities of local authorities as a means of building 
capacity to address low carbon transitions, in comparison to strategic urbanism, which refers 
to the role of more formal city networks for governing climate change e.g. transnational 
municipal networks such as C40 Cities, Global Covenant of Mayors and Climate Alliance 
(Bulkeley et al. 2014; Hakelberg, 2014; Pattberg & Stripple, 2008).  
Importantly, whilst the concepts refer to an active engagement in urban climate governance 
and a nascent form of urban politics, again this is variable due to the diverse actors within 
the city and their capacity, and also influenced by the historical organisation of infrastructure 
provision, which may differ between cities (Bulkeley 2013 in Stewart et al. 2013; Hodson 
& Marvin, 2013). As previously noted, cities do not act in a vacuum but are subject to 
external forces (e.g. regulations, markets, and wider political constraints, all of which are 
also internally differentiated). A multi-level understanding stresses that the engagement of 
cities in sustainable transitions can be implicated by national level measures, as discussed 
next.  
2.2.3. Austerity Urbanism  
Since the aftermath of the global financial crisis of 2008, national governments worldwide 
have implemented a series of austerity programmes in measures argued to balance country 
deficits. These fiscal measures have been particularly prominent in the UK from having a 
particularly centralised fiscal arrangement and also a longer history of neoliberal policies in 
comparison to other European countries. These neoliberal ideologies are part of a broader 
domination over political and economic thinking, with aims to reduce the role of government 
and prioritise private sector actors in the regulation and governance of both the economy and 
society (Harvey, 2007). This has led to debate surrounding the governance of cities under 
conditions of economic cuts and austerity, commonly termed as ‘austerity urbanism’ (Peck, 
2012) and ‘austerity localism’ (Hodson et al. 2016).  
Such concepts are particularly important for this research, since it takes into consideration 
the role of national economic measures on the agency of local government actors in 
particular, and the ways in which this can lead to new forms of urban politics – again, 




policy agenda driven by Margaret Thatcher in 1980s which limited the role of the state and 
favoured supply-side innovation and competitiveness, decentralisation, devolution, 
deregulation and privatisation of industry, land and public service (Leitner et al. 2007). 
Crucially, it considers the role of neoliberalism and dominant pro-market logics, and how 
these processes shape urban areas and governance especially (Whitehead, 2013). Such an 
approach which takes into consideration the relations between space and politics is explored 
by Massey (2005) in her discussion of conjunctures, and she reinforces that crises (such as 
the 2008 global economic crisis) are themselves politicised, navigated, articulated and 
narrated in different contexts. Austerity can therefore be considered as a political and 
economic conjuncture, and using this understanding Peck (2017) appropriately draws 
attention to the spatialities through which conjunctural politics are constituted, stressing the 
locatedness of conjunctural politics and projects of ‘conjunctural urbanism’ (Featherstone & 
Karaliotas, 2018; Peck, 2017).  This concept is also useful in terms of research methodology, 
as highlighted in Chapter 3.  
With this austerity in mind, and in conjunction with concerns of environment impacts on 
urban areas, urban governments have been increasingly positioning themselves as centres 
and destinations for new forms of ‘green economy’ investment (Gibbs & O’Neill, 2014). 
With regard to implementing low carbon transitions at the city level, the concept of austerity 
urbanism and the ways in which austerity urbanism can impact municipal capacity for 
sustainable transitions is therefore a key consideration. North et al. (2017) notably apply the 
concept of austerity urbanism and consider climate policy using the case study of Liverpool, 
asserting that in the context of austerity, cities are indeed considering climate policy, amidst 
conflicting pressures. The authors argue that perspectives for climate policy were driven by 
the growth agenda, but not necessarily because they were ‘neoliberal’ in content per se, but 
because they were more persuasive and considered ‘sensible’ by economic development 
managers. Using this example, North et al. (2017) argue the importance of not presumptively 
dismissing inaction as neoliberal, again reiterating the diverse agency of actors and what ‘the 
sensible’ looks like in various and changing contexts. Furthermore, since this is an evident 
example of the multi-faceted and contested nature of decision-making in practice, these 
arguments reinforce the need to take a more nuanced approach when investigating low 
carbon transitions and the agency of actors in particular. 
Additionally, Hodson et al. (2016) demonstrate that under pressures of austerity and 




state actors, such as volunteer groups to build local green infrastructure (also deemed as 
‘green entrepreneurship’ e.g. Gibbs & O’Neill, 2017; Mazzucato, 2015). Importantly, these 
studies highlight that there is a need for a more detailed engagement of austerity urbanism 
and the impacts this has on municipal governance of low carbon transitions. This also again 
raises the significance of multi-level analysis of urban governance, and the role of multiple 
actors at different scales across urban areas; all of which this research seeks to achieve. As 
noted by Hastings et al. (2017), austerity urbanism has been observed to disproportionately 
impact economically and socially marginalised groups in England, and therefore introduces 
the next key theme of justice and inclusion when considering urban governance of low 
carbon transitions, as explored next.  
2.3. JUSTICE AND INCLUSION IN SUSTAINABLE 
TRANSITIONS 
Energy systems have a vital role in structuring socio-economic and socio-ecological 
relations, and the pursuit of a decarbonised and sustainable society within recent years has 
encouraged scholars and decision-makers alike to engage with energy matters, such as what 
energy is used for, what values and moral principles ought to guide energy decisions, and 
arguably most importantly, who benefits and loses (Islar et al. 2017). It is important to 
recognise that in an era of growing social and economic inequality, sustainable transitions 
must be inclusive and equitable to avoid perpetuating an unsustainable cycle, which as noted 
above will take significant political will and pressure, particularly in the context of austerity.  
Justice and inclusion in sustainable transitions are therefore a vital consideration which has 
been omitted in much of mainstream sustainable transition discourse, and is therefore the 
third key theme of this research. This is particularly important in the context of urban 
transitions, with much of the attention on climate inequalities being focussed across 
countries, rather than within-country (Islam & Winkel, 2017). The supporting concepts of 
energy justice and transport justice at the urban level are useful, yet there is a surprising lack 
of empirical application of these concepts, particularly with regard to transport justice. 
Moreover, there are limited, if any, empirical applications which integrate energy and 
transport justice within urban sustainable transition studies, which this research seeks to 




2.3.1. Omissions of Justice  
As aforementioned, from analysing the leading sustainable transitions theoretical 
frameworks (e.g. the MLP and MaP), it is evident that whilst there are some merits to these 
frameworks, the notions of justice and inclusivity are absent (Hodson & Marvin, 2013). This 
is a particular drawback for advancing sustainable transition understanding, since energy and 
its associated technologies and infrastructure have a vital role in structuring socio-economic 
and socio-ecological relations. To illustrate, the focus on technological processes and 
artefacts has led to a neglect of social and political relationships and a limited attention to 
justice. Furthermore, the themes of agency and power are key aspects involved in decision-
making and implementation, yet are absent within these frameworks, thereby limiting the 
multi-actor dimension of sustainable transitions and subsequent justice implications. 
Additionally, the neglect of justice dimensions is acknowledged at the urban level, with 
studies showing that social justice remains peripheral, with cities not making social and 
environmental justice an important part of their agendas (e.g. Bulkeley et al. 2014; Castan 
Broto & Bulkeley, 2013; McKendry, 2015).  
This omission of justice is witnessed more generally in studies of sustainable transitions, 
which can be arguably related to the broader marginalisation of justice within climate change 
politics on the whole. Swyngedouw (2009) makes an interesting contribution to 
understanding the absence of justice within the broader climate change agenda by arguing 
that climate policy is made to fit comfortably with the status quo, which is dominated by a 
neoliberal agenda, globalisation and competition. As such, he argues that urban 
sustainability strategies are as a result characterised by technocratic, weak and vague 
commitments that do not challenge the underlying neoliberalisation agenda nor allow for 
more radical visions of socio-economic futures, such as ‘de-growth’ approaches12 (North et 
al. 2017). Instead, Swyngedouw (2009) argues that they are of a ‘post-political’ consensus, 
in that they are handled in a way that is considered ‘sensible’ by urban elites who want to 
preserve consumer capitalism, unsustainable levels of consumption and existing power 
relations. Therefore, in the face of ‘sensible’ and ‘sustainable’ climate policy commitments, 
                                                 
12 ‘De-growth’ is understood here as a concept and movement which broadly critiques the global capital system 
which causes human exploitation and environmental destruction. As such, it encourages a shift in thinking 
about the economy, which are not growth-orientated or measured by GDP by instead focuses on wealth 
redistribution, alternative models of business organisations (e.g. cooperatives and not-for-profit strategies) and 




it is argued that in fact an unsustainable approach is unfolding in reality (Bluhdorn, 2015 in 
North et al. 2017).  
Whilst not definitively rejecting Swyngedouw’s (2009) ‘post-political’ notion of climate 
policy, scholars (e.g. Beveridge & Koch, 2017; Chatterton et al. 2013; McKendry, 2015; 
North et al. 2017) suggest that the ‘post-political’ argument is limited by oversimplifying 
and understating the complex structures within urban politics by ignoring the role of other 
actors, for example grassroots activists, who are constructing alternatives to the neoliberal 
agenda. Instead, they rightly assert that because of these other actors’ roles, political 
contestation has a key part to play in formulating climate policy, rather than solely neoliberal 
rationale.  
Such reflections on Swyngedouw’s arguments are useful to consider for this research and 
the understanding of multi-level governance because they highlight the need to be attentive 
to the rationale behind decision-making, the complex political contestation involved in 
pursuing equitable low carbon urban transitions, and the abundance of actors involved in 
these processes. Furthermore, because of the omission of justice in the sustainable 
transitions’ literature, there are a number of novel and emerging concepts which can assist 
in distinguishing urban climate justice concerns from wider environmental concerns, such 
as concepts of energy justice and mobility justice, as discussed next.  
2.3.2. Understandings of Justice in Energy and Transport Systems    
In light of discussions of the ‘energy trilemma’ which concerns environmental sustainability, 
energy equity and energy security, the concept of ‘energy justice’ has gained prominence 
within sustainable transitions literature (Fuller & McCauley, 2016). Encompassing issues of 
social, economic and environmental equity, within and between past, present and future 
generations, energy justice  broadly has the aim to provide all individuals, across all areas, 
with safe, affordable and sustainable energy (Fuller & McCauley, 2016). It is a term which 
has strands for wider ‘energy democracy’, which seeks for a more just, democratic and 
sustainable energy system (e.g. Becker & Naumann, 2017; Burke & Stephens, 2017; Hess, 
2018).  
This is built on the influential concept of ‘carbon democracy’ as coined by Mitchell (2009) 
with regard to the limited democracy of oil in comparison to that of coal. The lack of 




dispersed geographically and therefore less vulnerable to strikes in comparison to that of 
coal; the subsequent weakening powers of local forces and growth of expertise of production 
to offices of managers and engineers; and the growing economic and political power of 
major oil companies from the relations that were formed out of the flows of energy.  
The concept of energy justice is particularly valuable in sustainable transition understanding, 
as pointed out by Healy and Barry (2017, p.451-452):  
Without an energy justice dimension, decarbonization strategies run the risk of 
‘locking in’ patterns of exploitation and dispossession that characterize the current 
global political economy, even while seeking to overcome carbon ‘lock-in’.   
Energy justice, which has emerged primarily from a social science research agenda, 
therefore shares the same basic philosophy as climate justice and environmental justice, 
however it is distinctive in that its attention is on both production and consumption of energy 
systems specifically as well as energy policy (Jenkins et al. 2017; Pesch et al. 2017). As 
such, energy justice can be beneficial in certain cases as whilst energy systems and wider 
climate justice concerns can be co-constitutive, the concept of energy justice allows a greater 
emphasis on energy systems and justice dimensions, rather than wider urban climate justice 
concerns as a whole.  
Given the lack of justice and equity dimensions in predominant sustainable transition 
frameworks, energy justice frameworks have emerged within the literature (e.g. Heffron & 
McCauley, 2017; Heffron et al. 2015; Sovacool & Dworkin, 2015). McCauley et al. (2013) 
and Newell and Mulvaney (2013) utilise the three tenets of justice from social justice theory 
(distributive, procedural and recognition as outlined Table 2.5) to develop the ‘Energy 
Justice Framework’. Whilst the relationship between energy and justice is certainly multi-
faceted, this three-pillar approach allows for energy policy and whole energy systems to be 
analysed more thoroughly, since without a multi-pronged approach, energy policy often 
deals with only one element of the energy system and therefore can detriment its overall 







Tenets Evaluative Normative 
Distributional Where are the injustices? How should we solve them? 
Recognition Who is ignored? How should we recognise? 
Procedural Is there fair process? Which new processes? 
Table 2.5: The evaluative and normative contributions of energy justice 
(Jenkins et al. 2017, p.175).   
 
Heffron and McCauley (2017) valuably propose a fourth and underdeveloped tenet, 
restorative justice.  Restorative justice seeks to repair and rectify the injustices which have 
occurred to individuals, communities or nature, which in turn can allow prevention measures 
to take place and more practical measures to be explored. The restorative justice dimension 
added by Heffron and McCauley (2017) therefore enhances the temporal aspects of justice, 
and the need to examine the past and the future to ensure all injustices have been considered 
when implementing low carbon transitions.  
In addition, Sovacool and Dworkin (2015) build on this framework and develop the notion 
of energy justice as a decision-making and policy tool. They highlight eight aspects in their 
framework which should be considered for making more informed decisions: availability; 
affordability; due process; good governance; sustainability; intra-generational equity; inter-





Figure 2.9: The Energy Justice conceptual framework (Heffron & McCauley, 2017, 
p.660).    
 
Whilst these frameworks are particularly important for examining energy injustices, scholars 
(e.g. Heffron & McCauley, 2017; Jenkins et al. 2017) reflect upon some noteworthy 
limitations of the concept. For example, despite the proliferation of these frameworks in the 
literature, they have not been widely applied out-with this, and Heffron and McCauley 
(2017) suggest that energy justice needs to be more targeted and have a more direct link with 
policy in order to aid decision-making. Furthermore, in parallel with this critique, Jenkins et 
al. (2017) offer valuable contributions to advance the application and study of energy justice 
with relation to policymaking. Firstly, the authors acknowledge that within present energy 
justice debates there is a lack of dialogue between national contexts and how countries might 
learn from one another. Secondly, they acknowledge the way in which energy policy is often 
detached from wider legal and regulatory UK policy. The authors therefore reiterate calls for 
multi-level analysis and for a greater consideration between national contexts and legal and 
regulatory contexts. Thirdly, Jenkins et al. (2017) recognise that few studies investigate the 
comparability and contrast of different production and consumption patterns, and whether 
there are justice implications from one source to another, and therefore propose for the 




extraction) as well as the energy type’s role as part of a diverse energy mix. In addition, they 
raise an important critique that much of the literature on energy justice engages with spatial 
explanations of change of uneven transitions, neglecting the aspect of time. They therefore 
advocate for greater attention to be paid to the contested spatial and temporal processes of 
transitions when considering energy justice, thereby having an influential contribution for 
this research.  
Transport, like energy, is another example of a large and vast socio-technical system which 
is critical to society (Hopkins & Higham, 2016). Yet whilst it is a key energy service, it is 
also a major source of air pollution, accounting for nearly a quarter of total worldwide carbon 
emissions (Hickman et al. 2011). There is overwhelming evidence of the negative effects 
that transport systems have on the environment, and this has been well-established within 
the literature. Not only does this have detrimental impact to the environment, exposure to 
poor air and noise quality can cause adverse health implications including premature death 
and long-term health problems (Kingham et al. 2007). Transport is therefore a vital 
component for achieving reduction targets. However, energy use and emissions reduction 
within the transport sector is proving to be difficult to achieve due to: the high dependency 
fuelled by carbon-based travel and the subsequent lock-in this has created; the lack of 
political will; public support; and (perceived) high restructuring costs (Banister, 2011; 
Gossling, 2016).  
The relationship link between transport and injustice has been well-established within the 
literature and can be traced to the 1970s whereby physical mobility was considered a major 
contributor to social, economic and racial inequality in the USA (Lucas et al. 2016). Lucas 
(2012) investigates the extent to which social disadvantage and travel disadvantage can 
exacerbate social exclusion (as shown in Figure 2.10), with reference to the UK and 
Australia. Despite the recognised link between transport and injustice, the discussion of 
justice, transport and climate change collectively has been surprisingly neglected, and there 
is a need to integrate ‘transport justice’ in discussions of ‘sustainable mobility paradigm’ 











Figure 2.10: The relationship between transport disadvantage, social disadvantage and 
social exclusion (Lucas, 2012, p.107).   
 
Similar to injustices experienced through the provision of low carbon energy technologies, 
the novel concept of ‘transport justice’ (which is often used interchangeably with ‘mobility 
justice’) contends that low carbon transport must address justice concerns associated with 
accessibility, availability and affordability of transport (Mullen & Marsden, 2016). Although 
the terminology ‘mobility justice’ is not cited specifically, this concept is recognised 
internationally and addressed in the Sustainable Development Goal 11, which states:  
By 2030, provide access to safe, affordable, accessible and sustainable transport 
systems for all, improving road safety, notably by expanding public transport, with 
special attention to the needs of those in vulnerable situations, women, children, 
persons with disabilities and older persons (UN, 2020).  
Furthermore, transport was not explicitly included in the COP 21 Paris Agreement, and 
therefore this confirms the disconnection and detachment between the decarbonisation of 
transport and justice dimensions in policymaking (Hopkins & Higham, 2016).  The 
conceptualisation of mobility justice has therefore arisen from social theory to include the 
consequences and distribution of burdens and risks on minority and vulnerable groups, as 
well as general (in)accessibility; income; and social participation (in terms of 




It is perhaps unusual that given the data on transport emissions, the concept of low carbon 
mobility justice has received very little attention within academic debate, with much of the 
discussion dominated by energy use in the domestic space. As a result, transport justice 
within low carbon contexts has a significantly underdeveloped conceptual and theoretical 
framework, for example with few applications to the three tenets of justice (distribution, 
recognition, procedure) as per energy justice. Nevertheless, given the prominence of energy 
and transport systems in cities, these concepts are beneficial to apply within urban areas and 
this study, as examined next.  
2.3.3. Urban Energy Justice   
There has generally been a lack of application of energy justice from a city scale, and to 
reiterate, this is likely because within transition analyses, scholars have often overlooked 
where transitions take place, and the spatial configurations and dynamics of the networks 
within which transitions evolve (Coenen & Truffer, 2012). As such, examinations of energy 
justice have only focused on inequalities between social groups (Bouzarovski & Simcock, 
2017).  
In response to this, there has been a rise of scholars who examine energy systems using a 
spatial approach, so called ‘energy geography’ (Becker & Naumann, 2017). For example, 
Bouzarovski and Simcock (2017) draw upon the concept of ‘spatial justice’ and relate this 
to inequity and inequality, recognising that fuel poverty can differ geographically between 
countries, for example in the EU. Importantly, this study reveals that the spatially uneven 
exposure to fuel poverty (that is, where households are required to spend in excess 10 per 
cent of their household income on heat) is driven by deeper socio-material inequalities, i.e. 
landscape variations that include both material and non-material elements, such as climatic 
differences or housing variations, in and between countries. Furthermore, energy justice 
concerns have geographical and spatial factors in that there are specific sites of extraction, 
refining, storage, combustion, transportation, consumption and waste disposal which may 
be detrimental to certain communities (Finley-Brook & Holloman, 2016).  
Another spatial dimension of energy justice is that there are disparities of energy injustices 
and inequalities within countries, such as based on geographical area, and the uneven nature 
of energy inequality can be extended to include the disparities between rural and urban 




area (between urban and rural) is more negatively affected (Healy & Clinch, 2004; Roberts 
et al. 2015). For example, using the UK as a case study, Roberts et al. (2015) argue that 
whilst urban fuel poverty is on average more persistent than rural fuel poverty, rural areas 
are more vulnerable to energy price shocks. The authors claim this is due to living in rented 
accommodation, which is less flexible than in urban areas, in that the rental market in rural 
areas is more transient and of a thinner nature and therefore decreases the incentive of 
landlords to improve energy efficiency (Roberts et al. 2015). On the other hand, an opposing 
argument is made by Bouzarovski and Simcock (2017), who emphasise that in urban areas:  
There has been a growing vulnerability of ‘transient’ groups living in private-rented 
or multiple-occupancy homes with poor energy efficiency, with the greatest 
concentrations in large cities where housing is less affordable (p.5).  
These debates are still on-going, and these studies reveal an important causal relationship of 
various forms of home-ownership and energy injustices, and the prevalence of fuel poverty 
within urban areas.   
An additional pattern illustrating uneven energy injustices is the correlation between energy 
vulnerability, economic inequalities and wider material inequalities. It is acknowledged that 
certain populations are often at greater risk of energy injustices, such as populations with 
existing health problems and disabilities, older population and minority groups, who are 
more likely to have lower-income and higher energy bills, due to the greater use of energy 
for their physical and mental health requirements. For example, according to Wealthy 
(2018), the average UK household spends £1,214 a year on energy, whereas 27 per cent (4.1 
million households) with a disabled person spend more than £1,500, with 790,000 
households spending over £2,500 a year on energy. This is appropriately termed the ‘vicious 
circle of vulnerability’, which can often lead to a stigmatisation of certain groups, which can 
be exacerbated in ‘area-based’ energy efficiency schemes (Bouzarovski & Simcock, 2017). 
This can cause neighbourhoods and their residents to become stigmatised, which may lead 
to suggestions that energy vulnerability is somehow internal to and the fault of the 
neighbourhood itself (Bouzarovski & Simcock, 2017), and therefore links to the broader 
processes of territorial stigmatisation. Again, this can result in an additional vicious circle 
whereby policies are not addressing injustices adequately, support is not sufficiently 
provided, and those who are struggling may not reach for help for fear of being stigmatised 
as ‘poor’ or ‘incapable’ (Bouzarovski & Simcock, 2017, p.6). Furthermore, this reiterates 




which low carbon experiments can indeed create new tensions and unforeseeable, 
unintentional consequences (Castan Broto, 2012).  
Similarly, uneven accessibility to services in themselves (such as networked infrastructures) 
within cities can also lead to forms of spatial inequality. One term to characterise spatial 
inequality within cities is ‘splintering urbanism’ deemed by Graham and Marvin (2001), 
whereby network infrastructures are not accessible for certain groups and regions. This 
importantly reinforces the increasing gap between areas which are networked and those 
which are significantly under-networked, leading to a ‘poverty of connections’ (Graham & 
Marvin, 2001, p.288 in Harrison & Popke, 2011).  
Many cities have sought to alleviate fuel poverty, reduce emissions and pursue a green 
growth agenda, and scholars (e.g. Hodson & Marvin, 2012) demonstrate the differences 
between ad-hoc and piecemeal activity and strategic and systematic approaches. De 
Laurentis (2012) uses the city case studies of Greater Manchester and Cardiff in the UK to 
investigate and compare lessons and practices, governance and development in urban 
retrofitting measures in a climate of austerity. Their findings indicate that whilst the cities 
seem to follow a common rhetoric of sustainability and economic growth, their retrofit 
responses are indeed very different, reinforcing the differing governing processes across 
cities. For example, within Greater Manchester, the author discovered an overarching 
emphasis on economic dimensions to attract investment and retrofit programmes were from 
a dominant technological approach, being delivered by business and elite politicians and 
aimed at raising funding from private and public sector. As such, they were considered to be 
predominantly top-down and less inclusive. In Cardiff, the drivers for implementation were 
more spread across economic, social and environmental dimensions, which had a focus on 
vulnerable communities and households and clear efforts to establish links with community 
groups and existing organisations. Such a study is therefore significant for this research by 
emphasising the different visions, priorities and processes that various actors across multiple 
levels have in pursuing low carbon just urban transitions across cities (Heffron et al. 2015). 
As aforementioned, a justice lens is important for considering other low carbon sectors, such 




2.3.4. Urban Transport Justice 
Similar to energy justice, the analysis of transport justice at the urban level has been largely 
piecemeal within sustainable transitions literature. Some local governments at the city scale 
have sought to engage in the reduction of carbon emissions in the transport sector, such as 
demand management (pricing, parking and access control, congestion charging, car free city 
centres); investing in public transport; priority for walking and cycling; and the 
concentration of urban development around accessible public transport (Banister, 2011).  
Yet, there is considerable variation between cities and these initiatives are generally in their 
infancy. Moreover, studies relating to transport justice highlight the higher prevalence in 
cities, and according to Kilroy (2007, p.10): ‘between 8 and 16 percent of urban households’ 
income is typically spent on transport, but this can rise to more than 25 percent for the poorest 
households in very large cities’. Whilst this is a notable finding, the application of an array 
of actors and their agency across cities regarding low carbon and just transport has also been 
neglected. Scholars (e.g. Gossling, 2016; Kingham et al. 2007; Mullen & Marsden, 2016) 
have attempted to address the lacuna of justice implications in low carbon urban transport, 
yet this is a largely underdeveloped field of study. Gossling (2016) makes a notable addition 
to sustainable transitions theory by conceptualising urban transport injustices within three 
dimensions, i.e. exposure, space and time. This conceptualisation raises important points of 
the multiple and intersecting dimensions which can affect urban transport justice, and which 
may vary substantially within contested, unequal cities and further exacerbate inequalities.   
Importantly, there is a recognised correlation between socio-economic inequalities and 
transport. Using the city of Bradford in the UK, Mueller et al. (2018) found that residents of 
lower socio-economic positions had the highest risk for adverse exposure and premature 
health, specifically 10 per cent of mortality in Bradford is attributable to breaching urban air 
and noise pollution exposure levels. Of this population, more ethnically-diverse 
neighbourhoods were more adversely affected, and were therefore increasingly susceptible 
to experiencing negative health outcomes. These findings clearly reiterate the well-
documented social injustices resulting from exposure to air pollution, and are therefore 
useful to note for examining justice in urban low carbon transitions. Yet, it would be 
interesting to examine the mobility of these affected neighbourhoods themselves, as these 
findings may support observations made by Cook and Swyngedouw (2012) who highlight 




transport whilst also having fewer or more unequal mobility opportunities and existing 
health inequalities (Mueller et al. 2018).  
In response to tackling transport pollution, the expansion of powered low emission vehicles 
is a policy approach followed by many countries. Mullen and Marsden (2016) draw upon 
mobility justice in low carbon energy transitions, using the example of electric vehicles in 
the UK. The authors note the substantial cost implications which can disproportionately 
affect lower income or minority groups within society. In addition, this is notable particularly 
within urban areas, whereby low carbon emission zones in cities which set fees for high 
polluting vehicles (e.g. London) can have unintended justice implications by 
disproportionately affecting lower income groups who may not have access to, or own, a 
better environmentally performing (and thereby more expensive) vehicle (Mullen & 
Marsden, 2016).  
The networked infrastructure of energy and transport is therefore particularly significant to 
consider in low carbon urban transitions. The studies above highlight that the concepts of 
energy justice and transport justice can be successfully applied for investigating injustices, 
particularly by drawing attention to the impact of low carbon schemes for vulnerable and 
low-income groups. From using a spatial lens, it is clear that inequality and exclusion is 
prevalent within certain geographical areas and neighbourhoods, i.e. between cities and 
within cities.  These concepts seek to avoid exacerbating existing injustices or creating new 
injustices from decarbonisation initiatives, and can be particularly useful for identifying 
whether certain governance approaches or actors are promoting, hindering or sustaining 
justice dimensions in low carbon urban transitions. However, there is a lack of empirical 
application of these concepts, particularly with regard to transport justice. Moreover, there 
are limited, if any, empirical applications which combine energy and transport justice within 
urban sustainable transition studies, which this research seeks to develop. Above all, it is 
important to consider how justice and low carbon urban transitions are implemented in 
practice, as discussed next.  
2.4. APPROACHES AND PATHWAYS IN SUSTAINABLE 
TRANSITIONS   
The transition to a more sustainable and inclusive urban future will require large-scale 




indeed formidable, and require substantial coordination of multiple levels of actors across 
different scales over time. The very nature of urban transitions involves a large-scale 
restructuring of infrastructure, therefore sustainable urban transitions not only should 
include a consideration of the actors involved, but the ways in which existing and future 
infrastructure can influence trajectories.  
It is important therefore to consider the ways in which low carbon and equitable urban 
transitions are achieved in practice, and therefore approaches and pathways in sustainable 
transitions is the fourth key theme of this research. The concept of urban materiality is 
particularly beneficial for understanding the interconnected relationship between objects 
within cities (which can also be conceptualised as an urban assemblage of infrastructures, 
economies, politics and communities), in addition to the role of lock-in and path creation for 
understanding the place-based and temporal legacies of systems, as examined next.    
2.4.1. Urban Materiality in Sustainable Transitions  
Within sustainable transitions literature, the notion of materiality (i.e. the physical things, 
objects, artefacts and structures) has been increasingly drawn upon when considering 
sustainable transitions, due to the relations between people and objects, and the multiple 
ways in which things are mobilised, experienced, used and understood (Rutherford, 2014), 
The concept of materiality  places emphasis on the social meanings, power relations, 
personal bonds and connections, which can be bound up or into artefacts and the wider built 
environment. It is closely related to the notion of the city as an urban assemblage of 
infrastructures, economies, politics, and communities (Bulkeley et al. 2013; McFarlane, 
2011) and as such is significant for this research. 
Such connections are particularly important for transitions thinking since these connections 
can affect the ways in which various actors can construct, govern and manipulate transitions 
in reality (Rutherford, 2014). Moreover, the notion of materiality recognises that whilst those 
living in areas have a socially-induced influence on the surrounding materials, those 
materials also have a significant impact on those populations, underlining that there is a 
reciprocal relationship between both human and non-human artefacts. Furthermore, it is 
important to acknowledge that whilst materiality is present within objects, it is also present 




simultaneously interwoven with, and independent from, human intent (Jayne & Ward, 
2016).   
Given the complex, intertwining and changing metabolic flows, practices and connections 
within cities (including between the infrastructure and built environment and those that 
interact with it), there has been a growth of literature assessing materiality and sustainable 
transitions in the context of urban areas. In light of urban energy transitions, Rutherford 
(2014) applies the notion of materiality to the case study of Stockholm and highlights the 
centrality of urban materiality to low carbon futures. This work demonstrates through this 
case study that climate mitigation is involved with materialities of energy policy, for 
example everyday objects such as heating bills, or technical infrastructure such as roads.  
The study emphasises the fluidity and dynamic nature of materiality, highlighting that the 
connections between infrastructures and objects (rather than the infrastructures and objects 
per se) can be manipulated through multiple arrangements, groups and interests. Using the 
case study of smart cities in Australia, Bulkeley et al. (2016) echo that a city’s materiality 
can actively shape the politics of the smart grid, whilst also shaping the future of the grid in 
the city and its reworking of the energy system. These arguments enhance understanding of 
the ways in which infrastructure can influence governance of urban transitions, and vice 
versa. 
Despite the value of considering materiality within transitions, there has been significant 
debate that the notion has been under-conceptualised. Using the example of the oil industry, 
Bridge (2008) draws attention to the materiality of production networks and the influence 
that materiality exerts on industrial organisations (De Laurentis et al. 2017). The study 
highlights that production networks are territorially embedded at different points along 
production chains, and therefore the materiality of the extractive sector is implicated on the 
location relative to market chains, the dependency on natural production, and the existing 
infrastructure (Bridge, 2008; De Laurentis et al. 2017). Therefore, spatial aspects such as 
territoriality are stressed within urban materiality debates and enhance understanding of the 
embeddedness of certain systems, again relating back to the spatial lens of ‘energy 
geography’. This can be applied in the urban context and can help explain the differences in 
trajectories between cities.    
In addition, Latham and McCormack (2004) introduce the notion of materiality to the case 




space automobiles have in urban areas, the materiality of automobility includes: ‘particular 
structures of [perceived and actual] feelings, relationships, moral imperatives and dilemmas’ 
(p.712). This highlights that people have strong emotional and personal investments in these 
spaces which can affect their agency (Coe & Jordhus-Lier, 2010). Such inter-relations with 
people are therefore hybrid and fluid, whereby humans and non-human agents ‘constantly 
interact and remake the living conditions in urban worlds’ (Schliephake, 2015, p.6). These 
considerations stress the social aspects of transitions and reinforce the reciprocal and 
complex relationship between both human and non-human agents. Furthermore, the notion 
of materiality highlights the role of infrastructure and its embeddedness on a spatial scale 
and natural resources, and the impacts on sustainable transitions. The concepts of lock-in, 
path-dependency and path creation build on these considerations, as discussed next.  
2.4.2. Lock-in and Path-Dependency  
Given the scale and socio-technical nature of sustainable transitions, the theoretical concepts 
of lock-in and path-dependency are particularly appropriate for discussing transition 
processes to sustainability. The concept of carbon lock-in, as first coined by Unruh (2000, 
2002) is with reference to the process of carbon-intensive, fossil fuel-based technological 
systems persisting over time. From a technological and economic perspective, this process 
is related to increasing returns to scale. As argued by Arthur (1994, in Foxon, 2002), the 
reasons for lock-in are predominantly due to existing large technological systems, such as 
electricity generation or transport systems, having significant ‘sunk’ costs from earlier 
investments.  
Such a positive feedback of increasing returns to adoption of a selected technology causes 
firms to become reluctant to invest in more sustainable alternatives (Foxon, 2002; Klitkou 
et al. 2015), even when the alternative system presents fewer environmental externalities. 
As a result, carbon-intensive industries become path-dependent, which leads to lower-carbon 
alternatives systemically becoming excluded and locked-out, leading to technological lock-















Figure 2.11: Schematic representation of a path-dependent process (Rosenbloom et al. 
2019, p.171).  
  
In economic terms, this is also known as the ‘energy return on investment’ (EROI), which 
refers to the ratio between the energy delivered of a particular fuel to society, and the energy 
invested in the capture and delivery of this energy (Hall et al. 2014). In addition, the 
institutional systems that govern technological systems are a key factor in the lock-in concept 
and should not be understood as a set of discrete technological artefacts (Foxon, 2002; 
Klitkou et al. 2015). Rather, as highlighted in the concept of a Techno-Institutional Complex 
by Unruh (2000), these technological systems are embedded ‘in a powerful conditioning 
social context of both private and public institutions’ (p.818), and there is therefore a distinct 
social nature to carbon lock-in. Persistent market and policy failures compounded by the 
lack of changes by society and government can exacerbate these conditions, which in turn 
lead to such circumstances which cause policy inertia towards the mitigation of global 
climate change. Foxon (2002) points out that institutional lock-in acts to reinforce the lock-
in of current carbon-intensive technological systems and therefore is distinguishable from 




of carbon lock-in reinforces the co-evolutionary processes of technology and institutions of 
carbon-based energy systems.  
Hassink (2005) importantly adds that the concept of political lock-in is similar to institutional 
lock-in and is described as the combined effect of institutional actors, such as governments, 
incumbent enterprises and trade unions which seek to defend the status quo. Furthermore, it 
is vital to recognise the concept of regional lock-in when considering sustainable transitions 
at the city scale. This concept builds on three forms of lock-in (functional, cognitive and 
political), and is described as a set of ‘interrelated lock-ins that manifest themselves at the 
regional level, but are influenced and affected by both intra-regional and extra-regional 
factors’ (Hassink, in Boschma and Martin, 2010, p.452).  
Notably, lock-in (and the various forms it comprises) and path-dependency not only 
reinforce the importance of using a multi-level governance analysis, but emphasise a high 
degree of place-dependence, as geographically concentrated clusters becoming inward-
looking and insular systems, which form strong linkages and support and trap them within 
clusters. Again, this is important for sustainable urban transition understanding as it 
reinforces the strong relationship of urban materiality and its effects on actor agency, which 
can in turn affect wider governance and the overall pattern of sustainable trajectories (Coe 
& Jordhus-Lier, 2010).  
2.4.3. Path Creation  
The notion of path creation is particularly influential for understanding sustainable urban 
transitions; however, it is a concept which has been under-theorised in comparison to the 
complementary notions of lock-in and path-dependency (Dawley et al. 2015; MacKinnon et 
al. 2019). The concept of path creation can be considered as a route for overcoming lock-in 
and blockages of incumbent actors and technologies; moving towards new alternative paths 
and facilitate trajectories to low carbon energy systems which can therefore give way to new 
forms of actor agency and governance (e.g. Fischer & Newig, 2016; Simmie, 2012).  
MacKinnon et al. (2019) make a distinct contribution to transition understanding by 
developing a multi-dimensional and systematic theoretical framework of path creation, 
emphasising that the process of path creation is dependent on five key elements: institutional 
elements; key economic, social and institutional actors; market construction; regional and 





Figure 2.12: Integrative Framework of Path Creation (MacKinnon et al. 2019, p.9). 
 
Using a multi-scalar approach to renewable energy technology in the UK, Essletzbichler 
(2012) importantly reinforces the notion that path creation is a geographically-localised 
process which can mobilise heterogenous and local actors around ‘regional’ energy visions 
which can improve implementation of renewable energy systems. As such, the place-specific 
legacies and conditions causing path creation are emphasised.  
Furthermore, scholars (e.g. MacKinnon et al. 2019; Steen, 2016) have contributed to this 
concept by stressing the role of casual relations, processes and mechanisms, actors and their 
agency through time and across space. For example, Pearson (2016) combines this concept 
and an actor perspective by providing a valuable study of the role of incumbent actors in 
creating new trajectories for decarbonisation, emphasising the importance of history and 
incumbency for transition thinking. Despite incumbent technologies and firms having 
constraining influences on low carbon transitions (as a result of unwilling behaviours, 
technological capabilities, culture, or structure), there may also be positive opportunities 
whereby incumbents may embrace new technologies and systems through innovation, 
reconfiguration and recombination (Pearson, 2016). Again, such a focus on actors is crucial 
for considering sustainable transitions at the urban area, however to date there are limited 
studies specifically drawing together path creation in an urban sustainability context, which 





In this chapter, I have set out the four overarching core themes which are valuable for 
considering sustainable urban transitions: firstly, the governance of sustainable transitions; 
secondly, cities in low carbon transitions; thirdly, justice dimensions in sustainable urban 
transitions; and fourth, approaches and pathways in sustainable urban just transitions. 
Through a critical review of the literature across disciplines (e.g. geography, engineering 
and business studies), I have discussed the merits and drawbacks of these themes and 
associated concepts. These avenues of research and culmination of themes are particularly 
useful for applying to the Nottingham city context, and this thesis seeks to develop 
understanding in these areas.  
First, multi-level governance is particularly pertinent for sustainable transition thinking by 
incorporating the multiple roles of actors across different levels and political jurisdictions, 
and is therefore introduced as the first theme of this research. Through a multi-level 
perspective of socio-technical transitions, the non-linearity of transitions is emphasised, in 
addition to the role of society and contingencies such as external shocks. However, this 
framework is limited for urban sustainability transitions, primarily through having a narrow 
view of socio-political aspects, and therefore a simplistic view of agency. In addition, 
mechanisms impacting transitions such as lock-in and co-evolutionary processes are 
overlooked, as well as a limited sense of scale, place and space. I strengthen theoretical 
understandings of multi-level urban governance by focusing upon actors, their agency and 
capacity in more detail, such as the roles of state and non-state actors, and network 
governance and intermediaries on sustainable transitions and make a valuable contribution 
to this field of research through the application of Nottingham.  
Second, the role of space and geographical context in sustainable transitions is highlighted 
as an important consideration and therefore comprises the second theme of this research, that 
is, cities in sustainable transitions. Here I have examined the ways in which the 
conceptualisation of the ‘city’ has altered within transitions literature, and how this can be 
useful in the Nottingham context – principally by considering the multiple 
conceptualisations of the city as inter-related, interwoven and complex, with governing 
actors being key ‘nodes’ in a wider system of climate governance. As such, I emphasise the 
role of the city in sustainable transitions, with notions that the city and local governments 
can range from having an informal, voluntary role in low carbon transitions, to having a 




account the role of ‘external shocks’ at the national level (such as austerity) on governance 
of sustainable urban transitions. The argument developed here therefore is that the shape and 
dynamics of urban areas are influenced by such contexts. I have introduced the concept of 
austerity urbanism in sustainable transitions as a valuable concept for this research and use 
the empirical findings of this research to contribute to these understandings.  
Third, I note that justice and inclusion are paramount considerations within sustainable 
transitions thinking and introduce this as the third theme of this research. There is a 
significant gap in this field, particularly from theoretical perspectives whereby justice has 
been largely omitted from predominant theoretical frameworks (e.g. MLP). In this chapter, 
I attended to the importance of making justice a core theme of low carbon transition thinking, 
and therefore place justice dimensions at the forefront of this research. Through conceptual 
understandings of justice in energy and transport systems, I have argued that both energy 
justice and transport justice contribute to understanding by highlighting the importance of 
multi-level governance for inclusive processes. However, these concepts are generally in 
their infancy when applied at an urban level and have not been used in conjunction with one 
another in empirical applications, thereby presenting a gap in the literature. I contribute to 
the addressing of this gap through using a cross-sectoral approach across energy and 
transport to consider justice dimensions in urban sustainable transitions.  
Finally, the approaches and pathways in sustainable transitions are fundamental at the urban 
scale and I therefore presented this as the fourth theme of this research. In particular, I 
emphasise the value of the concept of materiality and urban assemblages for understanding 
socio-technical systems. Complex infrastructure systems, such as energy and transport, are 
bound not only in the wider environment, by also within and between social connections, 
which can affect the ways in which various actors construct, govern and manipulate 
transitions on the ground. Furthermore, I contend that the concepts of lock-in, path-
dependency and path creation are beneficial when examining factors enabling or hindering 
progression, and include multiple dimensions that can affect these processes, such as 
institutional, economic, social, political and environmental factors. In addition to multi-actor 
and multi-level perspectives, these concepts stress that the agency of actors and the place-
based and temporal legacies of systems are a vital component when analysing urban 
sustainability transitions, and this thesis therefore seeks to enhance understanding in this 
field.  
The four overarching themes of this research that I use as a conceptual framework have 




theoretical basis. I address the gap of actor agency in low carbon transitions by providing 
this as a central theoretical focus of my thesis. I place emphasis on multi-scalar governance 
regimes, and relate this back specifically to local actor agency for sustainable transitions at 
the urban level (Bulkeley & Kern, 2006).  In doing so, I argue that both individual and 
collective agency and political capacity is important at the local level for low carbon and 
inclusive trajectories. I draw much needed attention to the role of the city as a space and 
place for governing low carbon and inclusive transitions, and embed the city context within 
the wider national and international governance arena to better understand the processes of 
urban transitions in practice and how climate change governance is enacted and constraint 
on multiple levels. I argue that the city has a fundamental role in low carbon and inclusive 
transitions, and advance current debate by arguing that the structure and size of local 
authorities has a significant influence on enacting low carbon inclusive transitions 
(particularly in terms of responsibilities and statutory duties), and that local policy contexts 
are shaped by national and international levels (Gibbs & O’Neill, 2017). Importantly, I add 
to the growing body of literature on the role of external shocks on transitions and place 
emphasis on the role of austerity in local and national governance to highlight that new 
patterns of governance are being shaped at the urban level to overcome barriers (Hodson et 
al. 2016; Peck, 2012).  
Crucially, I focus on the approaches and pathways taken by key governing actors and 
underline the importance of path creation, lock-in and path-dependency as concepts for 
further exploring past, past and future low carbon trajectories (Mackinnon et al. 2019). I 
argue that the use of these concepts helps new understandings of agency and governance - 
that is, past agency has a clear part to play in shaping contemporary transitions, both in 
providing constraints and opportunities, as shown in the Nottingham example. In addition, 
the notion of justice is integrated throughout my research (Jenkins et al. 2017; Mullen & 
Marsden, 2016). I directly reflect upon energy and transport justice to demonstrate the ways 
in which inclusive transitions can be integrated and achieved across sectors within the city, 
and add to current debate through this integrated application. The Nottingham case study has 
successfully allowed me to integrate these different theories which I develop as a theoretical 
basis. In doing so, I contribute to current debate on low carbon and inclusive transitions, 
both in terms of theoretical and conceptual terms with support of my empirical findings. In 
the next chapter I provide a more detailed examination of the research methodology and 




 CHAPTER 3 
RESEARCHING LOW CARBON AND EQUITABLE 
URBAN TRANSITIONS 
 
3.0. INTRODUCTION  
The topic of sustainable transitions is one which transcends many disciplines, and this 
research is deliberately interdisciplinary to complement the varying social, political, 
environmental and technical dimensions of low carbon and just urban trajectories. In the first 
two chapters of this thesis, I have set up the leading arguments in sustainable transitions 
thinking and the subsequent conceptual and theoretical underpinnings of this research.  
Whilst the interdisciplinary nature of this research will allow access to a range of 
perspectives, this poses a challenge from a methodological standpoint however, in that 
different disciplines utilise various approaches for research on sustainable transitions. There 
is no one preferred method for researching sustainability (Franklin & Blyton, 2011) which 
reinforces the need for careful methodological reflections. In addition, the application of this 
research from a multi-level perspective raises questions of how certain levels, scales and 
governing actors are understood across multiple disciplines, and the distinctive 
epistemologies behind these understandings. As such, methods for analysing sustainable 
transitions must be sufficient to capture not only micro-level and meso-level practices (for 
example, individual and community level), but also macro-level perspectives for 
comprehensively understanding policy and systems (Murto et al. 2020).  
In this chapter, I set out the methodological approaches which were involved during this 
research which investigated low carbon and equitable transitions in Nottingham. This 
chapter is divided into seven parts, and in the first section, I consider the research philosophy 
underpinning this study. This is closely aligned to pragmatic and interpretivist approaches, 
which are suitable for an in-depth interdisciplinary study and allowed for a combined 
methods approach for understanding sustainable urban trajectories in practice. In addition, 
rather than using one single theoretical framework or model, I applied a conceptual approach 




highlighted in the previous chapter). This is because the complex and interwoven social, 
political and technical aspects of transition are arguably best framed within a diverse and 
pluralistic set of understandings.  
In the second section of the chapter, I examine the research strategy used for this research. 
The use of a case study method has been a particularly fruitful avenue for researching urban 
sustainable transitions, and in this section, I discuss the adoption of this method in further 
detail, and subsequent rationale for the choice of a single case study, Nottingham in the UK.  
Following on from this, I detail the research design by focusing on the qualitative approach 
taken in this study and the research aim and objectives. Three research methods were used 
for data collection, that is: interviews; secondary data documentary analysis; and 
observational research and site-specific visits and therefore I incorporated a multi-methods 
approach. I discuss the rationale behind these choices, and the ways in which I conducted 
data collection in practice.   
In the fourth section, I discuss the research analysis and the ways in which data was coded 
using predominant themes and concepts in the literature and analysed using a grounded 
theory approach. In addition, I set out how triangulating data with a multi-methods approach 
has strengthened data analysis.  
In the fifth section, I consider the research ethics by providing details of ethical 
considerations in research practice, which in this instance is particularly important in terms 
of researching governance and just transitions using qualitative and mixed-methods. In 
addition, I consider ethics with relation to my own subjectivity, positionality and reflectivity, 
as well as the ethics of the study itself.  
In the sixth section, I provide a critical reflection of the research design, which includes the 
methodological challenges during research practice, by drawing upon the obstacles 
encountered whilst conducting interviews in particular. Finally, I provide a conclusion of the 
carefully considered and distinctive methodology which has been utilised specifically to 
incorporate and give sensitivity to the multi-faceted nature of studying low carbon and 




3.1. RESEARCH PHILOSOPHY  
Although there has been a substantial growth of empirical research on sustainable transitions 
from a variety of disciplines, this can pose a dilemma from a methodological perspective, 
since different disciplines have certain methodological approaches and understandings 
which are dependent on the specific research being conducted and particular assumptions 
made. For example, the study of sustainable transitions has become increasingly 
interdisciplinary and ranges from those with perspectives from sociology (e.g. Geels, 2005; 
Hess, 2014); geography (e.g. Bridge et al. 2013; Calvert, 2016; Coenen et al., 2012; Hansen 
& Coenen, 2015); political science (e.g. Bulkeley & Kern, 2005; Rutherford & Jaglin, 2015), 
economics and policy (e.g. Bolton & Foxon, 2012); engineering and systems management 
(e.g. Barton et al. 2018); and business (e.g. Burger & Luke, 2017). 
With such diverse methodologies, there are various and distinctive underlying assumptions, 
ontologies and epistemologies, which in turn result in different interpretations and insights 
(Zolfagharian et al. 2019). Studying the complex phenomena of sustainable transitions from 
a predominantly social science perspective therefore prescribes ontological considerations 
(which detail assumptions about the nature of reality) and epistemological considerations 
(which include the status of knowledge claims about that reality) (Moon & Blackman, 2014).  
Epistemology and ontology are therefore particularly significant in research, since they are 
critical in shaping the ways in which researchers frame and guide their research in their 
attempts to discover knowledge. Consequently, it is important to reflect considerably upon 
epistemological and ontological orientations in an informed and transparent manner to 
further validate and legitimate research, as discussed next.  
3.1.1. Epistemological and Ontological Position  
This research is interdisciplinary in nature, by encompassing social, economic, and 
ecological dimensions. There are four predominant paradigms (i.e. set of key beliefs and 
assumptions that affect method selection) that are identified within transition studies: 
positivist, critical realist, interpretivist and pragmatist (Zolfagharian et al. 2019). This 
research is not suitably placed within one specific epistemological and ontological stance, 
as attempts to do this would be considered restrictive and inappropriate for this research. 
Instead, the hybrid and multidimensional character of climate change should embrace 




2016). As such, the qualitative and multi-faceted nature of this research lends itself well to 
two particular philosophical stances which are most closely aligned to this research, that is, 
pragmatism and interpretivism, which are therefore discussed in turn.  
In pragmatic approaches, there is a general acceptance that there are single or multiple 
realities which are open to empirical inquiry (Kaushik & Walsh, 2019). A major 
underpinning of pragmatism is that knowledge and reality are based on beliefs and habits 
which are socially constructed in an ongoing iterative fashion rather than in a more abstract 
sense, and therefore it highlights the role of differing individual experiences. Pragmatism 
accepts that views, ideas and positions are better judged based on their practical 
consequences (Hartz-Karp & Marinova, 2017). This is particularly beneficial to this study 
on sustainable transitions, since sustainable transition research is dependent on evidence of 
practical and implemented shifts towards a sustainable path, governed by multiple actors at 
differing scales. Decisions regarding methodology are based on the usefulness in addressing 
particular research questions posed, rather than the extent to which they fit within a specific 
research philosophy (Denscombe, 2014).  
Furthermore, pragmatism as a philosophical approach allows the researcher to be cautious 
and self-conscious about positionality and the conduct of research (Ritchie et al. 2014). 
Therefore, the emphasis on positionality and conduct of research is important in the context 
of sustainable transitions due to the highly political nature of the topic, in addition to the 
complex, external and independent process of sustainable transitions with relation to the 
researcher (Zolfagharian et al. 2019). Whilst there are criticisms that pragmatism may 
indicate a certain lack of principles or philosophy, commonly referred to as ‘anything goes’ 
(Denscombe, 2014; Ritchie et al. 2014), the urgency of climate change at the urban level is 
complementary to pragmatic approaches, which are often value-driven and emphasise 
problem-solving. As such, pragmatism is orientated towards solving practical problems on 
the ground and complementary as a method for more practically-minded researchers 
(Kaushik & Walsh, 2019; Zolfagharian et al. 2019) (as reinforced in Section 3.5). 
Additionally, this research can be most closely associated with interpretivism, which can 
allow for the study of many versions of a specific, rich and complex situation (Hartz-Karp 
& Marinova, 2017). According to Zolfagharian et al. (2019), interpretivist transition research 
is distinctive by highlighting transitions as socially constructed through language and 




low carbon and equitable governance will be dependent on a multitude of actors, an 
interpretivist approach allows for the interpretation and understanding of a situation which 
may be viewed differently by multiple stakeholders due to their varying and subjective 
beliefs, understandings, interests, experiences, expectations, motivations and actions. 
Furthermore, interpretivism is complementary to the urban nature of this study and to claims 
that experiences of people are context-bound, and cannot be free from location and time or 
the mind of the human actor (Flick, 2018).  
Interpretivist approaches allow for the adoption of more personal and flexible research 
strategies (such as the focus on narratives, stories, perceptions and interpretations of actors) 
to encompass the richness and complexity of sustainable transitions (Zolfagharian et al. 
2019) and is therefore complementary to the qualitative data collection methods as reflected 
in the research design.  Similar to pragmatism, the interpretivist approach to research 
emphasises that the values of researchers and participants can become an integral component 
of research and therefore this approach is useful as it requires a high degree of reflexivity (as 
I discuss in more detail in Section 3.5).  
3.1.2. Conceptual Framework  
As aforementioned, sustainable transitions are a particularly complex phenomenon which 
have spurred interest across a multitude of disciplines and perspectives. It is beyond the 
scope of this chapter to define each and every conceptual approach within these disciplines. 
However Loorbach et al. (2017) highlight that sustainable transitions research can be 
generally categorised into three approaches, that is: socio-technical; socio-institutional; and 
socio-ecological. Since this research does not try to place itself within one restrictive 
approach, it rather is best considered to be underpinned by both socio-technical and socio-
institutional approaches.  
Socio-technical regimes are rooted in science and technology studies and are primarily 
concerned with the socio-technical regimes that have emerged around dominant 
technologies, which are the subject of transitions (Loorbach et al. 2017). This approach takes 
a particular emphasis on the role of innovation in understanding the dynamics of transitions 
processes, such as path-dependency, lock-in and disruption (as examined in Chapter 2).  
Such perspectives are useful to this research by highlighting the innovation of low carbon 




progression in practice, such as path-dependency and lock-in and materiality. In contrast, 
socio-institutional approaches place an increased prominence on the cultures, structure and 
practices surrounding sustainable transitions. Therefore, whilst technologies have an 
important role, significance is placed on the inherently political nature of transitions, and 
how incumbent powers, actors and motivations can affect change. This particular aspect is 
well-placed to aid the conceptualisation of governance of low carbon and equitable 
transitions. Furthermore, socio-institutional approaches often focus on specific sectors or 
geographical areas that face problems, and therefore lend well to the multi-level perspectives 
of this research at the urban scale (Loorbach et al. 2017).  
As highlighted in Chapter 2, this research is informed by a combination of themes which are 
prevalent in the literature: (i) Multi-Level Governance of sustainable transitions; (ii) Justice 
in sustainable transitions; (iii) Cities in sustainable transitions; and (iv) Approaches and 
pathways in sustainable transitions, as shown in Figure 2.1. Within each of these four 
themes, there are useful core concepts that I draw upon. I therefore utilised a conceptual 
framing which is based upon a synthesis of relevant core concepts and themes in order to 
examine the low carbon transition of the energy, transport and infrastructure sectors in cities. 
A summary of this conceptualisation is provided in Table 3.1.   
Using a conceptual framework combined with themes and concepts is preferable over the 
use of one underlying theoretical framework. This is because the established sustainable 
transition frameworks, such as MLP is limited from having underdeveloped concepts (e.g. 
the roles of actors and politics), or themes which are omitted entirely (e.g. justice), as stated 
in the previous chapter. Therefore, due to these limitations, relying on only one dominant 
theoretical framework of sustainable transitions theory would be problematic for this 
research methodology. Furthermore, it is observed that these frameworks remain rather 
abstract, passive and therefore difficult to use from a policy perspective, possibly as a result 
of the academic arenas in which these frameworks have been formulated. It is hoped that 
this research will provide ‘real-world’ empirical material which can in turn be accessible to 
both academics and policymakers. Therefore, I reflect upon these theoretical frameworks 
where appropriate, however this research is largely underpinned instead by a conceptual 
framing which is based upon a synthesis of relevant core concepts and themes which are 
prevalent in the literature in order to examine the low carbon transition of the energy, 
transport and infrastructure sectors in cities. The conceptual framing has been specifically 
























Conceptualisation of ‘governance’: i.e. multiple and diverse actors across scales (rather than 
traditional hierarchical, linear, state-centric process);  
Subject to wider processes and institutionalised practices therefore continuously contested 
and renegotiated.   
Benefits and limitations of established theoretical frameworks: (e.g. MLP, MaP) 
Emphasis on ‘levels’ and processes within transitions e.g. niche (micro), regime (meso), 
landscape (macro);  
Limited attention to the role of actors, agency and lock-in, simplistic sense of scale, place 
and space.   
Role of actors (state/non-state) and networks/intermediaries i.e. ‘New’ and emerging forms 
of climate governance;  
Combination of actors using different models of ownership and implementation (e.g. ESCo) 
Role of agency and capacity 
Varying and fluid between scales and levels, influenced by individuals and collectives 





Conceptualisation of the ‘city’: i.e. the city as interwoven, inter-related and complex (rather 
than nested and bounded areas).  
Emphasis on city as ‘assemblage’ shaped by wider and unequal biological, geophysical, 
political and cultural processes.  
Role of the city in climate governance ranging from informal and voluntary engagement 
(e.g. municipal voluntarism), to strategic and purposive (e.g. low carbon urbanism).  
Role of external shocks and forces at the national level on urban governance (e.g. 





Conceptualisations of ‘justice’ i.e. emphasis on incorporating a justice/inclusion lens within 
sustainable transitions; 
Notion of ‘just’ transitions, however omissions of justice largely within mainstream climate 
change politics 
Underdeveloped theoretical frameworks for understanding justice in energy and transport 
studies (e.g. energy justice framework, mobility justice)  






Complex infrastructure systems and concepts of materiality (e.g. transport and energy) are 
bound not only in wider environment, but also within and between social connections; 
Emphasis on changing social meanings, power relations, personal bonds and connections 
which can influence decision-making on the ground.  
Understandings of differing forms of lock-in and path-dependency;  
Emphasis on strong relationship of urban materiality and multi-level actor agency; 
Emphasis on place-based and temporal legacies of systems which can hinder transitions.  
Influential yet under-theorised notion of path-creation i.e. route for overcoming lock-in and 
blockages, can give way to new forms of actor agency and governance;  
Emphasis on place-based and temporal legacies of systems which can influence transitions;  
Focus on actors and positive opportunities which are created through innovation, 
reconfiguration and recombination.   
Table 3.1: Summary of key conceptualisations for developing research framework 
 
3.2. RESEARCH STRATEGY  
As set out in Chapter 1, the aim of this thesis is to investigate the governance of low carbon 
and equitable transitions in cities in advanced economies. In order to achieve this 
overarching aim, I seek to understand which actors are involved in sustainable urban 
transitions, the approaches taken in practice, and the ways in which the implementation 




In light of this aim, I reiterate in Chapter 2 that it is important to be attuned to four major 
components: firstly the governance of sustainable urban transitions and the agency and 
capacity of multiple actors; secondly the multiple level and scales at which governance 
operates across space and urban areas more specifically; thirdly, the justice dimensions to 
ensure that certain groups (e.g. vulnerable, elderly and minority groups) are not 
disproportionately impacted; and finally, the approaches and pathways underpinning 
transitions.  
The use of an intensive case study such as Nottingham lends itself well in comparison to a 
more extensive approach. This is because it allows for a rich, qualitative investigation which 
encompasses the complex and multi-faceted nature of sustainable urban transitions, and 
more specifically the multiple dynamics that are at play, including the tensions, barriers and 
governing actors. I further consider the use of a case study method and provide a rationale 
behind the Nottingham case, as explored next.  
3.2.1. Case Study Method  
Whilst there is no one preferred method for researching sustainability, case studies are the 
most frequently adopted research strategy for urban researchers (Maginn et al. 2008; 
Zolfagharian et al. 2019). Crucially, case studies allow the ability to explore and investigate 
complex real-life phenomenon through using detailed contextual analysis of events or 
conditions and their relationships (Yin, 2014). This is appropriate given the complex and 
rich nature of sustainable transitions and the plethora of actors engaging across multiple 
scales. Furthermore, according to Yin (2014), case studies are suitable when the studied 
phenomenon is complex and not clearly or sufficiently theorised, and are particularly fitting 
when a degree of flexibility of research design is required. Maginn et al. (2008) highlight a 
particular strength of the way in which case studies allow the use of multiple research 
methods and different perspectives, which contribute to the depth and richness of data that 
can be obtained. Furthermore, because of its versatility, a variety of transition studies utilise 
case study methods across scales, ranging from those at the national level to those at the 
community level.  
There are several categories of case study research, namely exploratory, descriptive and 
explanatory, as shown in Figure 3.1 (although it should be noted that on many occasions 




descriptive nature of case studies is useful for this study, in line with studies such as Scanu 
and Cloutier (2015). This is because it seeks to determine the extent to which low carbon 
and inclusive transitions have been achieved in practice, and given the complex and multi-






Figure 3.1: Types of case study methodology (Fisher & Ziviani, 2004, p.186).  
 
Particularly in an era of urbanisation and globalisation, the comparative case study approach 
has been praised within recent years (e.g. McFarlane, 2011; Robinson, 2015) and there has 
been an increase in comparative case study approaches in transitions research and urban 
studies alike. The case study method has developed into a comparative method, whereby 
multiple cases are studied or independent cases are conducted in a number of cities, 
employing similar methods and research questions. Whilst cities are recognised as unique 
and idiosyncratic in character, the comparison of cities (also known as ‘comparative 
urbanism’) is considered as the systematic study of similarity and difference among urban 
processes rather than in cities per se (Nijman, 2007). Generally, such studies address the 
extent and manner of similarity and difference using descriptive and explanatory questions. 
As McFarlane (2011) highlights, there is no general rule to the number of case studies 
compared, and constraints such as time and research funding can to some extent dictate this 
decision-making.  
I initially planned a comparative study for this research to compare different approaches for 
low carbon and equitable transitions from two different case study contexts (e.g. Lemon et 




to select countries which had made strides in the field of low carbon trajectories. Although 
criticisms remain that transition studies are lacking in their application of non-OECD 
countries (Kohler et al. 2019; Markard et al. 2012), I carefully considered areas in advanced 
economies, i.e. those in North America and Europe, due to their engagement, progression 
and advancement in low carbon and inclusive transitions (in contrast to non-OECD countries 
which might have existing, more prominent financial and governance issues more generally).  
As highlighted, the topic of sustainability and a just transition is an issue which is widely 
debated and subject to much interpretation and perspectives, and there is generally no 
universal acceptance of one definition or indeed what such transitions look like, nor the ways 
in which sustainable and equitable transitions should be achieved, nor where or at what scale 
this is appropriately achieved. Therefore, in line with other studies (e.g. Levin-Keitel et al. 
2018), it was favourable from a practical and research perspective to conduct data collection 
within an English-speaking country to minimise misinterpretation and miscommunication 
on an existing complex and controversial topic.  
In addition to Nottingham, the city of Seattle in the United States also presented an 
appropriate and interesting case of low carbon and equitable urban transitions, again by 
providing rich examples of cross-sectoral decarbonised and just transitions. However, after 
careful reflection and initial scoping, a single intensive case study methodology was 
considered the most applicable for this research, which is in keeping with methodologies in 
transitions research (Kohler et al. 2019).  
The reasoning behind a single case study is two-fold: first, the site-specific focus of this 
research, i.e. the urban area, and the multi-faceted nature of transitions and its corresponding 
social, economic and political contexts required a method that allowed for a deeper analysis 
of complex phenomena which given time-restrictions and capacity would not have been as 
thorough as with two separate and international case studies (Durrant et al. 2018). Second, 
in December 2016 I experienced significant health setbacks after the diagnosis of a chronic 
neuro-muscular condition which resulted in a four month leave of absence, continuous 
lifestyle adjustments and on-going medical treatment. During this time, I reflected upon the 
future of this research, the need for on-going medical treatment and what would be suitable 
logistically factoring these elements in. Since I was already familiar with the Nottingham 




Glasgow, Nottingham was the most appropriate single case study and therefore I took this 
forward for investigation, as I expand upon next.  
3.2.2. Rationale for Nottingham Case Study 
I identified the UK as a suitable context for this research since it has committed to targeting 
greenhouse gas emissions and therefore appears to have a dynamic sustainable trajectory. 
However, this engagement has been fluid and incoherent given changing governments which 
has resulted in varying political will and national government support within recent years 
(as elaborated in Chapter 4). Such contexts are useful for examining sustainable trajectories 
across both local and national levels. It presented the opportunity to assess theoretical 
frameworks such as the MLP and concepts such as multi-level governance, lock-in and path-
dependency, and to develop these understandings from an empirical application. In addition, 
neoliberal austerity within the UK is an interesting contextual background which allowed 
for a greater investigation of the constraints and barriers of implementation pathways 
encountered by actors and their subsequent governing agency and capacity in low carbon 
and equitable urban transitions. Furthermore, from living in the UK and working and 
studying in the sustainable energy sector, I had a strong foundation with the context, which 
was beneficial for understanding low carbon transitions from a UK perspective. In addition, 
this was advantageous given the funding and time restrictions, and therefore suited in terms 
of practical purposes. 
The chosen case study for this research was the city of Nottingham, which is located in the 
East Midlands and was selected as a result of many careful reflections. Through an online 
scoping exercise which I used to identify potential urban areas to investigate, I discovered 
that Nottingham has made particular progress within recent years in the field of sustainable 
transitions. A notable example of this is the city’s ambitious climate change goals, with the 
most recent announcement in 2020 ‘to make the city the first carbon neutral city in the UK 
by 2028’ (Nottingham City Council, 2020a). This overt commitment to decarbonisation was 
therefore distinguishable, and this rationale echoes that of Durrant et al. (2019) who utilise 
the case study of Brighton and Hove in the UK due to being an example of a ‘front runner 
in the UK context when it comes to political commitment to the environment and therefore 




Nottingham’s intention complemented the integrated approach of this study, with the 
emergence of low carbon initiatives across transport, housing and energy sectors. This 
therefore allowed for a more holistic view of sustainable transitions at the urban scale in 
comparison to a focus on a single domain (Durrant et al. 2018). The relevance of Nottingham 
to the research topic was therefore anticipated to be fruitful and rich for research, and even 
more so since a preliminary literature review revealed that the city had received limited 
academic attention in terms of low carbon and equitable transitions13. This is in contrast to 
the commonly studied ‘premium world cities’ which have received most attention within 
urban sustainability research (Hodson & Marvin, 2010). This notable gap of application in 
the literature was a fundamental justification for empirical research, and further reinforces 
the valuable contribution of this thesis to novel and in-depth empirical research in the 
academic field.  
In conjunction with suitable examples of low carbon projects on the ground, I determined 
the case study in terms of the timing and funding restrictions of this research simultaneously 
with practical considerations. Nottingham’s location in the UK was beneficial since this was 
within accessible travelling distance from the University of Glasgow and in the same time-
zone which aided data collection purposes (for example during interviewing). The size of 
the city was appropriate for the scale of this research, with Nottingham being classified as a 
mid-sized city and with a population of circa. 300,000 inhabitants, and therefore contributed 
to the gap in literature which focuses predominantly on larger metropolitan cities and 
neglected mid-sized and smaller cities and town (Kern, 2019). Furthermore, Nottingham was 
ranked 11th most deprived out of 317 districts in England in the 2019 Indices of Multiple 
Deprivation, an increase from 8th in 2015 (Nottingham Insight, 2019a). In tandem with this, 
30 per cent of the city’s Lower Super Output Areas (LSOAs) fall amongst the 10 per cent 
most deprived in England, as shown in Figure 3.2. Nottingham has a higher than average 
rate of people with a limiting long-term disability or illness (Nottingham Insight, 2019a). 
Therefore, the persistence and exacerbation of inequality was particularly important for 
researching justice dimensions in low carbon transitions. Furthermore, as reflected upon in 
                                                 
13 At the time of writing, examples of noteworthy empirical studies related to low carbon transitions in 
Nottingham are by (but not limited to): Lemon et al. (2015) who provide a comparative analysis of three 
Midlands locations (Leicester, Nottingham and Coventry) to explore the complex relationship between national 
and local level policy; Dale et al. (2017) who provide an empirical evaluation of the Workplace Parking Levy 
on local traffic congestion in Nottingham; Preston et al. (2020) who discuss practical lessons from 




more detail in Section 3.5.2, this choice was also influenced by my positionality and personal 













Figure 3.2: Nottingham City 2019 Indices of Multiple Deprivation (Nottingham Insight, 
2019a).  
 
3.3. QUALITATIVE RESEARCH DESIGN 
As set out in Chapter 1, the research aims and objectives for this thesis seek to develop a 
comprehensive understanding of low carbon and inclusive governance at the city level. This 
thesis is particularly focused on the social and political, as well as the material, economic 




approach, that is, through identifying the governance and agency of multiple actors across 
various scales. This thesis makes a distinct contribution by engaging with these multiple 
dimensions of low carbon transitions, and the ways in which they articulate with multi-level 
governance.  
As highlighted by Zolfagharian et al. (2019), transition researchers have three general 
options with regard to research method, that is, qualitative research, quantitative research, 
and mixed-methods research (a combination of qualitative and quantitative). In keeping with 
the majority of empirical work on sustainable transitions (McCauley et al. 2018; Wolfram, 
2016), a qualitative, mixed-methods approach was considered the most suitable for this 
study. The specific focus on actors and their agency, on all scales, and the ways in which 
equitable transition trajectories are constructed and/or contested can be researched through 
different narrative data sources. The in-depth nature of the data collection process and the 
fluid and flexible research design complemented by qualitative research ensured that the 
rich, complex and nuanced topic of low carbon and equitable transitions at the urban level 
was appropriately understood.  Furthermore, a mixed-methods approach allowed for data to 
be triangulated, which helped legitimate and validate research (as discussed in Section 3.4).  
Additionally, sustainable transitions research can be categorised into different 
methodologies with respect to time and transition trajectory processes. Zolfagharian et al. 
(2019) highlight that there are two predominant types of research design within transition 
research, longitudinal and cross-sectional research design. The former, longitudinal, is the 
most commonly used as a research methodology and involves a study over an extended 
period of time, in comparison to cross-sectional studies which investigate a variable at a 
particular point in time. However, due to the time constraints of a PhD, this fieldwork does 
not simply fit into either of these categories since this research was conducted over a 4-year 
period in total between 2016-2020.  
The consideration of urban low carbon and equitable transitions additionally raises temporal 
dimensions, in other words, the timing of change of the transition itself. Transitions are 
understood as complex and having multiple processes. Transitions are accepted as long-term 
processes which can take years to unfold (as per lock-in and path-dependency), but also that 
they are altered in the shorter-term by co-evolutionary and multi-actor processes which have 




As shown by the research objectives, it was important to consider the role of multiple actors 
in governing low carbon and equitable transitions, i.e. actor agency. In addition, it was 
important to understand the timing and wider relations of collective and individual agency, 
such as the dynamics of actor agency in relation to the wider political and social contexts, 
since changing roles and role relations can be an indication of changes in shared values, 
norms and beliefs (Coe & Jordhus-Lier, 2010; Wittmayer et al. 2017).  
Due to the political nature of sustainable transitions, certain factors which are subject to 
alterations over time, such as local and national government policies, were a key 
consideration and it was necessary to look also to the wider climate policy context to help 
provide a detailed overview of transition pathways. In relation to this, Massey (2005) 
introduces a spatial and political dimension to examining wider contexts or ‘conjunctures’ 
(i.e. the state of affairs or events occurring on a national and international level) and 
appropriately asserts that there is a need to recognise the uneven geographies of conjunctures 
(such as the 2008 global economic crisis), and the different ways in which this can be 
politicised, narrated and articulated across space (Featherstone & Karaliotas, 2018). Peck 
(2017) follows this thinking and stresses the need for a ‘conjunctural approach’ to urban 
analysis and methodologies, also termed ‘conjunctural urbanism’. He argues that such an 
approach ‘explicitly problematises the relative positioning of cities’ (Peck, 2017, p.8) in 
relation to contexts of multi-scalar relations, uneven development and wider economic and 
political contexts. Using this approach in the example of neoliberal urbanism can open up a 
space for the construction of explanation between urban areas and is sensitive to issues of 
contextual, positional and situational specificity, rather than viewing neoliberal urbanism as 
global in trend, uniform across space and ubiquitous (Peck, 2017, p.9). This is a particularly 
important aspect for this research which places emphasis on the wider economic and political 
context (e.g. austerity urbanism) and the effect this has had on urban low carbon governance 
and the way it is politicised and contested between actors and across space. Given this 
approach, I have also reflected on the challenges of conducting research during the current 
wider political and economic conjuncture and how this can impact on data collection and 
analysis, as described in Section 3.7.  
With specific reference to Nottingham, whilst the study intended to study Nottingham’s 
recent pursuits towards low carbon and equitable transitions (the term ‘recent’ was open to 
interpretation but was largely understood as within the last 20 years), it was vital to not be 




the ways in which past processes may have influenced present trajectories.  Therefore, a 
cautionary approach was taken in this study’s design to include both historical transitions 
and future trajectories within the past 80 years. The research design therefore encompassed 
this timeframe within the research aims and objectives, which I set out next.  
3.3.1. Research Aims and Objectives  
As highlighted in Chapter 1, the overall aim of this research was to investigate the 
governance of urban low carbon and equitable transitions in an advanced economy, and this 
remained unchanged during the entire research process. I identified this aim through 
conducting a thorough literature review and paying close attention to research gaps, as 
described in Chapter 2. I investigated the research objectives (as outlined on page 8) using 
three qualitative methods: interviews, secondary data sources, and observational research 
and site visits, as detailed next.  
3.3.2. Interviews 
I collected data during the period of June 2017 to September 2019 and interviews were one 
of the main sources of data collection for this research. I chose this form of data collection 
as an approach due to the social and political nature of sustainable transitions and the need 
to access in-depth opinions, views and perceptions of low carbon and inclusive transitions 
in the city. I pursued face-to-face interviews as the primary data collection method for this 
research, and where this was not appropriate or possible, I conducted online and telephone 
interviews. Due to the nature of this research, this type of method allowed me to access 
personal, in-depth material and accommodated for a far more wide-ranging discussion than 
a questionnaire would permit (Flowerdew & Martin, 2005). The choice of interviews over 
ethnography was primarily because of the positionality of the researcher (that is, myself) in 
relation to the study, as interviewing does not rely on researcher-led observations (as 
discussed in greater detail in Section 3.5.1). As such, interviews were beneficial to help 
analysis and an ‘outsider’ perspective allowed for an overarching view of potentially 
conflicting views across different actors (Durrant et al. 2018; Murto et al. 2020).   
In total, I conducted 35 interviews with a wide range of stakeholders within and out-with the 
city. Interviewees were determined by their position in relation to the research project, and 
was largely made up of sustainability advocates, or those working within the field of 




geographical scales was crucial to examine a range of perspectives and the socio-spatial 
relations and dynamics within different scales at the urban level (Coenen et al. 2012; Hodson 
& Marvin, 2010). Similar to other qualitative research investigating low carbon transitions 
on the national level (e.g. Willis, 2017), interviews were generally not conducted with those 
who were known to explicitly oppose transition strategies or those who publicly did not 
accept the scientific consensus of climate change. This is because firstly, this individual 
positionality was difficult to identify; and secondly, most of those working within the field 
of sustainable transitions had an active interest in the environment and low carbon futures. 
The participants consisted of state actors within local and national government, and non-
state actors comprising of third sector organisations and private sector organisations, shown 
in Table 3.2 (a breakdown of the number of individuals interviewed per organisation/entity 
is found in Appendix A).  
 
Actor type Organisation/Entity 
‘State’ Actors 
National Gov (n=2) 
Department for Energy, Business, Industrial Strategy  
Office for Low Emission Vehicles 
Local Gov (n=5) 
Doncaster Council/Great North Energy 
Green Party 
Nottingham City Council 
Nottingham City Homes 
Nottinghamshire County Council 
‘Non-State’ 
Actors 
Third Sector (n=12) 
Anonymous Charity 
APSE Energy 
Campaign for Better Transport Nottingham 
Global Justice Nottingham 
Great North Energy 
Meadows Ozone Energy Services (MOZES) 
National Energy Action 
Nottingham Energy Partnership 
Pedals 
Robin Hood Energy 
St Ann’s Advice Centre 
The Big Wheel 
Private Sector (n=3) 
LEVEL 
Municipal 
Western Power Distribution 
Table 3.2: List of organisations by actor type (in alphabetical order) 
 
It was also vital to secure interviews with individuals across sectors such as transport, energy 




in Table 3.3 (a breakdown of the number of individuals interviewed per sector is found in 
Appendix A). The employment position of interviewees varied significantly to allow a range 
of positions and opinions to be collected, for example, from those working more directly 
with members of the public (such as fuel poverty officers), to those who had responsibility 
for initiatives (such as project officers), to those who were senior in strategy and 
development (for example heads of department).  
 
Sector Organisation/Entity 
Energy (n=11) APSE Energy (Not-for-Profit) 
Department for Energy, Business, Industrial Strategy (UK Government 
department) 
Energy and Carbon Management (Nottinghamshire County Council) 
Energy Services (Nottingham City Council) 
Global Justice Nottingham (Not-for-Profit) 
Great North Energy (Doncaster Council) 
Meadows Ozone Energy Services (Charity/Not-for-Profit) 
Municipia (Private Consultancy) 
Nottingham Energy Partnership (Not-for-Profit) 
Robin Hood Energy (Nottingham City Council/Not-for-Profit) 
WPD (Private Distribution Network Operator) 
Green Party* 
Transport (n=10) Anonymous Charity (Charity) 
Campaign for Better Transport (Charity) 
Cycle City (Nottingham City Council) 
Electric buses (Nottingham City Council) 
Go Ultra Low (Nottingham City Council) 
LEVEL (Private Consultancy) 
Nottingham Electric Trams (Nottingham City Council) 
Office for Low Emission Vehicles (UK Government department)  
Pedals (Charity) 
The Big Wheel (Charity) 
Workplace Parking Levy (Nottingham City Council) 
Housing (n=6) Energy Services/REMOURBAN (Nottingham City Council)  
Fuel Poverty (Nottingham City Homes) 
National Energy Action (Charity) 
St Ann’s Advice Centre (Charity) 
Strategic Housing Assets (Nottingham City Council) 
Sustainable Energy (Nottingham City Homes) 
*It is noted here that the Green Party covers all sectors, i.e. energy, housing, and transport but for the basis of simplicity 
has been included as the energy sector since this was referred to most frequently by the interviewee.  





I independently recruited interviewees by initially emailing the organisation or interviewees 
directly, after sourcing their contact details on web pages and online documents. Gatekeepers 
are individuals within organisations who have (or can withhold) access or power to required 
candidates for research (Flowerdew & Martin, 2005). Similarly, the snowballing effect is a 
process in which one contact eases recruitment of another through association within similar 
fields for research. This in turn can help ease recruitment of prospective interviewees and 
allow the gaining of information and range of perspectives. As such, I used gatekeeping and 
snowballing as tactics frequently to recruit interviewees (the importance of which I reflect 
upon in Section 3.6).  
The location of interviews was an important methodological consideration, particularly as 
interview sites can produce ‘micro-geographies’ of spatial relations and meaning (Elwood 
& Martin, 2004). By its nature, the interview site may reflect relationships of the researcher 
with the participant, the participant with the site, and the site within a wider socio-cultural, 
power context which might affect both researcher and the participant (Edwards & Holland, 
2013). The site of each interview was determined by the interviewee in every case and face-
to-face meetings were held in public places to facilitate a more relaxed conversation and was 
appropriate regarding safety precautions. In the event of telephone and email conversations, 
I conducted interviews from home to allow for privacy and a quiet setting.  
The style of each interview was informal, in-depth and semi-structured based on open-ended 
questions around predominant themes which emerged from pre-read literature and research, 
as shown in Appendix B. This choice of structure allowed fluidity and flexibility of the 
conversation as opposed to structured interviewing techniques. Each interview varied in 
content and design depending on the participants’ role, background, function and 
knowledge. I recorded the data on a Dictaphone and took additional notes, where 
permissible. The length of interviews also varied, but generally lasted between 1 – 1.5 hours 
in duration per interview.  
3.3.3. Secondary Data Sources  
A second important source of data collection was in the form of desk-based documentary 
analysis, which consisted of primarily online documentary sources. This included those 
produced formally and published by the national government and local authorities in order 




documents. Since environmental policy can encompass a broader and overlapping range of 
themes and sector-specific areas (such as biodiversity, agriculture, water quality, waste, and 
historical environment), I restricted my analysis of environment policy and strategy analysis 
to that relating to low carbon to include transport, buildings, and renewable energy supply.  
Documents and website blogs from private sector organisations and third sector 
organisations such as non-governmental organisations and charities were another vital 
source of data for this study through permitting a data source which encompassed in many 
cases more critical and personal perspectives. Additionally, I used newspaper articles and 
academic literature to support data collection.  
I collected quantitative data, such as census data and sustainability ranking studies where 
appropriate, however this consisted a less substantial part of research. The data used in this 
study was utilised for contextual analysis and qualitative comparisons by abstracting those 
elements within the documents which were important and most relevant to the research aims.  
3.3.4. Observational Research and Site-Specific Visits 
Due to the technical nature of low carbon transitions in the city, site-specific visits comprised 
a third method of data collection, and I conducted a select number of interviews with key 
stakeholders during this time, as shown in Table 3.4 below.  
 
Participation Type Event/Activity Date 
Attendance Nottingham Go Ultra Low FestEVal June 2018 
Interview and Site Visit Remourban Housing Project July 2018 
Interview and Test-Ride Electric Bike and New Cycle Infrastructure July 2018 
Test-Ride Electric Tram Infrastructure July 2018 
Attendance National Energy Action Conference on Fuel 
Poverty 
Sept 2018 
Table 3.4: Observational Research and Site-Specific Visits (in chronological order) 
 
I conducted observational research during these events, which essentially placed people and 
observations at the centre of the research. Such an approach allowed for elements of 
immersive and ‘lived’ research, and events to be viewed through the perspective of those 




providing a deeper analysis of social processes of a given situation, which helped to identify 
fluid, complex and shifting issues and guide better understanding (Plows, 2008). During this 
time, I reflected and wrote down thoughts and observations in a field workbook. The degree 
of observations during ‘attendance’ and ‘site-visit’ were mainly passive, though where 
needed I initiated conversation with other participants and made my role as a researcher 
explicit.  
During ‘test-rides’, the role of observation was more active by using the infrastructure as a 
public citizen. Essentially, this involved borrowing an electric bike from Nottingham City 
Council for approximately 2 hours and being guided on the newly constructed and 
segregated cycle paths around the city by a member of the City Council transport team. 
During this time, I observed aspects such as the quality of the paths, ease of access including 
signage, and general concurrence with other road users such as cars. There was a discussion 
throughout this period and I asked questions to further understand the decision-making 
processes of segregated cycle paths. Furthermore, electric bicycles are a potential solution 
for transport decarbonisation and a fairly novel initiative in the UK, and this therefore was 
my first-time experience using one. As such, I made personal reflections on their ease of use 
(which was generally positive), yet there appear to be justice implications due to cost (as I 
reflect upon in Chapter 6). I arranged site-visits and test rides of infrastructure through 
gatekeepers, either initiated by myself or through the gatekeeper themselves.  
I gained access for attending the Go Ultra Low FestEVal and National Fuel Poverty Annual 
Conference by emailing the host organisers (Nottingham City Council and National Energy 
Action, respectively) and secured a delegate place. The Go Ultra Low FestEVal was a free 
two-day event held in the Old Market Square in Nottingham city centre to introduce 
members of the public to electric vehicles. This included a display of electric vehicles and a 
series of talks by advocates of electric vehicles and the shifts to decarbonised transportation, 
as shown in the programme flyer in Appendix C. The National Energy Agency Fuel Poverty 
Annual Conference was held in Nottingham over 2.5 days, and included a series of talks 
from various state and non-state actors, a programme of which is included in Appendix D. 
During the breaks and lunch-time, I was able to network with other delegates who worked 
specifically in the field of fuel poverty, and again made my role as a researcher explicit. I 




3.4. RESEARCH ANALYSIS  
The use of interviews was the main source of data collection and constituted the most time-
consuming element of this research, although this was enhanced by secondary data collection 
and observational research and site-specific visits. This mixed-methods approach was 
important for triangulating data as a research method, which allowed me to collect data from 
different sources and at various times to facilitate for rich, in-depth and rigorous research to 
be gained from the multiple sources available.  
I recorded interviews (where permissible) for ease of data collection, and then transcribed 
audio recordings onto a computer. I collated and inputted the transcript data into a specialist 
qualitative research computer software ‘Nvivo’ where I subsequently coded the data to 
discover predominant and emerging themes. I divided these primary themes into more 
specific sub-themes to aid in-depth analysis and to help identify overlapping connections 
and contradictions throughout the transcripts (such as those relating to multi-scalar 
governance, justice, and transition barriers, as shown in Appendix E). Such a technique 
allowed for appropriate discourse analysis to be conducted and provided flexibility and focus 
to answer the specific research questions. I applied a theoretical approach during thematic 
analysis, whereby I consulted thematic connections further with existing academic literature 
and correlated these (e.g. Eckersley, 2017; Loorbach et al. 2017; Zolfagharian et al. 2019).  
With regard to the analysis of data collected from secondary data, as aforementioned in 
Section 3.3, I restricted my analysis of environment policy and strategy analysis to that 
relating to low carbon to include transport, buildings, and renewable energy supply. I 
identified online documents using online searches, e.g. government policy documents, news 
websites, blogs, and inputted the relevant documents into NVivo. As per my analysis of the 
interview data, I subsequently coded the data using predominant and emerging themes, and 
again divided these primary themes into sub-categories to allow a closer analysis of the 
information. Similarly, I used my own observational notes which were transcribed into an 
MS Word document and coded this within NVivo in a similar fashion. Using these different 
data sources, I grouped findings and themes together or set them alongside those which I 
believed were to be related in order to identify emerging themes, viewpoints or focuses 
(Blaxter et al. 2001; Eckersley, 2017). Again, I consulted the findings with the conceptual 




Prior to data collection, it was acknowledged that data collection and analysis occur 
simultaneously and that the data collected throughout the research process may impact 
further data collection, for example by introducing preliminary themes and using findings 
from previous observations to guide the next observations (Merriam, 2009).  As such, a 
‘grounded theory’ approach was useful in data analysis as this enabled for data collection 
and analysis to be a continual, iterative process (in comparison to one which remained static). 
This allowed for new themes, concepts and phenomena to emerge from the data which can 
help enable theory to be formulated (Mills et al. 2010; Strauss & Corbin, 1998).   
After the majority of interviews had been completed and transcribed, it became evident that 
the predominant themes, issues and empirical data were being repeated by most individuals. 
As such I had reached a stage when I was not identifying any ‘new’ emerging themes. This 
stage of research collection is commonly known as theoretical saturation. It is worth noting 
that a researcher can never be certain that theoretical saturation has been achieved 
(MacQuarrie, in Mills et al. 2010), and therefore my decision to conclude data collection 
(apart from the very occasional contact for clarification or follow-up purposes) was taken 
carefully to ensure this was not done too hastily nor that data collection was being 
unnecessarily prolonged. Furthermore, given the length of time conducting empirical 
research (approximately 2.5 years), and the number of different participants interviewed 
(totalling 35), this demonstrated a sufficient range of perspectives and viewpoints for the 
study. The qualitative nature of data collection and analysis required an important 
consideration of ethical implications of this research, as described next.  
3.5. ETHICS IN SUSTAINABLE TRANSITIONS RESEARCH  
Researching sustainable transitions at the urban level is undoubtedly a complex issue, due 
to the multi-faceted nature of socio-technological systems, and the competing and intricate 
socio-political views and interests of a range of actors across sectors. These complex socio-
technical systems are not static, and investigating transitions involves past, present and 
future considerations across the urban area. As such, the complexity of sustainability 




3.5.1. Researcher Subjectivity, Positionality and Reflectivity   
Prior to data collection, I conducted a self-assessment to ensure that I had reflected upon all 
ethical considerations, and ethical approval was granted for this research by the University 
of Glasgow in April 2017 (Appendix F). No sensitive or vulnerable groups which required 
specific ethical approval were used in this research. I informed all participants about the 
research in an accurate and comprehensive manner and that their participation in research 
was entirely optional before data collection started (Appendix G). Before collection, I 
received full written consent from each participant permitting the use of the data, and in 
addition to this, the process of data recording was optional (Appendix H). In cases where 
interviews were collected by phone or email, I received written consent electronically. Post-
interview, I duly thanked participants for their time and participation by email and in person 
where applicable.  
I anonymised all interviewees randomly during and post data collection by giving them a 
number from 1-35 following ‘P’ (denoting Participant). The anonymisation of individuals 
was vital for preventing respondent bias and to allow for personal views to be candidly 
shared which may have been of a sensitive or political nature, or one which conflicted with 
the overall representation of the participants’ organisation. I have not disclosed the 
interviewees roles in case there was only one role of that nature in the organisation (which 
can often be the case especially in smaller organisations or businesses). However, I sought 
permission to include organisation names (except one organisation which wished to remain 
anonymous). The choice to include organisation names was considered particularly 
important due to the socio-political nature of this research, the context of this research, and 
to help understand views and perceptions from certain actors or sectors. 
The researcher is an important part of the research process by shaping the ways in which the 
study is framed and guided, and the ways in which data is interpreted, understood and 
presented. It is important to state that research was undertaken from my personal values to 
drive societal change towards a more sustainable and inclusive society, yet every attempt 
was made to remain critical and open to different perspectives from a research standpoint 
and reflexivity was constantly maintained during the research process. As such, my 
positionality as a researcher is undoubtedly pro-environmental with a willingness to 




ethical significance of my individual and personal actions before, during and after data 
collection to ensure the authenticity of views raised from the empirical research.  
Whilst there were benefits of commonality through there being no significant cultural 
differences between myself and the researched groups (Davies et al. 2002), I conducted 
myself and my behaviour in adherence to the University of Glasgow’s Ethical Committee 
guidelines, Economic and Social Research Council’s (ESRC) Framework for Research 
Ethics and British Psychological Society’s Code of Conduct, and for my own personal desire 
to conduct research effectively and professionally.  
Positionality affects every phase of the research process, as the researcher is the medium 
through which questions are constructed and designed, to the ways in which data and 
knowledge is collected, interpreted, analysed and presented (Coghlan & Brydon-Miller, 
2014). As highlighted in Section 3.1, research philosophy was mainly from a pragmatic and 
interpretivist standpoint, which places emphasis on the socially-constructed nature of 
transitions and subsequent differing experiences of those involved in turn. This included the 
way in which questions were presented to ensure they were not unethical, aggressive, 
underhand or discomforting, and sensitivity was given to the rights, beliefs and cultural 
context of participants and researched information (Cloke et al. 2004).  
Social justice, equity and power relations are particular themes of this research, and so the 
focus on justice dimensions in transitions is important to consider from an ethical standpoint. 
On the one hand, it is important to consider the ways in which justice in transitions is 
perceived, articulated and enacted at the urban level by multiple actors, and on the other 
hand, the ways in which justice in transitions is perceived by the researcher. As such, it was 
crucial to ensure that I handled these discussions in an ethical way, i.e. with sensitivity, 
delicacy and in an appropriate manner. I gave the interviewee time to share their opinions 
and reinforced that their participation was voluntary, anonymous, and could be withdrawn 
at any time without judgement.  
Davies et al. (2002) further emphasise that researchers should critically examine how they 
may influence the research process, and in doing so rigorously question interpretations to 
ensure that the evidence is not being ‘conveniently’ used to reinforce existing values. Thus, 
during post data-collection stages, I transcribed interviews verbatim as to not compensate 




research, I took caution by transcribing quotes verbatim throughout the thesis to ensure 
accuracy. In addition, I maintained a critical distance during interviews to allow the 
interviewee space to express their personal opinions and conducted several thesis edits and 
proof-readings to ensure that I had not made over-generalisations and to ensure that claims 
were presented soundly (Kantor & Savitch, 2008; Yin, 2014).  
The multi-level governance approach applied in this research brings to light the different 
responsibilities, agency and capacities of individual and collective actors in governing 
climate change. The nature of transitions requires changing embedded infrastructures and 
patterns of behaviour, which within sustainability thinking are considered to be ‘morally 
right’ decisions in the context of climate change and the anticipated and unanticipated 
consequences that current practices pose on present and future generations (Robertson, 
2017). Therefore, the idea of what is ‘morally right’ decision-making presented a particularly 
ethical consideration for this research, since it is dependent on individuals, their perceptions 
and values (i.e. micro-ethics), which can be conditional on personal and collective learning, 
experiences and social relations (Kibert et al. 2018; Miller, 2014). Whilst individual 
decisions and perceptions are important for sustainability ethics, the very notion of 
‘sustainability’ is a vision not simply of private benefit, but rather of common good, and 
therefore the ethics of sustainability from collectives, organisations and societies (i.e. macro-
ethics) is pertinent. As such, when discussions arose around sustainable transitions, ethical 
values and decision-making, I delicately sought clarification as to how the interviewee (or 
organisation) understood the concept of ‘sustainable transitions’14.  
Due to the particularly political nature of sustainable transitions, seeking a wide range of 
opinions and perspectives was vital for this research, in order to understand the barriers in 
progressing sustainable trajectories from a city-level. I was constantly aware of the position 
of the individuals and organisations who participated in research, that is, whether their 
position was pro-environmental from a third sector organisation, or whether they were bound 
as civil servants to remain politically neutral, or whether perhaps there were conflicts of 
interests from work or personal opinions.   
                                                 
14 Due to the scope of this research, it was not possible to examine the environmental ethics of each interviewee 
in detail. See an interesting empirical study by Pineda Pinto (2020) who examined the environmental ethics in 
the perception of urban planners using the case study of four city councils in Australia. The study provides 
insight into how environmental ethics can inform urban planning, and that in this case, perceptions of urban 




To overcome the dynamics of differing political parties in the research, I adopted an 
additional technique during interviews that was particularly successful from a researcher 
perspective. My general approach with each interview was to attend them with a ‘fresh’ 
perspective (although it is acknowledged that over time this can be unrealistic and 
problematic, as highlighted by Corbin Dwyer and Buckle (2009) with regard to ‘insider-
outsider’ relations in qualitative research). Nevertheless, from a practical, researcher 
perspective, I decided not to disclose too much information or knowledge about the 
participant and their background which successfully allowed the interviewee space to discuss 
their thoughts and opinions to an ‘outside’ perspective. Coincidentally it provided me a 
critical distance to ensure biases were not given. As such, I did not frame political questions 
antagonistically with a particular political party in question, however, I exercised a critical 
perspective in research analysis. Chapters 4, 5 and 6 are illustrative of the overall success of 
this research design, yet it is nonetheless important to critically reflect upon this, as discussed 
next.  
3.6. RESEARCH DESIGN REFLECTIONS  
A prior engagement and knowledge of sustainable transitions and the UK context was 
indispensable for this research, which at times was complex and required a particularly 
comprehensive understanding. Generally, the research design for this study proved effective, 
and the flexibility of this was particularly applicable given my on-going health situation. The 
number of interviews conducted achieved expectations and in-depth empirical data was 
collected. This was subsequently analysed, and the rich findings of this research are 
demonstrated in Chapters 4, 5 and 6. However, it is important to reflect upon the 
methodological challenges, of which there were five notable obstacles experienced, 
particularly during interviews.  
First, during interview questioning, it was important to strike a balance of gaining trust and 
building rapport with participants on one hand, and gaining information and data on the other 
hand. For example, I made all efforts to genuinely conduct interviews in a pleasant, friendly 
and sensitive manner; yet, participants often digressed from the topic at hand. Whilst this 
can often be productive for the analytical process, for example by providing contextual cues 
and revealing important knowledge, feelings and concerns (e.g. DiCicco-Bloom & Crabtree, 
2006; Riessman, 2012), this was also challenging and misleading in terms of seeking 




by practising patience and understanding, and relating back to the interview questions which 
in practice required a certain degree of flexibility, judgement and tact.   
Second, it became increasingly difficult during interviews to investigate the barriers to 
transitions, and upon reflection, I underestimated this before data collection. As previously 
highlighted, this could have been as a result of a general hesitation to be critical because of 
the interviewee’s position within their organisation. A good example of this is with regard 
to questioning civil servants within the national government. Although members of the 
public have the legal right to access information through the Freedom of Information Act, 
Environmental Information Regulations and Data Protection Act (Nottingham City Council, 
2020b), and the national government has a statutory duty to fulfil this, the sharing of personal 
views and opinions publicly contradicts the Civil Service Code and could jeopardise the 
interviewees position. Furthermore, most participants remained neutral or positive about 
Nottingham’s experience, and at times were uncritical of certain aspects. Whilst this 
neutrality and positivity has been duly represented in the research findings, I deliberately 
sought and explicitly framed more critical perspectives in order to avoid research bias. I 
further negotiated this lack of criticality by triangulating this with other interviews and 
documentary sources.  
Third, in practice it was difficult to engage with certain actors within one particular 
organisation (which cannot be disclosed in light of anonymity), and the reasons for this 
remain ultimately unknown. This conflicted with ethical considerations, which included 
being mindful not to coerce nor pressure individuals or organisations into participating in 
research after multiple elements of contact were attempted. Ultimately, I overcame this 
blockage through the use of a gatekeeper, in this instance an individual in a senior position, 
which was critical for securing an interview and gaining access to in-depth information.   
Fourth, whilst there were a range of actors engaged across the sectors of housing, energy and 
transport, in practice these sectors were not so clearly defined, and housing and energy were 
often discussed concurrently. As such, the definition of these sectors did in-fact prove 
messier than expected, and led to an imbalance of actors across sectors, as highlighted in 
Table 3.2 and Table 3.3. It is therefore acknowledged that at times in the empirical chapters 
(Chapters 4, 5 and 6) there may be an overuse of one sector over another, though examples 




Fifth, although every measure has been taken to remain as flexible as possible and mitigate 
against foreseeable problems, there are nonetheless three noteworthy points which posed a 
challenge from a research perspective in the current conjuncture (i.e. wider global context). 
The first is at the time of writing the global community experienced a world-wide pandemic 
from December 2019.  As of January 2021, the infectious coronavirus disease termed 
‘Covid-19’ has resulted in the infection of approximately 100 million people globally and 
over 100,000 deaths in the UK alone (WHO, 2021). Many countries including the UK 
underwent (and are still undergoing) a series of unprecedented quarantine and ‘lockdown’ 
measures to prevent the spreading of the virus.  Though the lockdown measures did not affect 
data collection directly since this was already completed by this period, this context is 
important for a number of reasons; namely, it is a significant reminder of the impact of 
sudden, global threats to communities on local, national and international scales. This 
presents a significant future challenge for city actors pursuing low carbon and equitable 
trajectories considering the socio-economic impacts of the pandemic (as detailed in the 
empirical chapters). What is more, it is interesting to note that since the outbreak of the 
Covid-19 pandemic, Nottingham has consistently recorded one of the highest infection rates 
in England (BBC, 2020). This is alongside other northern parts of England such as Greater 
Manchester, Lancashire, South Yorkshire and Newcastle which have witnessed ‘hotspots’ 
in local areas and have resulted in a series of local lockdowns in the north. Whilst there is 
no single answer for this trend, there is a possibility that this is due to the existing socio-
economic demographics in northern England which have made people located there 
particularly vulnerable to the virus, in addition to the higher levels of deprivation, serious 
health conditions and other issues such as overcrowded housing. Again, this reveals an 
important context for this research by highlighting the different and uneven effects of the 
pandemic on different geographic regions in the UK which can underscore existing equity 
dimensions. This also indicates the consequences this can have on local governance of low 
carbon and just transitions in terms of the potential political side-lining and overshadowing 
of climate change, the associated austerity measures as a result of the pandemic, and the 
future pressures that will follow as a result of this (e.g. Hepburn et al. 2020; Woodcock, 
2020).   
The second uncontrollable condition is the evolving and unpredictable international and 
national political conjuncture. During the writing of this research, there were a number of 
events which made environmental politics ambiguous at various points in the research. This 




after the UK’s referendum of European Union membership in 2016 which resulted in the 
UK’s general population voting to leave the EU (Brexit) and the UK-wide general elections 
in 2017 and 2019 which resulted in a Conservative Party majority. In addition, given the 
USA’s political strength in the global arena, the USA election in November 2020 which 
resulted in the (narrow) election of Democratic candidate Joe Biden poses significant 
questions for the future of environmental policy. On the one hand, the Democratic Party are 
viewed as more engaged with decarbonisation and environmental justice, and Joe Biden has 
committed to re-entering the Paris Agreement, for the US energy sector to go carbon-free by 
2035 and net-zero emissions by 2050 (Astor, 2020; JoeBiden, 2020). However, the 2020 
election resulted in an almost-even split of Congress between the Republican and 
Democratic Party and therefore there may be contestation in pursing green initiatives (Astor, 
2020; Tollefson, 2020).  
Another noteworthy circumstance in 2018 was the increased international youth climate 
demonstrations following Greta Thunberg ‘Friday for Climate’, which arguably placed 
climate change in the political spotlight like never before. Whilst this is a positive 
development, again such evolving and unpredictable conditions make it increasingly 
difficult from a research perspective to predict the pathways for low carbon and just 
transitions.  
The third shifting circumstance is that of Robin Hood Energy, which changed ownership 
structure during the last phases of writing up period. Prior to September 2020, Robin Hood 
Energy was a municipally-owned energy supply company that was set up in 2013 in a 
response to alleviate fuel poverty in the city. However due to debt this became privatised 
and sold off to Centrica (which also owns British Gas) (Centrica, 2020). This highlights the 
difficulties of conducting and writing research in a fluid and ever-changing environment 
since research up until this point had been focussed around the municipal ownership of this 
ESCo. It appropriately reveals the sensitive and unpredictable nature of energy markets, in 
particular smaller energy suppliers and those owned by local authorities which have made 
attempts and subsequently failed to gain traction in disrupting the energy market for low 
carbon and equitable urban transitions. Nevertheless, the privatisation of Robin Hood 
Energy has not made a significant change to the core research arguments and it is still an 
undeniably good example of an initiative pursuing urban low carbon and equitable 
transitions and has therefore remained in this research (and discussed in more detail in 




3.7. CONCLUSION  
Whilst there has been a substantial growth of empirical research of sustainable transitions 
from a variety of disciplines, this can pose a significant challenge from a methodological 
perspective, since different disciplines have certain methodological applications which are 
based on their suitability for the chosen research. As such, this has led to a distinctive 
methodology which is underpinned by various approaches and perspectives to research low 
carbon and equitable transitions in practice.   
In this chapter, I have set out that the research philosophy of this study is one which does 
not place itself within one particular and restrictive epistemological nor ontological stance, 
although the notions of pragmatism and interpretivism are considered closely related to the 
research philosophy which I adopted to answer the research aims. In terms of the conceptual 
approach, since there are limitations of using one particular and restrictive theoretical 
framework, I have drawn upon multiple frameworks, themes and core concepts which are 
prevalent in sustainable transitions literature and allowed me to develop a more 
comprehensive understanding.  
The research strategy used in this research is a case study method, which I considered the 
most appropriate for this study. I identified the case study of Nottingham in the UK as a 
strong and valuable city example to analyse low carbon and equitable transitions which was 
advantageous for providing in-depth and rich findings, and in terms of practically conducting 
research in the field.  
The research methods were qualitative to enable me to develop an in-depth and nuanced 
understanding of low carbon and inclusive urban governance. I considered this the most 
effective type of data collection, due to the complex social and political nature of sustainable 
urban transitions. In line with this, I took a conjunctural approach by giving weight to the 
broader context of transitions, which opened a space for the construction of explanation 
between urban areas and considered issues of contextual, positional and situational 
specificity, rather than viewing certain contexts (such as the global financial crisis or 
austerity urbanism) as global in trend, uniform across space and ubiquitous. I collected data 
primarily using semi-structured, in-depth interviews with a range of state and non-state 
actors. I supplemented data collection by using documentary analysis of core formal and 




three main sources of research methods allowed me to analyse data using themes. I 
subsequently triangulated data to enhance validity and legitimacy.  
It is important to disclose that research was undertaken from my personal values to drive 
societal change towards a more sustainable and inclusive society. As such, the position of 
myself as the researcher is pro-environmental with a willingness to encourage the solving of 
problems in practice. Due to the particularly qualitative nature of this research, I have duly 
reflected upon the ethical considerations and recognise the implications of my own 
positionality, interpretation and interaction with participants throughout the research 
duration.  
Finally, I have outlined the methodological challenges and demonstrated the difficulties 
encountered when conducting research of low carbon and equitable urban transitions in 
practice. For example, this ranged from the challenge of negotiating interview discussion 
and gaining more critical perspectives, to conducting research in a changing, evolving and 
unpredictable global context and political conjuncture such as Covid-19 and political 
elections. Despite these challenges, I have effectively conducted empirical investigations 
and produced in-depth and rich findings, as demonstrated next in Chapters 4, 5 and 6. By 
way of introduction, the next chapter sets out the policy environment for low carbon 





MULTI-LEVEL POLICY FOR LOW CARBON 
EQUITABLE URBAN TRANSITIONS 
 
4.0. INTRODUCTION 
To achieve critical reductions in global carbon emissions and prevent the catastrophic effects 
of climate change in cities, the governance of decarbonised and equitable transitions must 
be coordinated by a multitude of actors across various scales (international, national and 
local levels). Across these scales, climate change governance can be implemented by a 
variety of approaches and measures, such as via policy, strategic plans, treaties and 
regulation; new intergovernmental or interagency institutions; in addition to economic 
instruments, such as subsidies and tax incentives. These approaches and measures have their 
own distinct function and are a key intervention for enabling sustainable transitions 
(Pettibone, 2015). Importantly, the implementation and stabilisation of policies are subjected 
to external factors, such as institutional, political, social, technological, economic, legal and 
temporal pressures, which can in turn affect governance and are therefore crucial to consider 
(Knox-Hayes, 2012).  
Through a multi-level perspective, I critically address international, national and local 
climate policy in turn, and set out the governance and policy context shaping Nottingham’s 
efforts towards low carbon and equitable transitions. This chapter is divided into four 
sections. In the first section of the chapter, I argue that despite climate change being on the 
global agenda since 1992, greenhouse gas emissions have risen significantly on a global 
scale, regardless of multilateral emission reduction agreements, and as such have important 
implications for low carbon transitions at national and local levels. Through identifying the 
major policy approaches of climate governance on an international level, it is apparent that 
despite progress, there have been setbacks which include firstly, the uneven localisation of 
Sustainable Development Goals; secondly, the weakness of legally-binding targets (e.g. 
Paris Agreement); and thirdly, a belated emphasis on justice elements in low carbon 




In the second section, I situate Nottingham’s governance for low carbon and just transitions 
within the national political context, arguing that whilst the UK Government has made some 
progress in decarbonising its economy, the change in government since 2010 has resulted in 
a shift in climate change policy. This has become marked by economic austerity and 
inadequate progress for meeting climate change commitments, with the unlikelihood of the 
UK meeting its international climate change commitments (such as the Paris Agreement of 
limiting global warming to well below 1.5 degrees Celsius), nor its own targets (for example 
as laid out in the fifth carbon budget targets 2028-2032) (Emden & Murphy, 2019). As such, 
I demonstrate that despite stated commitments, the UK’s national low carbon and just 
transition is compromised through its current climate policy which is marked by: firstly, 
unsupportive policy for achieving climate change targets; secondly, the lack of ambitious 
targets; and thirdly, implicit reference to justice dimensions.  
In the third section, I consider the central policies governing environmental transitions at the 
city-level. Since the urban area of Nottingham is governed by two local authorities, I 
examine both Nottingham City Council’s and Nottinghamshire County Council’s climate 
policies in turn. Efforts to drive low carbon and inclusive transitions at the city level are 
contingent upon having suitable and ambitious visions, policies, directions and measures in 
place. However, there is a stark contrast between visions, approaches and measures taken by 
the two councils, which is exacerbated by the lack of supportive climate change policy at the 
national level. I contend that this has resulted in a local environment of firstly, uneven 
climate policy between Nottingham’s local authorities; secondly, unequal climate policy 
within Nottinghamshire County Councils; and thirdly, piecemeal references to justice 
dimensions in Nottingham City Council policies.  
Finally, I offer a conclusion arguing that on both international and national levels, there is 
evidence of weak climate change targets; fragmented and uneven climate policy; and 
inadequate attention to justice elements. As a result, this is being reflected in local level 





4.1. INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE FOR LOW CARBON 
AND EQUITABLE TRANSITIONS 
The governance of climate change on an international level is a formidable task and 
undoubtedly the biggest global challenge to date, particularly in terms of policy and 
international cooperation (Vogler, 2007). Although other institutions of state and non-state 
actors have also emerged at multiple scales, the creation of the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) remains the main international forum for 
climate change governance. In total, 195 countries have joined the agreement (known as the 
Convention) which recognises that coordinated action is necessary over four key areas: 1) 
mitigating greenhouse gas emissions; 2) adapting to climate change; 3) reporting of national 
emissions; and 4) financing of climate action in developing countries (UNFCCC, 2020). 
Most importantly, the Convention commits the Parties into holding a continuing series of 
annual conferences, known as Conference of Parties (COP). Recent discourse has sought to 
re-evaluate the UNFCCC as a climate change governing body, and instead of considering 
the UNFCCC as an authority that attempts to govern climate change in its entirety, the 
UNFCCC is more recently reconceptualised to have a more coordinating role in a diverse 
landscape of climate governance (e.g. Betsill et al. 2015).  
Whilst there has been limited success in emission reductions from some developed countries, 
greenhouse gas emissions have risen significantly on a global scale, despite multilateral 
emission reduction agreements dating back to the Kyoto Protocol in 1997 (Bulkeley & Kern, 
2005; Routledge et al. 2018). Such increases during this time reinforce the way that political 
will to tackle climate change is being generally eroded, rather than built. In 2018, the IPCC 
stated that urgent and unprecedented changes are needed to reach climate targets and to keep 
temperatures between 1.5 degrees Celsius and 2 degrees Celsius; with predictions that should 
these targets not be achieved within 12 years, the anthropogenic-induced damages made to 
the planet and its ecosystem will be irreversible (IPCC, 2018). In light of these enduring 
warnings and given the lengthy period that climate mitigation has been on the global agenda, 
it is important to identify and critique key international governance measures which are 
currently in place and the consequences for implementing low carbon and inclusive 




4.1.1. Uneven Localisation of Sustainable Development Goals  
Adopted in 2015 by 193 countries, the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development was 
created to implement a global partnership to end poverty in all its forms, envisaging ‘a world 
of universal respect for human rights and human dignity, the rule of law, justice, equality 
and non-discrimination’ (UNSDG, 2020). Most notably, this vision is led by the 
development of 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) which superceded the 
Millennium Development Goals15 (MDGs).  
The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development is of particular significance for low carbon 
and just transitions since this can be considered as the first international agreement which 
identified the need for social, economic and environmental action. Specifically, there are 
seven SDGs which are of particular importance for urban low carbon and just transitions 
which include (but are not limited to): eradication of poverty (Goal 1); gender equality (Goal 
5); affordable and clean energy (Goal 7); the importance of job creation and economic 
growth (Goal 8); the need for reduced inequalities (Goal 10); sustainable cities and 
communities (Goal 11); and the need for climate action (Goal 13) (UN, 2020).  
This agreement is a recent advancement for low carbon and just transitions in the urban area, 
since most SDGs directly relate to key notions of addressing climate change, reducing 
inequalities and promoting sustainable communities. However, it is worth noting that both 
the MDGs and SDGs have received much criticism (e.g. Langford, 2016, Liverman, 2018; 
Winkler & Williams, 2017). The effectiveness of this agreement for international 
governance of climate change is questionable, namely because it is not legally-binding and 
therefore does not hold governments to account, and it is contradictory in nature by 
advocating the pursuit of continued and unsustainable economic growth (e.g. Hickel, 2015). 
Furthermore, the localisation of the SDGs is fundamental to enact such desired goals and the 
application of the SDGs by national and local governments worldwide is extremely variable 
and uneven (UCLG, 2019).  
The variable pattern of localisation of the SDGs is experienced in the UK at a national level, 
with the SDGs being explicitly referred to by a UK Government report in 2017, which stated: 
                                                 
15 The United Nations Millennium Development Goals were 8 goals that committed 189 UN Member States 
to combat poverty, hunger, disease, illiteracy, gender discrimination and environmental degradation by the 




‘The UK is committed to the delivery of the Sustainable Development Goals… by ensuring 
that the Goals are fully embedded in planned activity of each Government department’ (UK 
Government, 2019b). This suggests that the SDGs have been utilised for guidance by the 
national government, and this is reiterated in the UK Government’s Voluntary National 
Review which was published and presented at the UN High Level Political Forum in July 
2019 (UK Government, 2019b). There is a lack of data critically analysing the evidence of 
the UK delivering on their commitments, and therefore the effectiveness of the SDGs for 
achieving the desired outcomes are yet to be determined.  
It is also noteworthy that the SDGs are referred to unequally at the local level. For example, 
the Local Government Association (2019) note that councils such as Bristol, Kent, Coventry 
and Derby have explicitly referred to the SDGs. They are referred to by Nottingham City 
Council within the 2028 Carbon Neutral Charter (2020a, p.23): 
The Council will work with partners to understand Nottingham’s own contribution 
to planetary boundaries, and the relationships in turn to Sustainable Development 
Goals from these boundaries and the aims and objectives in this charter, to understand 
how we get to a more sustainable good quality of life for all citizens.  
Specifically, the City Council focuses on five of the SDGs which include: Clean Energy 
(Goal 7); Innovation and Infrastructure (Goal 9); Sustainable Cities and Communities (Goal 
11); Responsible Consumption (12); and Life on Land (Goal 15). However, despite reference 
to the SDGs, this is not uniform across the City Council’s strategy. Furthermore, it is unclear 
as to why reference to goals regarding reduced inequality (e.g. Goals 1 and 10) are not made 
explicitly.  
In contrast, the SDGs are not explicitly referred to by Nottinghamshire County Council. This 
echoes arguments that the SDGs are considered as an overarching framework, and not an 
implementation plan and therefore need to be translated into national and local contexts 
(LGA, 2019).  This raises two key points: firstly, the issue of the lack of engagement by 
certain councils, which can be compromised by financial constraints on councils, a lack of 
devolved powers, challenges with monitoring and implementation, and a lack of awareness 
of the Agenda 2030 (LGA, 2019; UN, 2016). Secondly, despite the production of a roadmap 
for local policymakers in the Toolbox for Localising the SDGs (UN, 2016), this raises the 
broader issue surrounding the complexity of disseminating international environmental 




4.1.2. Weakness of Legally-Binding Targets 
Building on the 2030 Agenda of Sustainable Development and SDGs, the Paris Agreement 
is the first legally-binding international treaty and therefore can be considered as a landmark 
moment in climate change action. Signed in 2015 by 195 Parties of the UNFCCC at the Paris 
Climate Conference of the Parties (COP 21), this agreement sets out a global action plan to 
avoid dangerous climate change by limiting global warming to well below 2 degrees Celsius 
above pre-industrial levels and pursue efforts to limit it to 1.5 degrees Celsius (UNFCCC, 
2020). To date, 185 out of 195 countries have ratified the agreement and have agreed 
nationally determined contributions (NDCs) to achieve long-term goals.   
The Paris Agreement laudably aims to cut global average temperatures through an 
unprecedented universal agreement. The agreement is based on voluntary pledges for NDCs 
(which on the one hand are arguably the only realistic way forward from being bottom-up). 
However, there is ambiguity over decreasing emissions by excluding aviation and shipping 
emissions, and the agreement is critiqued to lack clarity on specific targets to ensure 
collectively-agreed outcomes (Bodansky, 2016; Routledge et al. 2018). As Clemencon 
(2016, p.18) highlights:  
The agreement defines no emissions peak year, no specific emissions reduction 
timeline, and no concrete plans to phases out of fossil fuel subsidies, to stop 
construction of new coal-fired power plants, and to substantially and transparently 
increase financial support to developing countries.  
In spite of opposition by USA states, cities and other non-state actors in coalitions such as 
‘We are Still In’ (Watts, 2017), the formal withdrawal16 of the USA from the Agreement led 
by President Trump on 4 November 202017 is significant as it demonstrates the fragility of 
the Agreement and the conflicts of maintaining a consensus on international climate 
governance with opposing national and subnational views (C2ES, 2019). This also 
                                                 
16 During the writing of this research, in November 2020 President Joe Biden from the Democratic Party was 
elected and committed to re-joining the Paris Agreement on the first day of his presidency, thereby reversing 
President Trump’s withdrawal. 
17 President Trump has been a vocal climate denier on the political arena. Although the withdrawal was in 
2020, President Trump verbally announced his intention to withdrawal in June 2017 as according to the rules 




underlines the importance of locating climate politics within the broader dynamics of the 
wider political conjuncture.  
Furthermore, similarly to the SDGs, the application of the Paris Agreement at the local and 
national level is variable. For instance, the UK as a member of the UNFCCC has ratified the 
agreement as part of a joint agreement by EU member states and the Paris Agreement can 
therefore be considered significant for holding the UK and wider EU accountable for targets 
in a global setting (CCC, 2019b; CCC, 2019c). Yet, it is important to acknowledge that the 
Paris Agreement is not directly referred to in policy at the local level, e.g. by Nottingham 
City Council nor Nottinghamshire County Council. This reinforces the disconnect between 
national and local level dissemination of international environmental policy, and suggests 
the lack of delivery of these pledges by UK agencies.  
The latest COP 25 held in Madrid in December 2019 further highlights the way that despite 
efforts to finalise Article 618 of the Paris Agreement, climate negotiations failed firstly, to 
deliver settled agreements on international carbon markets; and secondly, there was no 
consensus on the need to create more ambitious targets, particularly from high-polluting 
countries such as China and India (Kizzier, 2019; Sengupta, 2019). Again, the ending of this 
summit with a lack of resolutions and ambitious targets emphasizes the difficulties of 
governing international climate negotiations, due to the wide range of stakeholders and the 
multiple and competing interests at hand. This also raises concerns of the implications such 
failures have at the local level, such as the continued lack of ambitious targets and political 
will against climate change.  
4.1.3. Belated Attention to ‘Justice’ Elements  
Although the concept of a ‘just transition’ emerged in the US labour movement of the 1980s 
(Newell & Mulvaney, 2013), references to justice elements in climate change policy have 
been very limited and ad-hoc on the whole. The 2015 Paris Agreement is significant by 
clearly recognising the imperatives of a just transition in formal international climate 
agreements. Although there were discussions of the just transition agenda in the COP 16 
meeting in 2010 held in Cancun (Jenkins, 2019), the just transition features in the preambles 
of the Paris Agreement, stating that Parties: ‘should take into account the imperatives of a 
                                                 
18 Article 6 of the Paris Agreement on climate changes sets the rules on how countries can reduce their 




just transition of the workforce and the creation of decent work and quality jobs in 
accordance with nationally defined development priorities’ (2015, p.2). However, criticisms 
remain that it lacks clarity, vision and ambition, and the idea of a just transition receives no 
substantial mandate in this agreement, again echoing broader climate justice arguments of 
the marginalisation of social justice issues in climate change debate (e.g. Clemencon, 2016; 
Jenkins, 2019). 
The Solidarity and Just Transition Silesia Declaration in 2018 can be considered as a pivotal 
moment for progressing low carbon and just urban transitions. Importantly, this formal 
endorsement signifies the need to embed just transitions into national and international 
policy frameworks for climate change, economic development and social inclusion (Robins, 
2018), and has been commended as an enabling element of good NDC implementation and 
important for securing international political and public support (Ministry of the 
Environment, 2018).  
However, only 25 per cent of UNFCCC parties formally endorsed the Silesia Declaration, 
illustrating the varying commitment of the international community for taking into account 
just transitions when preparing and implementing their new NDCs, national adaptation plans 
and national long-term greenhouse gas emission development strategies (ITUC, 2018; 
Jenkins, 2019).  The lack of formal endorsement is illustrative of the wider lack of political 
will on an international level, and suggests superficial and tokenistic action by governments.  
In its role as a Party to the UNFCCC, the UK was one of 53 countries which signed the 
Silesia Declaration on a just transition, and therefore has demonstrated its commitment to 
the aims of a just transition. Though, the effectiveness of this Declaration for practically 
implementing low carbon and just transitions in urban areas remains undetermined given its 
infancy (Robins et al. 2019a, 2019b). Put simply, the core argument here is that the implicit 
reference to just transitions in international climate policy, alongside weak targets and 
uneven localisation of international policy, has impacted the articulation of this in national 




4.2. NATIONAL GOVERNANCE OF CLIMATE CHANGE 
POLICY IN THE UK 
Policymaking and governance are very variable across the UK which in turn has a 
considerable effect on national climate change governance. Such a variability in 
environmental policymaking can be attributed to two main factors: firstly, the devolution of 
powers and responsibilities; and secondly, the changing national political climate within 
recent years.  
With regard to the first point, the devolution of powers and responsibilities in the UK to 
Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland has resulted in the creation of devolved 
administrations, that is the Northern Ireland Assembly (set up in 1998), and the Scottish 
Parliament and the National Assembly for Wales (both of which were created in 1999). This 
devolution can be considered as one reason resulting in variable policymaking and 
governance which has, and is continually, shaped by different political cultures and priorities 
in the devolved nations.  
The devolution of powers and responsibilities is complex, asymmetric and very much an on-
going process in the current political climate (e.g. there are on-going calls for Scottish 
Independence which resulted in a referendum in 201419). Devolution of responsibilities and 
powers has provided devolved administrations greater fiscal and political autonomy (LGA, 
2020a, 2020b). However, there remain policy areas which are reserved to central government 
and are therefore contested.  
With specific reference to this research and low carbon equitable urban transitions, there is 
full devolution of environment, food and rural affairs; transport; and housing, communities 
and local government to all devolved administrations; yet, there is partial devolution of 
                                                 
19 The result of this referendum was that Scotland should remain as part of the United Kingdom. Yet, it is 
possible that there may be another Independence Referendum given the dominance of remain votes cast in 




energy only in Northern Ireland, probably because Northern Ireland remains geographically 













Figure 4.1: Devolution of Powers between Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland 
(Institute for Government, 2019, p.8).  
                                                 
20 However, it is worth noting that Northern Ireland and its devolved governance over energy has been subject 
to intense scrutiny in recent years (e.g. Muinzer, 2017). This is particularly with reference to Northern Ireland’s 
Renewable Heat Incentive, commonly referred to as the ‘Cash-for-Ash’ scandal, which resulted in the 
exploitation of the scheme which incentivised businesses through repayments in the form of fuel subsidies to 
switch from fossil-fuelled heating to renewable energy boilers (e.g. wood pellets), and in turn costing the 





In terms of implementing low carbon and equitable transitions, this variability is significant 
because despite a national aspiration to reduce greenhouse gas emission levels, this is 
conditioned and complicated by the uneven, complex and differentiated nature surrounding 
energy and environmental policymaking of Devolved Administrations21 (Muinzer & Ellis, 
2017).  Another dimension of devolution is the extent of fiscal decentralisation, with the 
UK’s devolved parliaments having limited revenue-raising powers (MacKinnon, 2015). As 
a result, the UK has the most centralised government of the G722 countries, with the UK 
having only 5 per cent of revenue raised locally, followed by France which is 13 per cent in 
comparison (Booth, 2015), as highlighted in Figure 4.2 and Table 4.1.  
 
                                                 
21  A perhaps obvious but worthwhile point to make here is that because of devolution, the devolved 
administrations and legislatures in Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales run on different electoral cycles and 
this therefore demonstrates additional nuances of politics and climate change governance from a national-level 
perspective (Institute for Government, 2021).  
22 Set up in 1975, the G7 countries (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, UK and US) is an informal forum 
which aims to bring together the world’s leading industrial nations, and complements the role of the G20 which 




Figure 4.2: Fiscal centralisation of UK in comparison to comparable nations (Raikes et 







Table 4.1: Percentage of tax revenue and government spending at sub-national level 
(Booth, 2015, p.19). 
 
Unlike other advanced economy countries, such as the USA and Germany, the UK does not 
have a federal system of government. Instead, there is a fragmented and patchwork landscape 




Regional Development Agencies (RDAs) which acquired a number of responsibilities and 
powers. However, from 2011, the Conservative-Liberal Democrat Coalition Government 
(referred hereinafter as the Coalition Government) set out a decentralisation strategy by way 
of the Localism Act to grant local governments in England more rights, powers and 
freedoms, as well as additional devolution to Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. 
Alongside this, RDAs were abolished, with the Coalition Government granting local 
governments the power and autonomy to form Local Enterprise Partnerships (LEPs) (DCLG, 
2011).  
Such dismantling has been subject to criticism, particularly with regard to the limited 
decentralisation of powers (for example, the inability to increase local taxes) and the scaling-
back of climate change action. For example, RDAs had clear responsibilities for regional 
action on climate change, in comparison to LEPs which have an exclusive aim at securing 
local growth, with partnerships of local authorities and private sector actors (Scott, 2011). 
Consequently, this has led to less LEP engagement with low carbon objectives, potentially 
because climate change adaptation is seen as having less of a role in driving economic 
growth than development of the renewables sector (Brisley et al. 2012). As such, calls have 
been made for a greater ‘regional’ governance to low carbon and just transitions, which 
would allow for better coordinated strategies across political levels and sectors (e.g. 
Dannevig & Aall, 2015; Gibbs & O’Neill, 2017; Hanssen et al. 2013; Truffer & Coenen, 
2012).   
Within recent years, there has been an on-going attempt of devolution to urban areas from 
central government, with the introduction of the Cities and Local Government Devolution 
Act 2016, which superceded the Localism Act. As highlighted by the Department for 
Communities and Local Government (2011, p.4):  
The Government is committed to passing new powers and freedoms to town halls. 
We think that power should be exercised at the lowest practical level - close to the 
people who are affected by decisions, rather than distant from them. Local authorities 
can do their job best when they have genuine freedom to respond to what local people 
want, not what they are told to do by central government. In challenging financial 
times, this freedom is more important than ever, enabling local authorities to innovate 
and deliver better value for taxpayers’ money.  
Despite the rhetoric of localism, austerity measures introduced by the Coalition Government 
since 2010 has had significant implications for devolved governments and their subsequent 




Paradoxically, most municipalities have had to scale back their existing functions, rather 
than carry out new activities (Eckersley, 2016). This specific mobilisation of localism, 
termed ‘austerity localism’, is a deliberate practice of ‘roll-back’ neoliberalism to enable the 
deregulation, dismantling and downsizing of the public sector (Featherstone et al. 2012; 
Peck & Tickell, 2002). The devolution of powers to local authorities is very much a 
politically salient issue, as demonstrated by on-going devolution deals for devolved 
administrations and urban areas in England, e.g. Greater Manchester (LGA, 2020a). As a 
result of this devolution and decentralisation, national policy areas associated with low 
carbon and just transitions (e.g. transport, land and housing, and finance) are extremely 
varied, complex, and evolving across the UK. Essentially, devolution provides for a limited 
and carefully circumscribed degree of self-governance which has resulted in a differentiated 
and uneven approach to low carbon and equitable transitions across the UK.   Again, such a 
diverse arrangement of power and responsibility across England (and the wider UK) 
highlights the complex, multi-faceted and variegated nature of governing decarbonised and 
equitable transitions in urban areas, such as Nottingham.  
With regard to the second point, the UK’s climate policy consensus is extremely varied 
which is also due to the varying political shades of central government within recent years, 
i.e. Labour administration (1997-2010), Coalition Government (2010-2015) and 
Conservative Government (2015 to present). The issue of climate change had risen rapidly 
in political salience in the UK prior to the general election in 2010, and the UK Renewable 
Energy Strategy, Energy White Paper and The Low Carbon Transition Plan were key climate 
change policies produced in 2009 under a Labour government (Gillard, 2016). However, 
after the 2010 general election, these clean energy policies were subsequently scrapped and 
replaced, alongside green energy subsidies and the abolition of the Department for Climate 
Change in 2015 by the Conservative Government (Rosenbloom et al. 2019). According to 
Gillard (2016), 2010-2015 marked a period of climate change dissensus, alongside national 
economic policy practice which involved the switch from investment to austerity politics 
(discussed more in Chapter 6). This subsequently resulted in fiscal reductions and ultimately 
threatened the validity of climate change policies as an effective means for public spending 
(Berry, 2016). As a result, there has been an increase in climate policy scepticism and 
restraint in the UK which has undermined climate change policy progress, as highlighted 




4.2.1. Unsupportive and Discordant Policy for Achieving Climate 
Change Targets 
The creation of the Climate Change Act was a pivotal moment in the UK’s history by 
institutionalising climate change as a political issue and embedding commitments to 
reducing greenhouse gas emissions (Gillard, 2017). Created in 2008, this Act set a legally-
binding target of 80 per cent reductions in emissions from 1990 to 2050. To achieve such 
targets outlined, five-year carbon budgets have been established, and to date have legislated 
periods 2008-12 (first carbon budget), 2013-17 (second carbon budget); 2018-22 (third 
carbon budget) and 2023-2027 (fourth carbon budget).  
The introduction of legally-binding emission targets has undoubtedly helped to drive 
successful policy action to some extent, with emissions from the power sector falling by 59 
per cent between 2008 and 2017, and renewable energy generation increasing from 6.1 per 
cent to 28.7 per cent over the same period (Emden & Murphy, 2019). As such, the first 
carbon budget has been met, with emissions in 2014 being 36 per cent below 1990 levels.  
This Act is significant since it demonstrates evidence of a national government setting a 
legal duty to meet an annual carbon budget, the UK Government being the first in the world. 
Despite a degree of success, the next proposed phases, i.e. the fourth and fifth carbon budgets 
which cover the periods 2023-2027 and 2028-2032 respectively, have received criticism and 
it is predicted that the UK is currently on track to exceed emission targets. For example, the 
Committee on Climate Change, an independent non-departmental public body formed under 
the Climate Change Act, estimates that between 2017 and 2030, emissions intensity will 
need to be reduced by a further 61-81 per cent in the power sector (CCC, 2018a). Put another 
way, emissions for the fourth carbon budget are capped at 1,950 MtCO2e (52 per cent below 
1990 levels), but it is recommended that fifth carbon budget emissions are set at 
1,765MtC02e, equating to 57 per cent below 1990 levels. Also, it is argued that the carbon 
budgets will not be met due to: low-cost, low-risk options not being supported by 
Government; ineffective regulation and enforcement; unstable political climate; and short-
termism (CCC, 2018a). As such, there is a contradiction in policy conditions and supporting 
mechanisms outlined by national government, and the extent to which such targets can be 




This raises the question therefore of the transformative effects of the Climate Change Act, 
the commitment of the UK withstanding time in achieving climate change targets, and the 
extent to which political commitments can be dismantled by subsequent political parties 
(Fankhauser et al. 2018; Lockwood, 2013). As highlighted by Lockwood (2013), whilst the 
Act may have appeared to lock-in commitments to reduce emissions through legal means, 
this did not guarantee the effects of positive political path creation nor lock-in.  As such, it 
can be argued that there is a need for reforming the Act, making it compatible with the Paris 
Agreement, Brexit, and to strengthen safeguards against political backsliding (Fankhauser 
et al. 2018).  
The Clean Growth Strategy which was produced in 2017 has been lauded for its ambitious 
targets and commitment of funding for example in energy efficiency, low carbon heat 
technologies, and research and development. Yet, there has been significant criticism of the 
strategy document, the most significant that the policies outlined are still short of meeting 
the fifth carbon budget’s 57 per cent targets (e.g. CCC, 2017; Friends of the Earth, 2017). 
Unlike the Clean Growth Strategy’s 2011 predecessor The Carbon Plan, the evolution of a 
strategy as opposed to a plan demonstrates that this document is more tentative and less fully 
informed. An apt example is that the Strategy refers to the use of ‘flexibilities’ that can be 
used if carbon budgets are not met, i.e. surplus from earlier budget periods, or buying 
international emission offsets to make up differences (Hickman et al. 2017). Although in 
some views the use of flexibilities might be used as a fail-safe plan to achieve targets, the 
use of flexibilities received significant scrutiny, with the Committee on Climate Change 
(2017) highlighting that targets should be delivered without accounting flexibilities or 
reliance on international carbon credits. The Strategy’s central focus of clean growth, and 
the shift away from a dedicated carbon plan, suggests maintaining the status quo in economic 
terms, which is contested as unsustainable, for example by de-growth advocates (e.g. 
Jackson, 2011; Klein, 2014; Ward et al. 2016). Thus, the creation of the Climate Change Act 
alongside current policies such as the Clean Growth Strategy are contradictory and the extent 
to which the UK is providing favourable policy conditions to meet climate change 
commitments is ambivalent (Amundsen et al. 2010).  
The unsupportive policy conditions are also echoed in the Road to Zero Strategy which was 
published in 2018 and is dedicated to tackling transport emissions. It declares the ambition 
to increase ultra-low emission cars on UK roads by 50 to 70 per cent by 2030. There is also 




(excluding the Scottish Government which has a devolved transport sector and brought 
forward this ambition for 2030). On the one hand, this strategy has been praised for financial 
support for ultra-low emission vehicles (which is defined as any car or van that emits 75g/km 
CO2 or less
23, commonly known as ULEVs) and for new measures to tackle emissions from 
heavy goods vehicles which had not been recognised in policy previous to this. Furthermore, 
there are also commitments to improve availability of charging infrastructure, particularly 
within new builds and in new lamp posts for on-street parking (CCC, 2018a, 2018b). On the 
other hand, this strategy has received criticisms due to: the dominance of free markets for 
combatting climate change; the reliance primarily on the private industry; and the lack of 
support and incentives from the national government to increase ULEV ownership (CCC, 
2018b). Given the current Conservative leadership during the time of this policy, the focus 
on free market is in keeping with that of neoliberalism as a dominant policy paradigm, and 
again brings forth debates on the extent of free market policies in combatting climate change 
(Featherstone, 2013; Klein, 2014; Whitehead, 2013). Furthermore, the goal of 2040 has also 
been scrutinised as having a lack of policy in place for legally-binding minimum-range 
electric vehicles, and instead adopts a voluntary approach to meeting its suggested targets 
(Kumar, 2018). This raises the question of the role of the state in pursuing low carbon and 
equitable transitions, and the extent to which incentives and regulations, e.g. zero-emission 
vehicles mandates such as those completed by China and California, should be provided in 
order to achieve desirable environmental change (Kumar, 2018; Steer, 2018).  
An additional example is that of fuel duty which central government announced in 
November 2018 would remain frozen for the 9th year. Though this scheme has been praised 
for providing economic savings for motorists, it has been highly contested by 
environmentalists. The freezing of fuel tax has had unintended environmental consequences, 
for example, since the first fuel duty freeze in 2011 the volume of traffic has grown by 4 per 
cent, resulting in an additional 4.5 million tonnes of CO2 (Begg & Haigh, 2018). In addition, 
this scheme costs the Treasury approximately £9 billion a year (£46 billion since 2011), 
which could help finance low carbon transport measures, as stated by one of the 
interviewees: 
“In terms of the air qualities perspective, they [central government] certainly could 
do more in terms of fuel duty. At the moment, fuel duty is set up in a way that 
                                                 
23 It is acknowledged that this definition is likely to change as technology advances, with vehicles requiring 




encourages use of diesel. But, we know that central government has given priorities 
to stop production of internal combustion engine by 2040 …[Instead]… we could 
have things like scrappage schemes to take older vehicles off the road, that’s 
something we’ve been lobbying for. We could have further incentives for people to 
buy electric vehicles” (Interview with P12, Nottingham City Council).  
As such, counter-productive policies and lack of strategic direction at the national level are 
frustrating low carbon trajectories particularly at the urban level, which is a barrier expanded 
upon in Chapter 6.  
4.2.2. Lack of Ambitious Targets 
Complementary to the Road to Zero Strategy (2018) and Clean Growth Strategy (2017), the 
Clean Air Strategy published in 2019 sets out the national government’s aims to tackle the 
UK’s air pollution. The UK’s air pollution strategy has been particularly contentious, with 
the UK failing to reduce emissions from 2010. There has also been legal action against the 
UK Government (for example by Client Earth and the European Commission) for failures 
to tackle nitrous oxide pollution (Friends of the Earth, 2018; The Lancet Respiratory 
Medicine, 2019). Likewise, these failures to meet targets demonstrate a degree of tokenism 
regarding commitments to the Climate Change Act. Although the Clean Air Strategy 
maintains the goal to end Internal Combustion Engine vehicle sales from 2040, this has been 
criticised as being too weak in comparison to other European countries, for example Norway 
which has a target by 2025, and the Netherlands, Germany and Scotland having targets for 
2030.  
Furthermore, as highlighted by Friends of the Earth (2018), the introduction of Clean Air 
Zones (CAZs) is a step in the right direction, with 5 charging CAZs being planned in cities, 
including Nottingham. However, whilst these CAZs can reduce air pollution in cities, the 
implementation of each CAZ was not expected until 2020 and no CAZs included cars, with 
only Birmingham and Leeds including Low Goods Vehicles24. Furthermore, out of 82 local 
authorities (of which 75 have illegal levels of nitrous oxide air pollution in 2017), only 33 
local authorities are required to produce a Local Action Plan (Friends of the Earth, 2018). 
This is because of the variable structure of local authorities, responsibilities and powers (as 
described later in this chapter in Section 4.3, and in Chapter 5). The Clean Air Strategy states 
                                                 





that new powers would be given to local authorities; however, it fails to provide detail on 
these powers and when they would be implemented. Therefore, although the Clean Air 
Strategy has been remarked for its targets more generally, the criticisms echo that of other 
strategies of the lack of ambition and insufficient detail provided for meeting such targets.  
4.2.3. Implicit Reference to Social Equity Dimensions 
Although there is no universally accepted definition of a ‘just transition’, there are a handful 
of governments worldwide (e.g. Canada, Germany, Scotland and Spain) which have 
explicitly incorporated the just transition into their climate strategies (Robins et al. 2019a). 
However, there is no formal nor explicit definition, idea or focus of a ‘just’ or ‘equitable’ 
transition regarding UK climate policy (Robins et al. 2019b). This is problematic for 
policymaking because when there is no clear definition or vision of a just transition, there is 
a lack of national consensus for progressing and implementing a shared vision. There is no 
explicit mention of just transitions nor associated policy measures within the Clean Growth 
Strategy (Raikes et al. 2019a), and the framing of emission reductions in terms of economic 
growth demonstrates a strong economic perspective to low carbon transitions, thereby 
ignoring the social dimensions.  
Nevertheless, there is acknowledgement of the need for decentralised decision-making, with 
reference to local areas as best places to drive emissions reductions. As such, this increase 
in local responsibility can be viewed as having elements of justice, but this is implicit.  
Moreover, there is reference to job creation as workers move to the low carbon energy sector, 
however this is not supported by concerted efforts to make necessary powers or levers 
available at a national, regional nor local levels (Emden & Murphy, 2019).   
Regarding low carbon and equitable transitions in the UK’s urban areas specifically, the 
polluted air quality of cities and towns is a key focus of the Road to Zero strategy. Although 
just transitions are not explicitly mentioned, there is reference to justice implications, 
pollution and health within the document: ‘We know that the effects of poor air quality are 
felt disproportionately by the most vulnerable groups in society and that the public are 
concerned’ (2018, p.28). As such, there is a clear recognition of the social and environmental 
implications of pollution in cities from national government. However, a frequent critique 
of electric vehicles (EVs) and just transitions which is not addressed in the strategy is the 




elitism in national planning (Sovacool et al. 2019), in addition to associations of 
environmental politics and actions as a middle-higher class concern. Consequently, there is 
an overall lack of justice dimensions in national climate change policy, and areas where there 
are justice elements, this is contradictory and ambiguous by not specifying the ways in which 
just transitions will be achieved.  
A useful policy to illustrate this is within the energy sector and tackling fuel poverty through 
the Energy Company Obligation (ECO3), a national scheme that delivers energy efficiency 
and heating measures to homes in Great Britain. Whilst there have been criticisms made 
formally by charities such as Energy Savings Trust (2017) and National Energy Agency 
(2018), the following quote from a third sector organisation illustrates the way in which this 
can affect urban residents, in Nottingham and beyond:  
“One massive issue with ECO is the need for customers to pay a top-up fee, so they 
might get so much [money] in terms of grant funding, but they need to make a 
contribution themselves. Often that can be a few hundred [or] sometimes a thousand 
pounds, and often people that the grant is aimed at are not in the position to come up 
with that sort of money in one go, and so they fall through the net. They could access 
the funding if they could provide the funds themselves, but they can’t, and so they 
benefit in no way at all.” (Interview with P24, NEA).  
As shown, ineffective fuel poverty policies from the national level are of no benefit to the 
urban level if they are exacerbating inequality and do not help those citizens who require it 
the most (Emden et al. 2018; Middlemiss & Gillard, 2015). These national level constraints 
which require a contribution from those who cannot afford it in turn affects the local agency 
to tackle fuel poverty, that is, the agency of energy consumers and local actors alike. 
Furthermore, ECO fails to target fuel-poor consumers appropriately by only being available 
to 20 per cent of households in fuel poverty, and it is particularly unequal in the way it 
distributes funding, since rural consumers only received measures worth £3.5 million, 
despite paying over £70 million in bill levies over two years (Emden et al. 2018). As 
previously highlighted, the ECO scheme is contraindicated by the policies made for this 
scheme, which results in a retention of old legacy approaches and is ultimately untenable for 
delivering its primary objective to tackle fuel poverty.  Put another way, the core argument 
here is that the contradictory climate policies at the national level can impact those policies 




4.3. LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND CLIMATE CHANGE 
POLICY IN NOTTINGHAM  
As contended, policymaking and national governance is complex in England due to a 
complicated and unequal distribution of power and responsibilities. This pattern is 
maintained at the local level, with England containing differing types of local government. 
To elaborate, the UK has a complex and evolving political system made up of different local 
authority structures across four countries: England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland. 
Local government is a devolved issue since 1997 in Scotland and Wales, and 1998 in 
Northern Ireland (UK Government, 2019a). Presently, there are 343 local authorities in 
England which are a mixture of two types of local government structure: a two-tier system 






Table 4.2: Local government structure in England (Adapted from UK Government, 
2019a).  
 
The one-tier system of local government includes unitary authorities, London boroughs and 
metropolitan boroughs, many of which were established during the 1990s under the Local 
Government Act 1992. There are 55 unitary authorities in England and these are 
predominantly located in cities, large towns and urban areas (with a few exceptions to this). 
Chiefly, unitary authorities are responsible for providing all local services, such as education, 
highways, social care, housing, planning applications and transport planning (UK Gov, 
2019a).  
Structure of local 
authority 
Type of local authority Number in UK 
Two-tier County councils 26 
District councils 192 
Single tier Unitary authorities 55 
Metropolitan districts 36 
London borough 32 
City of London 1 
Isles of Scilly 1 




Contrastingly, the two-tier system of local government includes county councils and district 
councils, and this is the structure that is in operation in most of England. The number of 
county councils’ totals 26 in England and each county council is responsible in their county 
for approximately 80 per cent of the services in these areas: education, highways, transport 
planning, passenger transport, social care, libraries, waste disposal and strategic planning 
(LGiU, 2020).  The county is subsequently divided into several districts or boroughs which 
are responsible for smaller, more local services, such as housing, leisure and recreation, 
environmental health, waste collection, planning applications and local taxation collections. 
In total, there are 192 district councils in operation in England (UK Gov, 2019a).  A summary 
of the differing distribution of powers amongst local authorities in the UK is shown in Table 
4.3.  
 
Table 4.3: Distribution of powers among local authorities in the UK by council type 
(Institute for Government, 2019).  
 
The urban area of Nottingham is an interesting example for low carbon and equitable 
transitions since the urban conurbation is governed by two local authorities, Nottingham City 
Council, and Nottinghamshire County Council. Nottingham City Council has been a unitary 
authority since 1998, before which it was a non-metropolitan district.  In comparison, 
Nottinghamshire County Council is a two-tier authority, and made up of seven district and 
















Figure 4.3: Map of Nottinghamshire District Councils (Nottinghamshire County 
Council, 2012).  
 
The division and examination of environmental policies for both City and County councils 
is therefore necessary to cover Nottingham’s urban conurbation. Through the Nottingham 
example, the complex and uneven governance of urban climate transitions is demonstrated 
by: inconsistent and variable policies for emissions reductions between local level councils; 
a lack of overarching policy and strategy at the County Council; and piecemeal reference to 




4.3.1. Uneven Climate Policy between Nottingham’s Local Authorities 
Climate change policies between Nottingham City Council and Nottinghamshire County 
Council reveal a stark difference in responses, engagement and policy to climate change (and 
the impact of statutory duties on policymaking for different types of local authorities is 
further reflected upon in Chapter 6, Section 6.1.2). It is apparent that a low carbon and just 
transition is core to the overall vision of Nottingham City Council, with a commitment to 
‘become the first carbon neutral city in the country, reaching this target by 2028’ 
(Nottingham City Council, 2020a). The 2020-2028 Draft Plan Carbon Neutral Nottingham 
builds on the Nottingham 2028 Carbon Neutral Charter by setting objectives to achieve this 
carbon neutral ambition across sectors such as transport, the built environment, energy 
generation, waste and water and consumption. There is also a strong focus on reducing 
inequality across the city (as discussed in more detail in Section 4.3.5).  
This strategy is continued in Nottingham City Council’s Energy Strategy 2010-2020, a 
comprehensive framework for cutting emissions, maintaining energy security, maximising 
economic opportunities and protecting the most vulnerable in the city. The City Council has 
set ambitious targets in the strategy, which include 20 per cent of the city’s own energy 
generated from low or zero carbon sources by 2020 and a 26 per cent reduction in CO2 
emissions by 2020. According to the Council, it is on track to achieve both these targets 
(Climate Emergency Declaration, 2020). More recently, the City Council has declared a 
climate emergency, alongside other councils within the UK, in addition to its strategy for 
carbon neutrality by 2028.  
Nottingham City Council’s vision for a low carbon transition is also echoed in the City 
Council’s transport policies. The Local Transport Plan 2016-2026 is a key document 
outlining the Council’s strategy regarding transport, and it is aligned with the overall 
strategic direction and vision of the Council, as stated in the Sustainable Community 
Strategy, indicated in Table 4.4. In this plan, the provision of a low carbon and resilient 
transport system is pronounced, with clear reference to climate change, aligning with the 
national targets to reduce emissions. Additionally, Nottingham City Council has a separate 
policy regarding its cycling infrastructure, as per the Cycle City Strategy and Action Plan 
2017-2021.  This Strategy is in line with national government objectives to double the 
number of trips made by bike by 2025, and Nottingham City Council aims to have 10 per 





Sustainable Community Strategy 
Local Transport Plan 
Strategic Objectives for Transport 
Develop Nottingham’s international standing 
for science and innovation, sports and culture 
Raise aspirations 
Deliver a world-class sustainable transport 
system which supports a thriving economy and 
enables growth 
Be environmentally sustainable Create a low carbon transport system and a 
resilient transport network 
Ensure that all children and young people 
thrive and achieve 
Tackle poverty and deprivation by getting 
more local people into good jobs 
Achieve fairness and quality of opportunity  
Improve access to key services, employment 
and training including creation of local 
employment and training opportunities 
Transform Nottingham’s neighbourhoods Improve the quality of citizens’ lives and 
transform Nottingham’s neighbourhoods 
Reduce crime, the fear of crime, substance 
misuse and anti-social behaviour 
Improve health and wellbeing 
Support citizens to live safe, independent and 
active healthy lifestyle 
Table 4.4: Local Transport Plan strategic objectives (Nottingham City Council, 2016a, 
p.28) 
 
In contrast to Nottingham City Council, Nottinghamshire County Council policy and 
strategy for enabling emissions reductions and tackling social inequality is very limited. To 
date, there is no overarching strategy on environmental targets, climate change, nor emission 
reduction targets. The lack of strategy and policy is somewhat surprising yet illustrative of 
the lack of mandate and vision for climate policy from the national level, and the 
consequences and variability this can have on the governance of low carbon and equitable 
transitions at the local level. This can be attributed to the political administrations of both 
Nottingham City Council and Nottingham County Council, with the former having a Labour-
majority and the latter a Conservative-majority25, which in turn can affect actor agency 
implementing low carbon urban transitions (as I discuss in more detail in Chapter 5). Central 
to this is a point raised by Bulkeley and Kern (2004) that the greater the support that exists 
from climate protection within a city’s leadership, the more rapidly it can become established 
as a key objective in policy. This lack of engagement therefore demonstrates the negligence 
that can occur at local level to combatting climate change.  
However, as introduced in Chapter 3, during the time of research there has been significant 
political pressure through recent environmental activism, for example Extinction Rebellion 
                                                 
25 It is important to note here that local authorities in England have local elections on different cycles. For 
example: Nottinghamshire County Council has a whole council election in 2017, 2021, and every 4 th year; 
Nottinghamshire County District Councils have whole council elections in 2019, 2023, and every 4th year; 
Nottingham City Council has a whole council election in 2019, 2023, and every 4 th year (UK Government, 




and youth climate strikes in more than 100 towns and cities across the UK, including 
Nottingham (Nottingham Post, 2019a; Taylor, 2019). According to one respondent, 
Nottinghamshire County Council are revisiting their climate protection policy as a 
consequence of this mounting political pressure (Interview with P18, Nottinghamshire 
County Council).  This appropriately demonstrates the effectiveness of recent environmental 
activism on county council actors and the progression of climate change policymaking, 
reinforcing that confrontational collective action (in this case youth climate activism and 
other grassroots struggles) remain a critical force that can bring the state into a space of 
engagement and negotiation (Routledge et al. 2018).  
The lack of a coherent and properly integrated structure of local government and regional 
layer of government witnessed in other countries, such as Germany and the Netherlands, is 
a hindrance to the agency and ability of local actors to undertake strategic planning on 
climate change (e.g. Hoppe & Miedema, 2020; Spath & Rohracher, 2010). It is evident that 
Nottingham City Council attempts to do this, but neither has the political power nor 
geographical scope to develop a full city-region policy with neighbouring authorities, since 
this is not within their remit. The recent production of the Air Quality Strategy 2020-2030 
for Nottingham and Nottinghamshire is an exception to this which overtly recognises the 
need and importance of working towards a strategic vision to improve air quality across 
Nottingham (Air Quality Strategy, 2020, p.3) Yet, the overall lack of strategic working is 
exacerbated by the difference in local authority structure of the County Council and City 
Council and prevents a more integrated climate strategy across both local authority areas (as 
discussed in greater detail in Chapter 6).   
4.3.2. Unequal Climate Policy within Nottinghamshire County Councils 
As a result of a fragmented climate arena between both Nottingham’s local authorities, there 
is subsequently no aligned vision nor ambition for Nottinghamshire County Council. This 
has resulted in a complex and uneven policy arena for low carbon and equitable transitions 
by the individual district and borough councils present in Nottinghamshire. Ensuring 
alignment of strategy is difficult from a County Council perspective:  
“Aligning doesn’t really happen by design – it’s up to individual councils, and in 
Nottinghamshire there is no structure nor agreement to work collaboratively on 
setting and addressing net zero targets. There is talk about working together on 
carbon zero ambitions – districts have desire and commitment but little capacity to 




As alluded to, there is no mandate for Nottinghamshire County Council to set targets, and 
whilst districts might have a desire to set such targets, there is little by way of capacity to 
enable this process (as I attend to in more detail in Chapter 6). Consequently, there is a very 
uneven policy arena for climate change and just transitions across Nottinghamshire County, 
which reinforces that despite municipalities appearing homogenous, they have a multi-
faceted nature and are made up of departments and officials with diverging interests, 
objectives and cultures (Rutherford & Jaglin, 2015). To illustrate with an example, 
Rushcliffe Borough Council is a Conservative-controlled area located in the south of 
Nottinghamshire and has the most prominent policy regarding low carbon transitions. To 
date, Rushcliffe is the only district council which has a dedicated environmental strategy by 
way of: Climate Change Strategy 2013-2020; Climate Change Action Plan 2014-2020; Air 
Quality Action Plan 2010; Environmental Policy 2017; and Housing Delivery Plan 2016-
2021.  The reasons why Rushcliffe has a more comprehensive environmental policy and 
strategy in comparison to other Nottinghamshire district councils is ambiguous, however 
this could be due to the local demographics of the area and the presence of Green Party 
councillors, as stated: “Rushcliffe I think is the only local council with Green Councillors 
and historically has a vocal, green, highly-educated electorate in certain wards” (Interview 
with P18, Nottinghamshire County Council).  
This is in comparison to the other 6 districts in Nottinghamshire County, which “may be 
more influenced by issues of regenerating former coalfield communities, re-shaping an 
industrial economy after the decline of textiles, coal, manufacturing, industries” (Interview 
with P18, Nottinghamshire County Council). Rushcliffe Borough Council has had 
consistency of political control, whereas other districts have had more change within recent 
years, and therefore climate commitments have more political continuity (which impacts 
actor agency, as argued in Chapter 5). Moreover, it is also speculated that the policy and 
strategy is more comprehensive by Rushcliffe as they take more care with how they are 
presented, by “making good of what they are doing and maintaining their website” 
(Interview with P18, Nottinghamshire County Council). Therefore, it could be argued that 
Rushcliffe Borough Council is more conscious and purposive as a council as to how they 
appear externally and for ensuring suitable policy is in place.  
The unevenness of climate change policy across Nottinghamshire is also reinforced in 
variations of climate emergency declarations across Nottingham and Nottinghamshire. This 




commitments have been made by 4 councils (Nottingham City Council; Mansfield District 
Council; Broxtowe Borough Council; Gedling Borough Council); and 2 councils have not 
officially declared a climate emergency (Nottinghamshire County Council; Bassetlaw 
District Council). Table 4.5 also reveals that the ambitions for achieving in-house and area-
wide carbon neutral targets is highly variable, with some councils setting in-house targets 
(e.g. Nottingham City Council, Broxtowe Borough Council; and Rushcliffe Borough 
Council) and others not (e.g. Ashfield District Council). Rushcliffe Borough Council and 
Newark and Sherwood District Council are an exception here with having set an in-house 
carbon neutral target, but not area-wide targets. Not only are there differences of targets 
being set overall, but also the year in which these targets are aimed to be achieved is also 
variable, e.g. ranging from targets by year 2027 to 2040. This variability across the 
Nottingham urban conurbation thereby reinforces the complexities of governance of climate 
change at local governance levels, not only on a county scale, but on a broader country-wide 
scale which could hinder governance towards low carbon and equitable transitions.  









Nottingham City Council 21/01/19 Commitment made 2028 2028 
Mansfield District Council 05/03/19 Commitment made 2040 2040 
Rushcliffe Borough Council 07/03/19 Partial commitment 
made  
2030 No target 
Nottinghamshire County 
Council 
16/05/19 None No target No target 
Bassetlaw District Council 27/06/19 None No target No target 
Newark and Sherwood 
District Council 
16/07/19 Partial commitment 
made 
2035 No target 
Broxtowe Borough Council 17/07/19 Commitment made 2027 2030 
Ashfield District Council 16/09/19 Emergency 
declared 
No target No target 
Gedling Borough Council 20/11/19 Commitment made 2030 2030 
Table 4.5: Declaration of Climate Emergencies in Nottingham (in chronological order) 
(Adapted from unpublished internal council document, received 18/09/2019; Climate 
Emergency UK, accessed 23/02/2021).   
Moreover, the variation in commitments within environmental policy and strategy across 
Nottinghamshire could also be due to the existence of the Local Plan (2014) which was 
produced by Nottingham City Council, Gedling Borough Council and Broxtowe Borough 
Council, and is an aligned set of policies and core strategy on how the Greater Nottingham 
region can develop between 2011-2026.  The area in focus of the Local Plan is defined as 




Council, Broxtowe, Gedling, and Rushcliffe Councils, and the Hucknall part of Ashfield 
Council (all of which are located in Nottinghamshire County Council), and Erewash 
Borough Council (which is part of the neighbouring Derbyshire County Council), as shown 
in Figure 4.4.  
 
Figure 4.4: Map of Greater Nottingham area (Nottinghamshire County Council, 2011, 
p.4).  
 
Importantly, the Local Plan (Nottinghamshire County Council, 2014) is a significant policy 
in terms of implementing low carbon and equitable transitions in Nottingham. For example, 
the delivery strategy for sustainable growth highlights the importance for sustainable design 
and adaptation, reducing CO2 emissions, and decentralised energy generation 
(Nottinghamshire County Council, 2010, p.38-39). Furthermore, aspects of an inclusive 
transition are highlighted, for example, by managing travel demand and the need to address 
accessibility deficiencies (Nottinghamshire County Council, 2010, p.101-102). Whilst 
partnership working across Nottinghamshire is encouraged to address the main urban area 
of Nottingham, the exclusion of some district councils which make up Nottinghamshire 
County Council, such as Ashfield, Newark and Sherwood, Mansfield and Bassetlaw councils 




because the exclusion of certain councils out-with the Local Plan can potentially result in 
uneven development, with some councils having unequal access to resources, guidance and 
support for implementing decarbonisation and equitable strategies. Whilst it is 
acknowledged that these areas might not fall within the urban conurbation, this nonetheless 
raises the important issue of ensuring uniform climate governance across the Nottingham 
region. Again, this local governance context clearly impinges on the ability of Nottingham 
City Council and Nottinghamshire County Council to develop a fully integrated city-region 
strategy across its urban area.     
4.3.3. Piecemeal ‘Justice’ Dimensions in Nottingham City Council 
Policies  
Like many urban areas in the UK, Nottingham is a city with prevailing social issues. While 
there have been improvements since 2007 and 2010, the city has persistently high levels of 
deprivation, and according to the Indices of Multiple Deprivation (IMD), Nottingham ranks 
8th out of the 326 districts in England. According to the Index of Multiple Deprivation, 
approximately one third of Lower Super Output Areas in the city are in the worst 10 per cent 
nationally, as shown in Figure 3.2 (Nottingham Insight, 2019a). Furthermore, out of the 
seven separate ‘domains’ used in the IMD, Nottingham performs worst in Health and 
Disability. This is concerning for the city in terms of overall well-being, but also in terms of 
environmental sustainability, since the city has poor levels of air quality with an established 
5.9 per cent of adult mortality (equivalent to 127 deaths) being due to exposure to human-
made particular air pollution in the city in 2014 (5.6 per cent of adult mortality i.e. equivalent 
to 410 deaths in Nottinghamshire County).  
Nottingham’s population has a lower-than-average employment rate (62.4 per cent) 
compared with the national average for England (75.3 per cent), and it is noted that this is 
still high when accounting for the high student population in Nottingham (73.5 per cent 
compared to 80 per cent in England). Correlating with this, the city has a higher-than-average 
benefit claimant population at 4.2 per cent, compared to the national average of 2.9 per cent. 
The city also performs poorly in terms of education attainment, and Nottingham has a high 
level of people aged 16-64 with no qualifications (12.9 per cent) compared with the national 
average (7.6 per cent). Full-time employment income in 2018 is one of the lowest in the UK, 
and there are notably high levels of child poverty, with 41,700 city children living in 




per cent (in comparison to 39.3 per cent in England). Nottingham is a city with high levels 
of fuel poverty (14.6 per cent) and low levels of car ownership, with 56.3 per cent of all 
households having at least one car in 2011 compared to 74.2 per cent in England 
(Nottingham Insight, 2019a), therefore access to low-cost heating and sustainable transport 
is paramount. The number of food banks have increased significantly over the last few years, 
totalling 14 in 2018 in comparison to 2 in 2012 (Interview with P14, St Ann’s Advice 
Centre), demonstrating the unfortunate realities of increasing urban poverty.  
Taking the aforementioned social inequalities into consideration is therefore imperative for 
governing low carbon trajectories at the urban level. On the whole, whilst Nottingham City 
Council has a coherent climate policy and strategy, references to justice dimensions are 
fragmented across the City Council’s climate policy in comparison. For example, the just 
transition plays a key part within the City Council’s energy strategy, with aims to reduce 
fuel poverty, which is one of the top five priorities for Nottingham City Council (Nottingham 
City Council, 2019). This is further reinforced by the recent production of Nottingham City 
Council’s Fuel Poverty Strategy 2018-2025, which makes it one of the first UK councils to 
produce a fuel poverty strategy, and this therefore echoes the City Council’s commitment on 
a strategic level to combat this issue. The Strategy therefore commits to ‘[eliminating] E, F 
and G EPC-rated homes occupied by fuel poor households by 2025, where practicable, in 
line with national objectives’ (Nottingham City Council, 2018c, p.5). The Council aims to 
achieve this through three avenues: maximising household income, reducing energy bills, 
and improving energy efficiency. Similarly, in the Local Transport Plan (2016-2026) there 
is a focus on delivering a world-class sustainable transport system which provides social 
inclusion to key services, employment and training, and a transport system which is 
comprehensive in coverage; frequent, reliable and fast; high quality, safe and accessible; 
easy to understand and use; affordable; and integrated (including park and ride).  
Although the City Council can be commended for having a dedicated fuel poverty strategy 
and aligning targets with national objectives, the aim ‘where practicable’ is ambiguous, and 
there are no breakdown or interim targets in place. Therefore, the measurability and 
accountability of progress for achieving fuel poverty reduction is indeed questionable. In 
contrast, the City Council’s Cycle City Strategy and Action Plan 2017-2021 has no mention 
of tackling inequality dimensions with relation to cycling (with the exclusion of providing 
free bike rides). This is somewhat surprising since accessibility and social inclusion are a 




continuity and the presence of political silos when developing low carbon and just policies 
(Hirsch, 2018; Robins et al. 2018).  
Furthermore, Nottingham City Council is the first UK council to trial ULEV owners in 
shared priority bus and cycle lanes on a major traffic corridor e.g. Daleside Road/A612 in 
2018. This is an initiative which has been adopted in other parts of the UK such as Milton 
Keynes and Derby (Transport Nottingham, 2021) and non-compliant vehicles found driving 
in the lane are issued with penalties. While this can have benefits for urban air quality by 
encouraging the uptake of low carbon vehicles and increasing public awareness of air 
quality, this evokes justice considerations. For example, it can be argued that since ULEVs 
are more expensive to own than older, more polluting vehicles, lower-income groups will be 
disproportionately affected as they are not given priority on the roads. As stated by one 
interviewee:  
“Essentially, what it means is that the wealthy businessmen with their top salaries 
and their swanky new, top-of-the-range electric vehicles get to by-pass the morning 
traffic, whilst us regular workers who are on low to medium salaries have to sit in 
traffic congestion especially during peak hours because we don’t have that luxury [of 
the electric vehicle] and that exemption. That doesn’t seem fair.” (Interview with 
Anonymous).    
Therefore, attempts by the City Council to facilitate a just transition within the transport 
sector are fragmented and implicit, and the efforts to promote a systemic behavioural change 
are questionable (e.g. through sustained EV use) (Sovacool et al. 2019).   
4.4. CONCLUSION  
The development of effective policies and supporting mechanisms across international, 
national and local levels is fundamental for addressing low carbon and equitable transitions 
in cities, and it is important to understand these policies are subject to temporal, social and 
political pressures. Through examining governance approaches by way of policies and 
strategic plans across international, national and local levels, in this chapter I have 
demonstrated that there are two overarching factors that are thwarting transitions: firstly, I 
have argued that there is a weakness of climate targets and subsequent fragmented and 
dissonant climate policy across all levels; and secondly, I have contended that there is 




Related to the first point, on an international scale, I have noted that even though climate 
change has been on the global agenda for decades, it was not until the 2015 Paris Agreement 
that marked the first treaty which became legally-binding. Despite this Treaty, international 
governance of climate change is thwarted from this Agreement since the pledges are 
voluntary and the agreement lacks clarity on targets, measurements and accountability (e.g. 
Clemencon, 2016; Routledge et al. 2018). The failing of COP25 to create more ambitious 
targets further exemplifies the complex governance of international climate negotiations and 
the fragility of existing agreements. Similarly, the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable 
Development has provided a framework which incorporates targets for low carbon and 
inclusive environments. Yet, these goals are limited by being voluntary and contradictory in 
nature by advocating the pursuit of continued and unsustainable economic growth (e.g. 
Hickel, 2015; Liverman, 2018). I have emphasised that the articulation of SDGs is uneven 
across local and national levels, and therefore the localisation of the SDGs is limited.   
On a national level, there are laudable attempts to transition to a low carbon and just society 
e.g. 2008 Climate Change Act. However, I contend that the changing political parties in 
power in the UK has resulted in varying political support of climate change commitments, 
with differing governments having varied priorities, particularly since 2010 where there has 
been a decreased willingness and commitment for climate change policy strategies (Gillard, 
2017). This is reflected in the lack of ambitious targets in current UK policy, particularly 
regarding air quality and carbon emissions. Furthermore, there has been an evident reversal 
in clean energy policy since 2010 under Conservative neoliberal austerity policies. While 
there are targets to encourage emissions reductions such as via ULEVs, I have noted that 
this current policy is centred around clean growth and reliant on private forms and is lacking 
in support and incentives from national government (e.g. Hickman et al. 2017). I have argued 
that the complex division of powers and responsibilities across the UK, and England in 
particular, is illustrative of the patchwork nature of devolution and subsequent uneven 
approaches to low carbon transitions. 
On a local level, I have demonstrated that climate change commitments are variegated 
between and within local authorities, displaying a weak consensus and inconsistent approach 
across local government. For example, Nottingham City Council has set some of the most 
ambitious targets for combatting greenhouse gas emissions from a UK council, and the 
policy and strategy reflect these ambitions by applying across multiple sectors, such as 




Nottinghamshire County Council which also covers the urban conurbation, however has 
very limited policy and strategy for emissions reductions and tackling social inequality. 
There is also an unequal climate policy within Nottinghamshire County Council, with vast 
inconsistencies between district and borough councils in their approaches to combatting 
climate change and social inequalities. This further illustrates the lack of mandate 
surrounding climate policy in the UK and demonstrates the very fragmented and uneven 
political strategies of two neighbouring councils when addressing low carbon and just 
transitions. I contend that this is attributed to the structure of local authorities across the UK. 
Again, I have argued that this local governance context clearly impinges on the ability of 
both councils to develop a fully integrated city-region strategy across its urban conurbation.  
This suggests that despite legal commitments, current climate commitments are 
continuously exposed to political resistance and political inertia on international, national 
and local levels, which can in turn disrupt transition pathways.  
Related to the second point, I have illustrated that there is inadequate attention to justice 
elements across international, national and local scales. The concept of a ‘just transition’ is 
visible in international environmental discourse, and formal endorsements were introduced 
in the Paris Agreement in 2015 and the Solidarity and Just Transition Silesia Declaration in 
2018. Whilst this is a step-change towards securing political and public support, it has 
received limited endorsement from all UNFCCC parties, highlighting the lack of progress in 
this area and the varying commitment of the international community for enabling just 
transitions (e.g. Jenkins, 2019). In other words, the inadequate attention given to justice 
elements in climate agreements has resulted in the exclusion of just transitions from 
mainstream climate policy.  
I have asserted that the marginalisation of just transition in climate policy is also evident on 
a national level, so commitments to an inclusive transition remain implicit and result in a 
lack of political consensus and vision (e.g. Raikes et al. 2019a; Robins et al. 2019a). This 
has repercussions for just transitions at the local level, with justice dimensions being seldom 
referenced in the limited climate change strategy from Nottinghamshire County Council. On 
the one hand, there is reference made within Nottingham City Council strategy to justice 
dimensions and combatting the social inequality prevailing in the city, however this is also 
inconsistent and ambiguous e.g. with regards to reducing fuel poverty ‘where practicable’. 
Therefore, the measurability and accountability of progress for achieving fuel poverty 




dimensions with relation to cycling (with the exclusion of providing free bike rides) by the 
City Council, and the provision of priority bus lane use for ULEV owners, which is 
inconsistent and contradictory to the Local Transport Plan where accessibility and social 
inclusion are a key feature. Therefore, attempts by the City Council to facilitate a just 
transition within the transport sector are fragmented, implicit and lack uniformity across 
policy, which suggests the presence of political silos in governing low carbon and inclusive 
policies (Hirsch, 2018; Robins et al. 2018).   
Again, the core argument here is that the inadequate attention to justice on an international 
and national level reinforces the political and institutional inertia and resistance for tackling 
social justice issues, despite urban areas such as Nottingham which have displayed some 
degree of commitment through their policy. I have argued that such inattention to justice on 
national and international levels has created a lack of path-dependency, transition pathway 
and policy stabilisation which is in turn disrupting the governance of low carbon and just 
transitions. Despite these issues, Nottingham City Council in its political capacity as a local 
authority has overcome some barriers to govern sustainable and inclusive transitions, as 





GOVERNING LOW CARBON EQUITABLE URBAN 
TRANSITIONS IN PRACTICE 
 
5.0. INTRODUCTION 
Due to mounting political pressure within recent years, many local authorities across the 
world have started to recognise the detrimental effects of present-day unsustainable urban 
practices. As such, some local authorities have begun to address environmental issues and 
social inequalities prevalent in cities through low carbon governance. The concept of 
governance is highly contested but broadly, governance is understood here to be the range 
of approaches and actors involved in enacting sustainable transitions at the urban level. The 
governance of such climate change mitigation by local authorities is not uniform across the 
UK however, with levels of energy governing activity being differentially distributed across 
the UK. In a study by Webb et al. (2016), only 9 per cent of the UK’s local authorities were 
classified as ‘energy leaders’ (i.e. those investing in a minimum of three and up to eight 
projects, with or without an accessible energy plan) in comparison to 23 per cent of local 
authorities being classified as ‘yet to join’ (i.e. had no accessible evidence of plans or 
investment). This differentiation is likely to be attributed to distinctive political, economic 
and cultural factors. The governance of low carbon and equitable transitions should therefore 
not only be considered from a purely economic perspective, but it is also important to 
consider differing governing modes as a result of varied political capacities, social and 
cultural differences; all of which can be shaped over time and result in diverse historical and 
institutional legacies. Chapter 4 has provided a contextual background to sustainable 
transitions by examining the multi-level policy surrounding low carbon and inclusive 
transitions on international, national and local levels.  
Following a multi-level and multi-sectoral perspective, in this chapter I explore the ways in 
which political capacity is shaped by various factors, including: first, the type of local 
authority; second, collective and individual agency of local government; third, path creation; 




just urban transitions, as demonstrated by the case study of Nottingham. The rest of the 
chapter is structured as follows. In the first section I argue that political capacity is crucial 
to implement low carbon and just transitions, and the presence of political capacity is 
partially owed to the type of local authority in existence (e.g. Kuzemko & Britton, 2020). 
Through examining local authorities in urban areas, the multiple and differing 
responsibilities across the UK are highlighted. This in turn can hinder (or facilitate, as in 
Nottingham’s case) the local government’s ability, commitment and interest to drive low 
carbon and equitable transitions, all of which have an influence on political capacity.   
For the second section, I consider the agency of individual actors and group of local 
government actors for governing sustainable and equitable trajectories at an urban level. As 
acknowledged, these can differ between councils across the UK and therefore have a 
significant impact on the governance of sustainable transitions in urban areas. Therefore, it 
is important to examine this agency using a scalar approach which can reveal different 
political practices and discourses, and their relations at and across varying scales (e.g. 
MacKinnon, 2010). Hence, actors and their agency are considered at two levels of local 
government; first, the larger (collective) political administration (i.e. the council institution 
as a whole), and second, at a smaller (individual) personal level. By considering both 
collective and individual agency, I highlight the importance of political stability and 
leadership for the governance of equitable and low carbon transitions, as shown by the 
Nottingham example.  
Next in the third section, I consider the role of path creation in governing sustainable 
transitions, which can be viewed as an enabler by positively contributing to Nottingham’s 
political capacity for governing low carbon and equitable trajectories (MacKinnon et al. 
2019). I highlight that agency on an administrative and individual level in the past brings to 
the fore transition pathways and the role of lock-in, path creation and temporality in 
sustainable transitions, all of which are key conceptual themes that resonate strongly with 
the Nottingham case study and contribute to transition thinking. As shown by the historical 
examples of the Nottingham Declaration and the city’s district heating system, path-
dependency, lock-in and self-reinforcement are very much prevalent in the pursuit of the 
city’s current decarbonisation strategy.  
In the fourth section, I examine the role of local government ownership in transitions, which 




carbon and equitable transitions (e.g. Cumbers, 2012). Using a cross-sectoral approach, I 
discuss local government ownership of energy, social housing and transport in turn, and the 
ways in which this has positively influenced low carbon and equitable projects. As such, the 
City Council has begun to address environmental and social inequality in practice by 
progressing schemes including: first, low carbon and affordable energy (demonstrated by 
the establishment of an energy service company Robin Hood Energy, and through 
retrofitting social housing); and second, low carbon and affordable transport (demonstrated 
by the bus network, Workplace Parking Levy and tram).  
Finally, in the fifth section I conclude by drawing upon the overarching themes that are 
apparent across this multi-level and cross-sectoral perspective and argue that the engagement 
of local authority in low carbon and inclusive transitions is contingent on political capacity. 
This in turn is influenced by: the type of local authority present in urban areas; agency of 
actors; path creation; and local government ownership; all of which are beneficial for 
pursuing low carbon and just trajectories.  
5.1. LOCAL GOVERNMENT CAPACITY FOR LOW CARBON 
AND INCLUSIVE TRANSITIONS  
The capacity of government entails the extent to take political decisions in pursuit of agreed 
public goods, and the type of local governmental capacity can vary in relation to sustainable 
energy systems (Kuzemko & Britton, 2020). Kuzemko and Britton (2020) usefully highlight 
that local government capacity can take a variety of forms, by way of: responsibility, 
political authority, finance, personnel, knowledge and energy materiality; all of which can 









Capacity type Description 
Responsibility Statutory duties; defined administrative authority, often assigned by central 
government and/or national constitution 
Political authority Policy discretion; ability to make policy decision in relation to the locality, 
rather than contributing to national policy 
Finance Financial resources; local tax raising abilities; capital assigned from the 
centre; land  
Personnel Personal capital; number and quality of staff capable of making and 
implementing sustainable energy policies 




Proximity to energy resources; low carbon energy assets; local infrastructure 
Table 5.1: Types of capacity (Kuzemko & Britton, 2020, p.2).  
Eckersley (2017) stresses that capacity and autonomy should not be confused, since 
autonomy refers to the degree of freedom from central direction. This may be constrained 
for example by an unclear constitutional status, reliance on unpredictable revenue streams, 
and a lack of resources. Therefore, a municipality may have autonomy but also a reduced 
capacity, which may make it more reliant on other actors to achieve objectives.   
Nottingham’s experience demonstrates that the type of local authority that is in operation 
(i.e. whether it is a one-tier (unitary) authority or two-tier authority) is a significant factor 
for progressing low carbon and equitable transitions, as this in turn affects its capacity for 
governance. As highlighted in Chapter 4, the UK has a complex and evolving political 
system made up of different local authority structures across four devolved countries: 
England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland. Within this political system, there can be 
tensions between actors at different scales and it is out-with the scope of this chapter to 
examine in detail all the different types of local authorities in the United Kingdom. Presently, 
there are 343 local authorities in England alone which are a mixture of two types of local 
government structure: a two-tier system and a one-tier system (also known as single-tier or 
unitary) as shown in Table 4.2.  
Nottingham is classified as a medium-sized core city and is governed by two local 
authorities: Nottingham City Council and Nottinghamshire County Council. Nottingham 
City Council has an administrative boundary area tightly surrounding the inner-city with a 
population of approximately 330,000 inhabitants (Figure 5.1).  Nottingham City Council 






























Figure 5.1: Map of Nottingham City Council and ward boundaries (Nottingham 
Insight, 2019b).   
 
In comparison, Nottinghamshire County Council surrounds the wealthier outskirts and 
suburbs and covers an approximate population of almost 818,000 (ONS, 2017). 
Nottinghamshire County Council is a two-tier authority and made up of seven district and 




In the case of Nottingham, there are different levels of responsibility between the local 
authorities, which are in turn affecting their approach and subsequent political capacity to 
implement sustainable transitions. Nottingham City Council as a unitary authority has 
responsibility for all local services, such as transport, housing and planning, and therefore 
the planning, implementation and operation of low carbon transitions is considered a simpler 
process than other two-tier systems which share responsibility between county council and 
district councils.  For example, in the case of Nottingham, decisions are predominantly made 
in-house within the City Council, and therefore minimise the requirement for external 
stakeholder decision-making which can also be hindered from differing political priorities 
and result in a lengthier process.  
Instead, as a two-tier system Nottinghamshire County Council and its seven district and 
borough councils have varied and devolved responsibilities, such as planning and social 
housing. It is important to reinforce here that unlike Germany or the USA, there is an uneven, 
fragmented and patchwork landscape of regional governance in the UK. As mentioned in 
Chapter 4, the abolition of RDAs has resulted in no clear regional tier of government or 
strategic planning in the East Midlands. It is important also to reiterate that the UK is the 
most centralised government of the G7 according to the proportion of revenue raised by sub-
central government, with 5 per cent of revenue raised locally in comparison to France (13 
per cent) and Germany (29 per cent). This is despite gestures for increased localism which 
were part of a broader centralising logic from the Coalition Government in the UK, in 
combination with fiscal austerity and curtailed powers (Featherstone et al. 2012; 
Featherstone et al. 2020).  
Consequently, the different levels of responsibility have resulted in varying political 
authority which is impacting decision-making and political capacity to implement low 
carbon and just transitions.  In Nottingham, Nottinghamshire County Council does not have 
the same decision-making powers or autonomy as Nottingham City Council. For example, 
planning applications in the county area are determined by the district councils, with each 
having their own local plans, in comparison to the City Council which is a unitary authority 
therefore has both housing and planning responsibility. Due to these differences in 
responsibility (e.g. in housing), one interviewee argued that this has led to a different 
engagement between the councils:   
“The County Council in a way doesn’t have quite the contact with householders, or 




have said ‘well we cannot really put resources into something that is non-statutory 
when we’ve got the demands for us as a county council’. It’s like social care, and 
young people, it’s difficult to argue that the work we used to do around climate 
change could still be done when we are really struggling to look after people who are 
very vulnerable adults or young people” (Interview with P18, Nottingham County 
Council).  
It is arguable that since unitary authorities have all the duties ‘in-house’, they have formal 
responsibility and are subsequently more engaged with issues of energy and affordable 
warmth at the city level. In comparison, county councils do not have specific remits such as 
housing, and therefore are less inclined to be engaged with energy issues at the household 
level (such as fuel poverty), since this is not in their remit. In addition, the austerity measures 
posed on local authorities’ (austerity localism) further places pressure on their ability to meet 
their statutory requirements, let alone meet non-statutory requirements. This is problematic 
for enabling sustainable and just urban transitions in the UK especially since the two-tier 
system of government (like that of Nottinghamshire County Council) is the structure that is 
in operation in most of England.  
This is reinforced by Bulkeley et al. (2013), who state that cities as actors of low carbon 
transitions may have differing responsibilities (and by extension rights) on a national and 
international scale, and therefore there may be substantial differences within cities where 
duties, burdens and benefits of addressing climate change could and should be. Such 
reflections are particularly important when considering low carbon urban transitions as they 
emphasise the multi-scalar nature (i.e. local, regional or national levels) of addressing 
climate change in justice terms, and the different governance approaches that might be taken 
in various contexts. The broader point here is the local authority structure in operation leads 
to the obvious lack of city-region strategy, which would allow local authorities to combine 
in their efforts towards a decarbonised and inclusive transition. 
Furthermore, the Nottingham example highlights that the spatial arrangement of the city can 
affect the governance of low carbon and sustainable transitions. In Nottingham, the urban 
area is governed by two different authorities and therefore the urban area of Nottingham 
itself is problematic to define, as commented:  
“[The administrative boundary] is really tightly knit, so if we go 2 miles we are in 
the County, even though we are still in the Nottingham urban area. So what people 
regard as Nottingham and the Nottingham City boundary area are 2 very different 




Whilst the urban area of Nottingham is problematic to define and can add a layer of 
complexity to Nottingham’s urban governance, the tight administrative boundaries have 
indeed been beneficial for the City Council by maintaining a relatively small and compact 
size. This has been positive by allowing value for money to be a lot easier to obtain, since 
energy materiality’s (such as local infrastructure) are in closer proximity, which in turn can 
make projects more appealing for the City Council financially since there are smaller 
distances to cover. On the one hand, this can also be particularly advantageous for transport 
and mobility justice by allowing the City Council to provide an extensive network in the 
city. This supports arguments of the benefits of a ‘compact city’ approach for achieving 
sustainable city objectives and improving social equity and spatial mobility (Ahlfedlt & 
Pietrostefani, 2017; Neuman, 2005). On the other hand, this can have negative implications 
since Nottinghamshire County Council has a more spread out and rural population, leading 
to accessibility and isolation being worse (Interview with P18, Nottinghamshire County 
Council).  This can therefore be disadvantageous for the wider Nottingham conurbation in 
terms of spatial equity and transition policy across the region, echoing critiques of compact 
cities on social equity dimensions (e.g. mobility in rural areas, inner-city affordability), as 
per Ahlfedlt and Pietrostefani (2017).  
The bounding of the urban unit by administrative responsibilities into a smaller, more 
confined location has therefore shaped the way in which transitions are enacted at the city-
level and have in turn made them more desirable and easier to implement from an economic 
standpoint. Whilst it is acknowledged that other spatial considerations of low carbon urban 
transitions have tried to shift away from the concept of urban areas being ‘bounded’ units 
and more inter-related, interwoven and complex, (e.g. Bulkeley et al. 2011; Wittmayer & 
Loorbach, 2015), the Nottingham example reinforces that the governance of low carbon just 
urban transitions is indeed influenced by, and to some extent restricted to, each local 
authority’s administrative boundaries. This is because of the different responsibilities and 
remits of local authorities within their own administrative boundaries, which as shown in 
this example has stimulated transitions within Nottingham City Council administrative 
boundary, but inhibited actions outside of this area (Franzen, 2013). This appropriately 
reinforces the point that the decarbonised energy transition is a fundamentally geographical 
process which involves reconfiguring current spatial patterns of economic and social activity 
(Bridge et al. 2013). It is also important to consider the agency of local government actors 
in governing low carbon and just transitions, on both collective and individual scales, as 




5.2. AGENCY OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT ACTORS  
As I have contended, the type of local authorities (i.e. unitary or two-tier authority) for 
governing sustainable and equitable transitions is critical to consider, since this can 
significantly alter a local authority’s political capacity to implement changes at the local 
level, due to variations in responsibility between local authorities. Additionally, the type of 
local authority consequently impacts the role of actors and agency for governing sustainable 
and equitable transitions at an urban level. In other words, actors (both individuals and 
groups of individuals) and their agency (behaviours) in attempts to prevent, sustain and 
generate change at the urban level.  
Since actors can work collectively and independently of one another, it is worthwhile to 
examine their agency using a scalar approach which can reveal different practices and 
discourses and therefore agents of change, as in the context of governing urban sustainable 
transitions (Affolderbach & Schulz, 2015; Coe & Jordhus-Lier, 2010; MacKinnon, 2010). 
The actors which are particularly important for governing sustainable transitions in 
Nottingham can therefore be considered at two scales of local government: first, as a 
collective set of actors, i.e. the political administration and institution; and second, as 
individual actors, independent of one another.  
Nottingham’s local authority Nottingham City Council is a democratic organisation covering 
20 electoral wards in the city. At the time of writing, the Labour Party is the main political 
administration with a large majority of 50 out of 55 councillors representing the Labour 
Party; 2 representing the Conservative Party; and 3 councillors representing the Independent 





















Figure 5.2: Political representation of Nottingham by Ward in 2019 (Nottingham City 
Council, 2019). 
 
There has been a stable Labour administration at the City Council since 1991 and there is no 
indication that this political stability will change in the next number of electoral cycles (Dale, 
2017). Part of the reason for this political stability can be attributed to Nottingham City 
Council’s small administrative boundary which comprises a largely working-class 
population, with most of the wealthier residents of the city who traditionally vote 
conservative living out-with the City Council boundary in the neighbouring Nottinghamshire 
County Council, for example in areas such as West Bridgford and Rushcliffe (Interview with 
P3, Nottingham City Council, 2018). Given this past (and possibly future) political stability, 




of change in administration. This political stability has also allowed for the ability to plan 
longer-term and make decisions which might be considered politically controversial, such 
as the Workplace Parking Levy and tram extension (discussed in Section 5.4.2) and is 
therefore a key factor for governing sustainable transitions. However, Nottingham appears 
to be fortunate in its experience of political stability and advancing sustainable transitions, 
since the prevalence of one-party councils over time can also be subject to negative 
consequences, such as complacency, stagnation, reduced accountability and lack of 
competition for the governing elite (e.g. as per the controversial reported political corruption 
in former industrial heartlands including Scotland (such as Glasgow City Council), England 
(Hull and Doncaster) and South Wales)) (Barrington & Maxwell, 2013).   
In comparison, Nottinghamshire County Council has had a much more dynamic political 
representation that has been changing over recent years. As noted in Chapter 4, local 
government authorities run on different electoral cycles, with Nottingham City Council 
having whole council elections in 2019, 2023 and every 4th year; Nottinghamshire County 
Council having whole council elections in 2019, 2021, and every 4th year; and 
Nottinghamshire’s 7 District Councils having elections in 2019, 2023 and every 4th year (UK 
Government, 2019e). Between 1981-2009 and 2013-2017 the political administration was 
Labour-majority, and in interim periods 2009-2013 and 2017-present the County Council 
was (and presently is) controlled by a Conservative majority. Today, the County Council is 
represented by 66 councillors with a more varied political administration, with 36 seats to 
Nottinghamshire County Council Conservatives and Mansfield Independent Group; 22 seats 
to Labour; 6 seat to Ashfield Independent; 1 seat for Liberal Democrats; and 1 seat for 
Independent (Councillor Maureen Dobson) (Nottinghamshire County Council, 2021). Such 
a broad array of political groups within the County Council can arguably make project 
planning problematic within the local authority, due to differing political views and 
priorities, and as a result the County Council requires more collaboration between parties 
(Interview with P18, Nottinghamshire County Council, 2018).  
Long-term political stability and consistency has enabled a strong collective leadership and 
political will in the leadership of the country, which has been particularly favourable for low 
carbon and equitable transitions in terms of collective agency. This is because historically, 
the Labour party are ideologically socially democratic, which is commonly aligned with 
more environmentally and socially-conscious values. This is certainly the case in 




Nottingham than other English Labour councils, as stated: “Everything we do is through a 
lens of reducing deprivation and supporting the most vulnerable in society…” (Interview 
with P3, Nottingham City Council). Again, this demonstrates the delicate and contested 
balance of agency of collective political party politics and those of individuals at the city 
council-level (Coe & Jordhus-Lier, 2010; O’Neill & Gibbs, 2014).  
Evidently, a Labour administration has been beneficial to the progression of low carbon and 
equitable transitions in Nottingham, by maintaining collective political control which has 
allowed sustainable projects to progress, as commented:  
“It’s obvious that knowing some of the characters in the opposition party in the city 
that we would have never had a tram. The Workplace Parking Levy would have been 
cancelled if there had been any chance to cancel any of these things in the progress 
they had been happening because they [the opposition party] wouldn’t have been 
prepared to make that investment. And Robin Hood Energy wouldn’t have happened. 
They are very much opposed to that. There are all sorts of indications that if we lost 
elections, a lot of these things would have been derailed” (Interview with P3, 
Nottingham City Council).  
This reiterates arguments in Chapter 6 of the contested nature of transition processes, and 
that in practice these involve political conflicts which in some ways have been avoided 
and/or overcome in Nottingham from the stable political leadership in the city council over 
many years. In addition, it is considered that the environmental and social ethos has been 
built up over several years and therefore to a certain extent become politically embedded 
(Interview with P12, Nottingham City Council). As noted in Chapter 4, this local 
government agency for driving low carbon and equitable trajectories is also reflected in 
Nottingham City Council’s environmental and social policy (e.g. Fuel Poverty Strategy 
2017), and its targets and commitments to become a leading low carbon and equitable city 
(e.g. Go Ultra Low Strategy). Such strong environmental and social policies have 
encouraged positive policy feedback and stability (Roberts et al. 2015). Furthermore, as a 
set of collective actors, the political administration can be viewed as forming a core alliance 
at the regime level, which has overcome political resistance to change from opposing 
political parties (Geels, 2015) and powerful incumbent interests in the energy sector. This 
collective agency is also known to act as a role of ‘path advocates’, which has legitimised 
and anchored pathways to more sustainable trajectories at the urban level (MacKinnon et al. 
2019). Though, it is important to note that such collective agency needs to be maintained to 




noted in Chapter 4 and the dismantling of national government climate change policy (Bauer 
et al. 2012; Innes, 2019).  
In addition to the governance by collective local actors, Nottingham City Council is 
considered to have had particularly strong agency and political leadership on an individual 
level, particularly those of council members who are considered to have made bold and brave 
decisions and are therefore crucial for driving forward and governing sustainable and 
equitable transitions. Individual agency is therefore considered to have been imperative in 
Nottingham’s sustainable transition, particularly through individual actors. An example of 
this is the late Councillor Alan Clarke who was the Portfolio Holder for Energy and 
Sustainability between 2011-2017, and during this role set up Robin Hood Energy, 
developed the Nottingham Declaration on Climate Change and oversaw Nottingham’s 
commitment to become one of the UK’s cleanest cities (Nottingham Post, 2017). In addition, 
individual agency is essential for the progression of controversial decisions for the benefit 
of the environment and Nottingham residents (Interview with P12, Nottingham City 
Council; Interview with P3, Nottingham City Council). A pertinent example of this is Robin 
Hood Energy and the Workplace Parking Levy, which are both unique models in the UK:  
“On the face of it [the schemes] are not an obvious vote winner, you’ve really got to 
be quite bold and ambitious to be prepared to do it… [the City Council] had people 
in power who have been very progressive about what they want for their city and 
perhaps emboldened a bit about the stable position they’ve got, and perhaps being 
prepared to go that bit further. I mean our neighbouring city Derby has currently got 
no overall control and it’s very hard to make decisions like this which are extremely 
controversial, you have the Chamber of Commerce up against you, doing something 
that looks bad for the economy on the face of it now as well” (Interview with P6, 
Nottingham City Council).  
As highlighted, the individual actors and their principled sense of environmental and social 
values to take bold, decisive and progressive decisions in local government is compelling in 
the example of Nottingham’s transition. In this instance, both Robin Hood Energy and the 
Workplace Parking Levy (as discussed in Section 5.4) can be considered as ‘urban 
infrastructure regimes’ and ‘experiments’ through which climate change is governed and can 
lead to institutional change (Bulkeley et al. 2012; Coenen & Truffer, 2012; Hodson et al. 
2017; O’Neill & Gibbs, 2014). Bulkeley et al. (2012) explain that climate change 
experiments establish new circuits, configure dominant actors in new sets of relations, and 
through these means realise the potential for addressing climate change in urban areas. 




circulation can be confined and marginalised, leaving dominant energy regimes (relatively) 
intact’ (Bulkeley et al. 2012, p.1471), this is not quite the case in Nottingham. On the 
contrary, whilst there were sites of conflict, i.e. much contestation amongst local businesses 
and groups, in time this has dissipated and led to a positive behavioural change and modal 
shift to active, more sustainable travel (as examined in Section 5.4.5). The role of individual 
agency is consistent with findings that individual actors are motivated by interests and values 
that emerge from personal interests, culture, political and ideological persuasion, and other 
institutional functionalities (e.g. Pesch, 2015). As such, individual actors have a significant 
role in stimulating sustainable transitions and trajectories, even if they are dealing with 
conflicting sets of meanings or organisational behaviour (Vringer et al. 2020).  
Furthermore, the City Council has been particularly fortunate in their pursuit of a low carbon 
urban transition as it has had capable, knowledgeable and skilled officers working for the 
council who have carried out projects successfully. The motivations behind this agency are 
not confirmed, but this is likely because the individuals had a strong interest in improving 
the city environmentally and making it more socially equitable (Interview with P3, 
Nottingham City Council; Interview with P4, Nottingham City Council). Furthermore, 
Wurzel et al. (2019) comment that the extent to which actors develop into climate pioneers 
is dependent on their internal and external ambitions, as well as more structural drivers, such 
as competitive and problem pressures and the political/public salience of climate change. 
Both Van der Heijden (2019) and Bulkeley and Kern (2005) emphasise that the presence of 
a local climate champion, by means of mayors or other urban political leaders, are looked 
upon as a precondition for effective climate governance, and to an extent this is reinforced 
in Nottingham (however, it is recognised that such arguments can reinforce a top-down 
notion of politics).  
The Workplace Parking Levy is a particularly good example of agency in governing low 
carbon and sustainable transport (as highlighted in Section 5.4.7).  Whilst this scheme was 
introduced in 2012, it underwent a long period of planning and discussion which began in 
1998 - a time when sustainable transport was not perhaps so political salient in comparison 
to present-day. This was before local authorities were even given the powers to implement 
Workplace Parking Levies (which was permitted under the Transport Act 2000). The 
benefits that are being accrued to date in Nottingham, both financially and environmentally, 
demonstrate the forward-thinking foresight and long-term planning of the individuals at the 




Furthermore, whether well-judged or coincidental, the timing of the scheme is a key factor 
for the political and public palatability of the project, since this was during a time of public 
spending and when bolder decisions could be made:  
“The noughties were very much a time of public spending, they had been willing to 
go a bit further I think from the time that Tony Blair got (elected) in, up until Gordon 
Brown, and then the (2008 Financial) Crash. I think [back then] was the time when 
there was bolder investment, and now doing something which attacks the employee 
in the city or the employer in the city could be seen as something as politically 
challenging, I think” (Interview with P6, Nottingham City Council).  
This supports arguments that not only is individual agency a fundamental component of low 
carbon and equitable transitions, but emphasises the importance of understanding the timing 
of agency and its effects on significant and lasting change (Coe & Jordhus-Lier, 2010). 
Clearly, the early planning and subsequent implementation of what is now a well-functioning 
and sustainable transport system continues to reap present-day benefits, particularly with 
sustainable transport becoming an increasingly prominent issue. It is also important to reflect 
on the past influences on agency and capacity for shaping contemporary urban transitions, 
as considered next.  
5.3. PATH CREATION AND GOVERNING URBAN 
TRANSITIONS 
I have argued that collective and individual agency has contributed to the political capacity 
of urban governments to progress low carbon and just transitions. In addition to this, agency 
has a temporal nature and spans to past activities, which can embed sustainable transitions 
in urban areas. This can result in a trajectory of path creation (shown in Figure 2.12), which 
asserts that actors have actively and/or intentionally interacted with their environment in an 
innovative fashion (also known as mindful deviation) to purposefully change the structures, 
practices and regulations to influence a certain outcome (MacKinnon et al. 2019). 
This therefore highlights the socio-cognitive processes in agency and the ability to influence 
future trajectories and is useful for understanding why certain urban areas have followed a 
certain trajectory, and why others have not. In the instance of Nottingham, I argue that it is 
evident that path creation has played a key part in political capacity and subsequent low 




heating network in 1974, and launch of the Nottingham Declaration in 2000, as discussed in 
turn next.   
5.3.1. District Heating 
Path creation and agency for low carbon and equitable transitions are certainly apparent in 
Nottingham, and the city’s district heating system is a fitting example. Particularly in recent 
years, the use of district heating has been advocated as an energy and carbon saving measure 
for urban areas. Whilst this has been a popular method in Europe (particularly in the 1970s), 
district heating development has been limited in the UK, with less than 2 per cent of the 
UK’s heating demand being met currently by district heating (Randall, 2014).  
Contrary to this, Nottingham is exceptional to most cities and established a district heating 
system in 1974, which remains owned by Nottingham City Council under the present arms-
length management organisation Energy Services Company Enviroenergy (Brandon et al. 
2017; Enviroenergy, 2018).  The district heating system was set up by the National Coal 
Board at the time and built to provide heating and hot water to some 7,000 dwellings, civic 
buildings, colleges and shopping malls, and to supply steam for industrial loads (Lawson & 
Mason, 1974). Motives behind the scheme were to primarily tackle the city’s increasing 
refuse and to decrease cost, since most existing and potential refuse tips were becoming 
filled up by 1965. At the time, an exhaustive search revealed that there were no available 
sites which were likely to have planning permission granted for tipping (Lawson & Mason, 
1974). Furthermore, the scheme was implemented to deliver anti-pollution measures by 
substituting two chimneys for otherwise many hundred, and utilising waste allowed for the 
conservation of energy (Lawson & Mason, 1974). The political context of the introduction 
of the district heating system in Nottingham at the time is unclear, however this system was 
in parallel with many others introduced in urban areas during the 1970s, such as Paris and 
Hong Kong (Schumacher, 1985).  
There are numerous benefits which are clear from the building of this scheme, and the 
advantages that this has on political capacity for implementing low carbon and just 
transitions at present. Currently, the district heating network is the largest in the UK and is 
comprised of a 68km network, supplying heat and hot water for 4,700 dwellings and over 
100 commercial partners such as the Nottingham Arena and Nottingham Trent University 




160,000 tonnes of the city’s municipal waste at the Eastcroft Incinerator (Enviroenergy, 
2018).  
This is a form of sustainable energy which replaced, and continues to replace, the need to 
burn fossil fuels for heating and hot water. The establishment of a municipally-owned energy 
system, Enviroenergy, has benefitted the city’s progression towards present and future low 
carbon systems by developing knowledge capacity in the infrastructure and wider operation 
and flows of energy across the city (Kuzemko & Britton, 2020). Whilst there is still a high 
level of pollution within the city at present (especially air pollution as aforementioned), the 
emphasis is on the historical delivery of this scheme which was particularly forward-thinking 
for that time and has provided many present-day benefits.  
In addition, by building the district heating network, the city has been historically and 
positively embedded towards low carbon energy systems, which has allowed for the 
development of learning and expertise in the field over three decades. This is both through 
Enviroenergy and the Council’s Energy Directorate, which have full in-house operation 
covering generation, distribution and network operations, metering, retail and billing 
(Interview with P15, Robin Hood Energy). As aforementioned, this was, and remains to be, 
a relatively unique venture for a UK city, with the exception of a small number of cities such 
as Sheffield, Birmingham, and Aberdeen having successful networks (Randall, 2014). As 
stated by one interviewee, timing is a key element:  
“When looking at other cities like Copenhagen, you can’t just say, ‘we’ll have the 
same model’, as they have forty years on from when they started doing it, because 
we don’t have 40 years to get there” (Interview with P9, BEIS).  
Again, the temporal aspects are reinforced as a key factor in the success of Nottingham, and 
the lock-in and embeddedness of a system can be beneficial in terms of timing for low carbon 
and equitable transitions.  
Importantly, it has further stimulated sustainable trajectories by enabling the City Council to 
expand the district heating system (and make savings from sunk costs in existing 
infrastructure which was built almost 40 years ago) and operate this as a commercial service 
(Interview with P9, BEIS):  
“I think there is a uniqueness in Nottingham, the reason being if you are an authority 




where we’ve gone, that’s a long journey and you’ve really got to develop a team and 
bring in that expertise and reputation and it would be very difficult to start from a 
small team or nothing to get to where we are” (Interview with P20, Nottingham City 
Council).  
As such, it can be argued that this arrangement, i.e. low carbon technology operated by the 
City Council, has become acceptable to Nottingham’s city residents, which I argue is key to 
the delivery of low carbon projects in practice. Therefore, a pattern of positive self-
reinforcement has occurred which in turn has aided political capacity to drive forward 
sustainable futures (Bulkeley & Kern, 2005; Rosenbloom et al. 2019). However, it is noted 
that the benefits of district heating systems are restricted to those households that they serve, 
which excludes the city as a whole as it serves a finite number of households. As a result, 
there are no direct benefits for most city residents (Interview with P15, Robin Hood Energy), 
although Nottingham City Council sought to address this issue in the establishment of a 
wider energy service company Robin Hood Energy (as discussed in Section 5.4.1).   
Through having a long history in energy supply and management, the City Council has 
assembled a dedicated Energy Services department which is to date a large team consisting 
of approximately 40 full-time staff that are committed to providing a commercial service 
and can fulfil sustainability drivers. This Department is particularly significant and 
demonstrates the weight and capacity given to these issues by the Council. The existence 
and size of the Energy Services department in Nottingham is unusual, with most other UK 
councils having very limited (if not any) staff with the remit of energy and sustainability 
(Interview with P1, APSE Energy).  
Furthermore, since the Energy Services department is deeply embedded within the Council 
and provides a commercial business and necessary income, it can be suggested that there is 
less risk of being abolished. As such, the establishment of district heating in Nottingham in 
1974 has set a particular course in motion of societal development which affect choices into 
the future, i.e. path-dependence, which is highly significant for transitions (Rosenbloom et 
al. 2019). Therefore, the core argument here is that the early action of individual and 
collective agents establishing a municipally-owned city district heating system has been a 
positive development for the city through providing sunk costs, interest, learning and 
expertise; all drivers of which are positively self-reinforcing and enable political capacity 




5.3.2. Nottingham Declaration  
Additionally, the notion of agency and path creation can be witnessed in the example of the 
Nottingham Declaration, a voluntary pledge signed in October 2000 by 326 local 
government bodies to tackle the causes and impacts of climate change at a local level. The 
Declaration committed local authorities to three broad aims: first, to acknowledge the 
existence of climate change; second, to welcome and engage government targets; and third, 
to commit to working at a local level on carbon management (Brebbia & Longhurst, 2008). 
The significance of this is two-fold. First, the Declaration was co-founded and signed in the 
city of Nottingham, putting the city at the heart of climate change action, whilst also being 
the UK’s first local authority initiative to combat climate change. Second, the East Midlands 
was the first UK region where all 46 of its local authorities became signatories, revealing the 
strong environmental awareness and political willingness of the city and wider region to 
tackle climate change.  As of 2012, The Nottingham Declaration was superceded by the 
Climate Local, which was a Local Government Association initiative to drive, inspire and 
support council action on climate change (LGA, 2019).   
While criticisms have been made regarding the absence of targets for cutting emissions, this 
Declaration is considered as a breakthrough in the UK and more broadly in terms of political 
support for climate change mitigation (Friends of the Earth, 2011). Again, the individual and 
collective agency to form, sign and engage with this Declaration has influenced future 
sustainable trajectories in Nottingham, causing a positive lock-in and path creation for 
sustainable transitions. Therefore, the agency at collective and individual levels has led to 
much discussion of historical path-dependency and subsequent lock-in, that is, the idea that 
characteristics of existing regimes set preconditions for the development of new transition 
pathways (Foxon et al. 2010; Klitkou et al. 2015). As noted by one interviewee:  
“We need to still remember that back in 2000, Nottingham created the Nottingham 
Declaration and that was the basis for local authorities signing up to environmental 
best practice across the whole of the UK. So there was a political engagement in 
environmentalism” (Interview with P9, BEIS).  
To a certain extent, it provides a historical legacy of climate change commitment in the city, 
with sustainability becoming strongly embedded and ultimately empowered the city with “a 
strong platform to move forward” (Interview with P20, Nottingham City Council).   This is 




actors in other local authority areas to collectively pursue environmental strategies and 
potentially initiated pathways for wider regional climate governance. 
As appropriately highlighted by Rosenbloom et al. (2019), path-dependent processes have 
traditionally been considered as a barrier to the adoption of low carbon systems. Yet as the 
Nottingham example demonstrates, path creation, positive lock-in and self-reinforcement 
have contributed to political capacity of urban governments to pursue urban decarbonisation. 
This illustrates that path creation can act as an enabler by positively contributing to 
Nottingham’s present-day sustainable and equitable transition and therefore create a virtuous 
cycle for sustainable governance (MacKinnon et al. 2019). This can be through collective 
leadership which can enrol other interests and actor agency, and in doing so, individuals and 
leaders can act as path advocates and have the ability to legitimise and anchor sustainable 
pathways (MacKinnon et al. 2019; O’Neill & Gibbs, 2014). In addition, the local 
government ownership of assets is favourable for implementing low carbon and equitable 
transitions, as discussed next.  
5.4. OWNERSHIP AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT CAPACITY  
Collective ownership has encountered a resurgence in recent years across Europe with new 
initiatives emerging in cities such as Barcelona and Grenoble (Cumbers, 2012; Cumbers & 
Paul, 2020). There has been a particular increase of public ownership in terms of low carbon 
and equitable transitions26; ranging from buying back the existing electricity network by 
municipalities (e.g. remunicipalisation, also referred to as ‘new municipalism’ of over 305 
cases in German energy sector since 1990), to the building of new low carbon systems by 
communities (e.g. wind farms and solar farms in western Europe) (Cumbers, 2018; Cumbers 
& Paul, 2020; Featherstone et al. 2020). A number of motivations are behind such ventures; 
chiefly, collective ownership allows: a strong governance towards more political influence 
in the local energy market; greater participation and decision-making with citizens; allows 
profits to be reinvested back into the council and used for local services (Wagner & Berlo, 
2015); and promoting synergies between various stakeholders (Energy Cities, 2018). This 
may also be influenced by a wider environmental movement, and as witnessed in the German 
Energiewende (energy transition) and some areas of Scandinavia, remunicipalisation reflects 
                                                 
26 Though the trend towards municipalisation (or new municipalism) is also evident in other sectors of local 




a deeper historical and social ethos of public value and responsibility for public well-being 
(Beveridge & Kern, 2013; Cumbers & Paul, 2020). Municipal ownership of low carbon 
systems is therefore considered a ‘win-win’ scenario in terms of urban low carbon and 
equitable transitions, by linking justice dimensions and environmental benefits and is thus 
of key importance to sustainable transitions (Chatterton et al. 2013; Cumbers, 2018; 
Johnstone et al. 2020). Importantly, the argument developed here is that these processes of 
neoliberalisation and nationalisation shape and configure contemporary (urban) governance 
(Leitner et al. 2007).  
In the UK, public ownership has had a varied history, particularly within the last few 
decades. During the Thatcher era of neoliberalism and privatisation in the 1980s, and 
partially continued in the New Labour era, many councils within the UK sold their council-
owned assets to gain capital which was cut from central government (Harvey, 2007). 
However, the city of Nottingham is distinctive and went against the grain by not selling 
public assets unlike many other Labour councils in the UK, for instance Glasgow. The results 
behind this variation of privatisation in UK Labour-council cities could be a result of 
differing local politics to influence policy (Millins & Murie, 2006). Again, this is noteworthy 
and highlights the effect of individual and collective agency in negotiating local government 
policy and a willingness of urban actors to break with some of the characteristic neoliberal 
politics (Featherstone et al. 2020). Furthermore, this underlines the distinctiveness of 
Nottingham for local political transformation in relation to the strategies of other UK Labour 
councils. Unlike most UK cities, Nottingham City Council retained ownership of its bus 
network and social housing, which has positively influenced low carbon and equitable 
trajectories in the transport and energy sectors to date by providing political capacity for 
enabling transitions.  
I argue that from this municipal ownership, Nottingham City Council has been able to pursue 
environmental benefits (in terms of low carbon initiatives), social benefits (in terms of equity 
and justice dimensions) and converge low carbon transitions and ownership to generate 
economic benefits (in terms of sustainable income streams). This is demonstrated through 
the provision of low carbon and affordable energy and low carbon and affordable transport, 




5.4.1. Provision of Low Carbon and Affordable Energy 
The privatisation and liberalisation of the UK energy markets was driven during Thatcher’s 
Conservative Government in the 1980s. Since 1947, the energy sector structure was under 
complete public ownership as a result of the 1945–1951 Labour government which had 
nationalised almost 570 private and public bodies involved in the generation and distribution 
of electricity to a single, nationalised industry (International Business Publications, 2015; 
Pond, 2006; Wollmann & Marcou, 2010). It was envisaged at the time of nationalisation that 
a coordinated, integrated industry structure was the most optimal for restructuring the 
national economy (Wollmann & Marcou, 2010) and energy infrastructure was considered a 
non-competitive, ‘natural’ monopoly (Bielecki & Geboye Desta, 2004).  
The Conservative Government under Thatcher’s administration viewed this system of state-
control as highly inefficient in comparison, with the need for investment by private actors 
and the function of the sector using a market-oriented approach (Hulsink, 1999). It was 
arguably used as a key agenda to break the power of the National Union of Mineworkers 
(and other unions) particularly during the 1984-85 strikes against coal pit closures and the 
loss of 20,000 jobs which devastated communities in Northern England, Scotland and Wales 
(Pearson & Watson, 2012). The impact of these closures continues to have significant socio-
economic legacies and hence raises justice implications for deindustrialisation and the low 
carbon transition (e.g. Johnstone & Hielscher, 2017). As such, during the 1980s the 
liberalisation, restructuring and privatisation of the UK energy sector came into force, which 
involved the processes: introduction of competition through structural changes, such as the 
removal of subsidies; horizontal unbundling of incumbents in order to create competitors; 
vertical unbundling to facilitate access to monopoly networks; the establishment of an 
independent energy regulator; and selling to private corporations (Pollitt, 2012).  These 
processes were carefully planned and managed over a period of 10-15 years, and at the time 
it was considered unique in that the UK undertaking this large shift was the first country at 
the time, and therefore had little experience to draw upon (DTI, 2000).  
Consequently, the present-day ownership of the UK’s energy sector is concentrated into few, 
large multinational utilities which operate across generation, distribution and supply.  The 
energy supply market is comprised of six utilities known as the ‘Big Six’ which supply 
approximately 95 per cent of domestic and 80 per cent of commercial consumers (Hall et al. 




British companies and seven are owned and controlled by foreign stakeholders. Moreover, 
only 25 per cent of UK energy is generated by British corporations, with 66 of the UK’s 
generating capacity being owned by European countries and 70 per cent of nuclear sector 
foreign owned (International Business Publications, 2015). Such oligopolies are particularly 
concerning for low carbon and equitable transitions as these concentrations of vested 
interests can have consequences for long-term decision-making being geared towards short-
term profits, and is a particular issue for the benefit of society since local political agency is 
largely redundant.  
In response to this concentration of a select number of energy oligopolies, the energy supply 
market has witnessed an increased number of entrants in the sector within recent years, for 
example in the UK the incumbent energy suppliers had reduced from almost 100 per cent in 
2008, to 85 per cent in 2015 (Johnstone et al. 2020). Correspondingly, there has been 
increased activity using a wide variety of business models, particularly from local authorities 
and third sector organisations. One such example is the establishment of Energy Service 
Companies (ESCo) which are organisations that provide customers with energy services and 
relate to the physical benefit, utility or good consumers derive from energy (Hannon & 
Bolton, 2015), as shown in Figure 2.6.  
As such, ESCos are heralded for having strong environmental, economic and social well-
being dimensions to their development (e.g. reducing the effects of fuel poverty) since the 
nature of the energy network (such as combined heat and power) is often more energy 
efficient and low carbon than conventional market-led fossil-fuel energy supply from private 
companies. As noted previously through the setting up of Robin Hood Energy, Nottingham 
pursued an active governance in this venture which I argue has aided low carbon and 
equitable transitions in the urban area. However, as highlighted in the methodology chapter, 
it is important to note Robin Hood Energy was municipally-owned up until September 2020, 
when during the time of writing it became privatised and sold off to Centrica (which also 
owns British Gas) following a loss of £34.4 million by March 2019 despite receiving £43 
million of public cash and £16.5 million of loan guarantees (Ambrose, 2020; Centrica, 2020). 
Regardless of this privatisation, Robin Hood Energy is a valuable illustration of the benefits 
of municipally-owned energy in low carbon and just transitions. For example, even though 
the concentration of incumbent energy suppliers is declining with a net loss of 1.4 million 
‘Big Six’ customers (Ofgem, 2018), the retail markets are still concentrated and dominant 




to concentrate power in few hands. As such, the incumbent energy suppliers still hold a 
degree of market and political power and can hinder UK sustainable energy transition, and 
Robin Hood Energy is illustrative of contesting this market and dominant political power 
(Johnstone et al. 2020; Kuzemko, 2015), as discussed next.  
‘ROBIN HOOD ENERGY’ ENERGY SERVICES COMPANY 
The city of Nottingham recognises that a transition to a low carbon and equitable energy 
system is essential, particularly because it has had a persistent problem of high and 
fluctuating rates of fuel poverty. Overall, Nottingham’s fuel poverty was 21.7 per cent in 
2011/12, 12.6 per cent in 2014/15, and 14.6 per cent in 2016/17 (Nottingham City Council, 
2018c). This is in comparison to the rest of England which has an average of 10.2 per cent 
in 2017 (UK Government, 2019c). Fuel poverty is also highly variable across the 
Nottingham urban conurbation, with areas such as Dunkirk and Lenton having the highest 
percentage (30.2 per cent in 2015), in comparison to the lowest percentage in Wollaton West 
(10.7 per cent in 2015), as shown in Table 5.2. These disparities reaffirm arguments that 
energy justice is a deeply geographical phenomenon since it is unequally distributed and 
experienced across different places (Bouzarovski & Simock, 2017), and therefore addressing 
energy justice from a spatial perspective (e.g. on the urban scale) can provide a more 
comprehensive understanding of the problem.  
As emphasised in Chapter 4, Nottingham City Council has developed the Energy Strategy 
2010-2020, with a target of 20 per cent of energy used to be produced within the Greater 
Nottingham area from renewable or low/zero carbon sources (Nottingham City Council, 
2010).  Tackling Nottingham’s social inequality is very important according to the City 
Council (Interview with P3, Nottingham City Council), and this mission is clearly echoed in 
the City Council’s Energy Strategy, which continuously refers to eliminating societal issues 
caused by energy, most commonly fuel poverty, as one of the Council’s top five priorities 
identified in the Nottingham Plan. As such, Nottingham is one of few city councils within 
the UK to have a dedicated Fuel Poverty Strategy (2018) and commitment “To eliminate E, 
F and G EPC-rated homes occupied by fuel poor households by 2025, where practicable” 
(Nottingham City Council, 2018c, p.3).    
An important scheme to alleviate fuel poverty has been led by the Council through the 




the city’s second ESCo (the first being Enviroenergy) was established predominantly in 
response to: i) a limited competition in the energy market in the East Midlands area and 
subsequent high levels of fuel poverty; ii) poor representation of existing energy suppliers; 
iii) a disengaged base of residents; and iv) high number of Nottingham residents on 
prepayment meters (Interview with P15, Robin Hood Energy). Robin Hood Energy is a 
notable initiative as it aimed to reduce fuel poverty, both within Nottingham and across the 
UK, through an ownership model which went against the status quo. At the time of research, 
the customer base was approximately 180,000 domestic customers and increasing (Interview 
with P15, Robin Hood Energy).  
Prior to its collapse in 2020 and being bought out by Centrica, the ESCo was set up and 
owned by Nottingham City Council. This is key to the uniqueness of Robin Hood Energy, 
which was the only council-run ESCo in the UK before its privatisation. Robin Hood Energy 
as a company can be viewed as an exemplar of the emergence of new kinds of actors in 
energy provision and services (Johnstone et al. 2020). Through this public ownership, the 
ESCo operated and marketed itself on being not-for-profit and therefore Nottingham City 
Council did not take a dividend, which allowed for the cost benefits to be passed onto the 
consumer, whilst also ensuring that general interests take precedence over private interests 
(Piketty, 2017), a fundamental difference to the neoliberal logics of incumbent energy 
companies.  
Such an emergence of new kinds of actors in energy provision and services is an example of 
energy ‘disruption’, which can challenge incumbent ownership and wider regimes, linking 
to issues of energy democracy and justice (Johnstone et al. 2020). For instance, an important 
feature of the broader energy democracy principle is increasing transparency in ownership 
(for example being owned by a public body), and therefore the dominant energy agenda is 
resisted by reclaiming public control over a privatised market and serving the public interest 
(Burke & Stephens, 2017). However, given the market difficulties and uncertainties 
adversely affecting smaller energy suppliers, and the collapse of Robin Hood Energy in 
2020, it is indeed questionable of how ‘disruptive’ new actors are in practice. I argue that 
the privatisation of the ESCo (given its financial debts which amounted to £34.4 million in 





Furthermore, the institutional organisation of the ESCo was noteworthy and based on social 
justice principles, by not having shareholders or director bonuses in order to allow the 
economic benefits to be passed onto the customers (Robin Hood Energy, 2020). These 
financial savings were also continued through its staffing structure: “We try and keep the 
staffing structure quite lean and try and attract people who want to be at the company for the 
ethics and ethos, rather than necessarily the salary being as high as other suppliers” 
(Interview with P15, Robin Hood Energy). Again, the provision of 200 full time jobs in 
Nottingham and lack of director bonuses deliberately supported the principles of energy 
justice, by reclaiming the energy sector in order to redistribute local wealth (Burke & 
Stephens, 2017), as highlighted in Table 5.3, and shape an alternative imaginary in the 
current energy market (Featherstone et al. 2020). This is particularly important as re-
municipalisation (or new municipalism) can often not always lead to progressive outcomes, 
with many turning back to the same top-down management and which ultimately reinforces 
a set of top-down elitist and exclusionary practices (Cumbers & Paul, 2020; Featherstone et 
al. 2020).  
Moreover, by employing individuals who are like-minded, this further suggests that energy 
justice principles were supported by the City Council by allowing the company to be 
managed and operated by individuals who supported the ESCo and were likely to operate in 
the best interest of society.  This demonstrates the strong corporate social responsibility of 
Robin Hood Energy and its engrained social justice and environmental ethos. In addition to 
this, Robin Hood Energy was overt about its mission to reduce fuel poverty through its 
marketing. Their marketing was based on strong justice ethics, and Nottingham City Council 
appears to have utilised the famous tale of Robin Hood - a legendary heroic outlaw who 
defended and protected the rights of the poor against the wealthy (Valdes Miyares, 2019) to 
further reinforce this message. Through using a familiar and heroic character, this may 
potentially have attracted greater attention from Nottingham’s residents, particularly because 
of its local and cultural association with Nottingham, and possibly stimulate behavioural 





Table 5.2: Nottingham fuel poverty statistics by ward (Nottingham City Council, 
internal, unpublished, received 02/06/2019).  
 
Robin Hood Energy was distinctive from other energy companies by having a central aim 
on the reduction of fuel poverty and therefore promised to keep prices low, with ‘clear, 
simple pricing’ (Robin Hood Energy, 2020). This transparency is particularly important in 
the energy sector which has experienced scrutiny especially in recent years, with record-
breaking energy price hikes, despite government price caps and falling wholesale and 
environmental costs (Syal, 2019). As Robin Hood Energy maintained, “[our] tariffs are 
consistently cheaper than the Big Six” (Interview with P15, Robin Hood Energy). 
Furthermore, Robin Hood Energy introduced an 18-month fixed tariff, which was their first 
‘roll-over’ tariff. Through this scheme, the customer was automatically moved onto the 
cheapest available fixed tariffs, without an exit fee, rather than defaulting to a standard 
variable tariff (which is historically more expensive). As stated, “That’s something we 




well” (Interview with P15, Robin Hood Energy). Again, in a time of austerity, keeping profit 
margins low and alleviating economic distress for vulnerable groups is essential for a just 
transition and helps decrease social inequality.  
The ESCo also offered a green tariff which provided 100 per cent of electricity from UK 
wind and solar generators (Robin Hood Energy, 2020). However, this tariff was more 
expensive and therefore it was likely to be purchased by those on higher incomes and evokes 
justice considerations. However, since Robin Hood Energy offered other competitive tariffs, 
there was a choice for consumers, and the energy being utilised in each home is part of the 
overall energy mix. This provision of clear pricing and a green energy tariff was therefore 
in-line with the concept of the energy justice framework (Table 5.3), which advocates for 
principles of availability; affordability; due process; transparency and accountability; 
sustainability, intergenerational and intragenerational equity and responsibility (Sovacool & 
Dworkin, 2015). Moreover, as of April 2019, Robin Hood Energy won a contract to supply 
green electricity to Nottingham Express Transit, the council-owned tram network (as 
discussed in Section 5.4.2), with the company giving the ‘most competitive price’ and ‘has 
clear green credentials’ (Nottingham Post, 2019b). Again, this illustrates firstly, the wider, 
joined-up sustainable vision for the city; and secondly, the pro-active behaviour of local state 
actors in pursuing low carbon and equitable transitions through the (albeit temporary) 














Principle Description Contemporary applications 
Availability People deserve sufficient 
energy resources of high 
quality 
Investments in energy supply and energy 
efficiency; upgrades to infrastructure 
Affordability The provision of energy 
services should not become a 
financial burden for 
consumers, especially the 
poor 
Fuel poverty eradication efforts; low-
income assistance for weatherization 
efficiency improvements; retrofits to older 
buildings 
Due process Countries should respect due 
process and human rights in 
their production and use of 
energy 
Social and environmental impact 
assessments; free, prior informed consent 
Transparency and 
accountability 
All people should have 
access to high-quality 
information about energy 
and the environment; and 
fair, transparent and 
accountable forms of energy 
decision-making 
The Extractive Industries Transparency 
Initiative; independent accountability 
mechanisms; international accounting 
standards for energy subsidies 
Sustainability Energy resources should not 
be depleted too quickly 
Natural resource funds designed to save for 
future generations; system benefit charges 
Intragenerational 
equity 
All people have a right to 
fairly access energy services 
The UN’s Sustainable Energy for All 
initiative; Sustainable Development Goal 7 
Intergenerational 
equity 
Future generations have a 
right to enjoy a good life 
undisturbed by the damage 
that our energy systems 
inflict on the world today 
Promoting environmentally friendly forms 
of low-carbon energy such as renewables or 
efficiency that can minimise externalities or 
prolong resource efficacy; implementing 
environmental bonds 
Responsibility All nations have a 
responsibility to protect the 
natural environment and 
reduce energy-related 
environmental threats 
UN Framework Convention on Climate 
Change; the Green Climate Fund 
Table 5.3: Energy justice decision-making framework (Sovacool et al. 2016, p.5). 
 
Furthermore, a significant issue with regards to fuel poverty is the discrepancy between 
tariffs for customers on prepayment meters and those on direct debit schemes. Typically, 
prepayment meters have several disadvantages as they charge above-average rates for gas 
and electricity (as shown in Figure 5.3 and Figure 5.4). As a result, one quarter of all 
households using prepayment meters are fuel poor in comparison to less than one in 10 of 
those paying by direct debit, and one in 6 of those on standard credit (Climate Just, 2017). 
A key aim of Robin Hood Energy was to actively reduce the number of customers on pre-




base) and onto direct debit which allowed for reduced tariffs and therefore a cheaper method 
of payment (Interview with P22, Municipia). Through this initiative, Robin Hood Energy 
engaged closely with the customer and installed a smart meter in ‘pay-as-you-go-mode’ and 
monitored the customers top up activity. Customers that top up regularly and stay out of 
emergency credit suggests that they do not need to be on a pre-payment meter, as stated: 
“[After monitoring] At Robin Hood Energy we write to them [the customers] and offer them 
the opportunity to move onto a direct debit tariff. Through this, the customers are able to go 
on a lower tariff and save money” (Interview with P15, Robin Hood Energy). Therefore, as 
per the concept of energy justice, Robin Hood Energy was actively promoting an inclusive 
transition in the city by increasing the affordability of energy to consumers.  
 
Figure 5.3: Proportion of households in fuel poverty and electricity payment method 





Figure 5.4: Proportion of households in fuel poverty and gas payment method against 
average fuel poverty gap (BEIS, 2020, p.44).  
 
Another key scheme for targeting fuel poverty was that Robin Hood Energy voluntarily 
offered the Warm Home Discount Scheme (Interview with P15, Robin Hood Energy). This 
is noteworthy as even though it is a nation-wide strategy and set up by the UK Government 
to tackle fuel poverty, this is only mandatory for suppliers with 250,000 or more domestic 
customers (Ofgem, 2020). As noted, Robin Hood Energy’s client base at the time of writing 
before privatisation was approximately 180,000 domestic customers across the UK, and 
therefore they were not statutory obligated by the UK Government to provide the Warm 
Home Discount Scheme. The company set themselves apart from other energy companies 
by offering this at a beneficial time of year “When it is needed the most” (Interview with 
P15, Robin Hood Energy) i.e. in October or November, rather than March:  
“This is what the Big Six suppliers do, they leave it as late as they are allowed. We 
are going to do it before it gets really cold so [the customers] can put it straight onto 
the prepayment meter or get it credited to their account” (Interview with P15, Robin 
Hood Energy).  
This is a striking initiative in terms of fuel poverty alleviation and speaks to the different 




such as customer well-being. Therefore, the provision of this to customers across the UK 
demonstrates the wider spatial effects of municipal energy in tackling social inequalities.  
Furthermore, Robin Hood Energy stated a clear aim to reduce fuel poverty within the city 
itself, through the provision of a discounted tariff for Nottingham residents specifically. 
Whilst there is no information on the total numbers of Nottingham-based customers, this 
customer base significantly increased, with Nottingham tariff customers doubling in the last 
12 weeks of 2018. As commented by one respondent, this shows that “people in our 
heartland are backing us as a business which is vitally important” (Interview with P15, Robin 
Hood Energy). This reiterates findings by Devine-Wright (2011) and Devine-Wright and 
Batel (2017) of citizen identity, place attachment and social acceptance of low carbon 
transitions, and that local residents with strong place attachments are likely to give support 
if proposals or projects maintain or promote place distinctiveness and historical continuity. 
Additionally, Robin Hood Energy stated the protection of 2,500 Nottingham-based 
prepayment tariff customers from a 5.6 per cent price increase. This demonstrates the 
strategic endeavour of a municipal energy company in alleviating fuel poverty, particularly 
at the urban level (Interview with P15, Robin Hood Energy; Interview with P18, Nottingham 
City Homes).  
An additional key measure to help reduce fuel poverty implemented by Robin Hood Energy 
was through switching void properties (i.e. properties which are empty or in between 
occupied tenancy) to a Robin Hood Energy tariff. Through being contracted by Nottingham 
City Homes (an arms-length management organisation which manages Nottingham City 
Council’s 27,000 social houses), this produced far-reaching economic savings for the 
company:  
“We are putting the properties on a tariff that might be £200 a year cheaper than 
British Gas tariffs or SSE [Scottish & Southern Electric] tariffs. When the tenants 
move in, they don’t engage with the energy supplier and they don’t switch around. 
At least [now] they are on a competitive tariff, so it’s a big accumulated benefit 
there… They were switching to British Gas previously, the [cost] difference in our 
tariff versus British Gas that we generate their new tenants over a 4-year period is a 
£2.1 million saving, which is money which stays into their pockets and the local 
economy” (Interview with P15, Robin Hood Energy).  
The securing of green electricity supply from Robin Hood Energy to Nottingham Express 
Transit as aforementioned is indicative also of the low carbon vision of the city and the 




Energy and Nottingham City Homes is undoubtedly favourable by encouraging a long-
standing customer base, which further facilitated the on-going operation of the ESCo and 
coordination for pursuing an integrated strategy across the city, as outlined next.   
ENERGY EFFICIENCY BY NOTTINGHAM CITY HOMES  
Domestic housing accounts for 14 per cent of the UK’s carbon emissions, mostly from 
heating and hot water. However, policy attempts to encourage a decrease of emissions (such 
as the Green Deal Scheme in 2013) have failed (CCC, 2019c; Syal, 2019). As illustrated in 
Chapter 4, policies to support low carbon measures in domestic housing have been weakened 
or withdrawn. Though, the ownership of housing structures is found to also have an impact 
on low carbon domestic housing transitions. For example, the progress in energy efficient 
insulation of privately-owned houses has been incremental and patchy, and can therefore 
alter the practical implementation of energy efficiency programmes (Webb, 2015).  
As shown in Table 5.4, there is a variation across the UK but by and large, most local 
authorities in England transferred ownership of their social housing largely from the 
introduction of the Right to Buy policy (sales to tenants) under the Housing Act 1980 and 
Large Scale Voluntary Transfers (transfers from local authorities to housing associations), 
that were developed in the late 1970s (Murie, 2016). This was part of a broader shift towards 
privatisation, deregulation and cuts to public expenditure under Thatcher’s Conservative 
government. However, Nottingham City Council retained its social housing, which has 
proved advantageous when implementing energy efficiency programmes in practice, as 















Glasgow March 2003 80,556 37 64 
Sunderland March 2001 38,356 64 73 
Bradford February 2003 24,764 41 66 
Walsall March 2003 22,971 50 71 
Coventry September 2000 20,125 32 58 
Knowsley July 2002 17,090 44 59 
Tameside March 2000 16,959 43 69 
St. Helens July 2002 14,632 59 70 
Telford March 1999 13,081 58 74 
Calderdate March 2001 12,759 42 62 
Bromley April 1992 12,393 42 76 
Table 5.4: The biggest transfers in social housing in the UK up to March 2004 
(Ginsburg, 2005, p.120).  
 
At present, Nottingham City Council has one of the largest proportions of publicly owned 
housing in the UK, which resonates with the broader context in terms of public ownership 
of energy and transport. Nottingham City Homes is the arms-length management 
organisation (ALMO) which is owned by the City Council and manages 27,000 of the city’s 
social houses. This is significantly high in Nottingham, with social housing rented from the 
council constituting 20.8 per cent, in comparison to the average in England which is 9.4 per 
cent (ONS, 2011). Whilst the term ‘energy justice’ was not used explicitly, it is clear that 
Nottingham City Council are trying to pursue energy justice elements through affordable 
warmth strategies and low carbon, efficient homes. To reiterate, the democratic control of 
the housing allows a more just transition through serving in the interests of the public and 
not a private, profit-driven motive.  
Nottingham City Council in conjunction with Nottingham City Homes have been conducting 
thermal upgrade retrofits of 1,240 social houses with a value over £7 million. This is part of 
a wider scheme called ‘Greener Housing Nottingham’, which has delivered external wall 
insulation to 7,000 homes and solar panels to over 5,000 homes (Preston et al. 2020). This 
scheme also involves connecting 94 new households27 to the city’s energy-from-waste, low 
                                                 
27 Despite this progress, the number of new households involved in this scheme is discernibly low which raises 
concerns about the uneven impact of this scheme. This number is likely to be due to financial constraints 




carbon district heating network, allowing the residents to have more energy efficient homes 
which are cheaper to run. Furthermore, another example of an affordable warmth and low 
carbon housing strategy is through ‘REMOURBAN’, a European wide smart city project 
using £5 million from the EU 28  (Figure 5.5). This project has identified Sneiton in 
Nottingham as one of three demonstrators to pilot energy efficiency in cities. The project is 
a collaboration between Nottingham City Homes, Melius Homes and Energiesprong, and 
involves the UK’s first Energiesprong retrofit model on 10 homes as part of a wider scheme 
to retrofit 200 homes (Observational notes). This involves innovative insulation techniques, 
solar panels on roofs, battery storage and ground source heat pumps, which have been proven 
to radically improved the homes warmth and fuel running costs over a 30-year period (CCC, 
2019a; Remourban, 2020).  
 
Figure 5.5: Nottingham City Homes – 2050 ‘Energiesprong’ homes (Committee on 
Climate Change, 2019, p.43).  
 
Additionally, Nottingham City Homes has employed a full-time fuel poverty officer in-
house since 2009 (notably outlasting austerity and budget cuts). This position involves home 
visits, supporting tenants with fuel debt, switch and save, energy saving advice and training 
                                                 
28 At the time of writing, the UK was in the process of leaving the EU following a UK membership referendum 
in 2016. Therefore, the provision of funding and collaboration on future low carbon projects is ambiguous and 





frontline staff. Having a dedicated fuel poverty officer is considered to be beneficial to both 
Nottingham City Homes and tenants alike, with home visits conducted with 126 tenants and 
over £8,000 of fuel debt wiped off in 2018, and saving tenants on average £197 through the 
‘Switch and Save’ service (Interview with P19, Nottingham City Homes). Furthermore, this 
position is important particularly by signposting vulnerable groups to other services, such as 
Nottingham Energy Partnership, food banks, and advice centres such as St Ann’s Centre. 
Again, this promotes the agency and capacity to implement change. As explained by one 
anonymous individual:  
“Most people don’t understand what fuel poverty genuinely looks like on a day-to-
day basis. Some people go to food banks, but they don’t take home food that they 
need to heat up because they can’t afford the electricity, or don’t have the equipment 
[microwave, oven]. It genuinely is a case of choosing whether to heat or eat […] I 
know that some organisations work [collectively] to help individuals get second-hand 
or free equipment to heat food, but still, that level of poverty is harrowing” [National 
Energy Action Fuel Poverty Conference, 2019].  
As such, this evidence demonstrates that as well as addressing fuel poverty in the 
Nottingham City Homes Corporate Plan, Nottingham City Homes is committing time and 
resources to address fuel poverty, which can be considered uncommon for an ALMO: “I’ve 
not met another officer yet whose role is just like mine, they usually have an energy saving 
or an environmental remit, rather than specifically fuel poverty and energy saving” 
(Interview with P25, Nottingham City Homes). Furthermore, this close connection and 
support of tenants can facilitate effective personal relationships with energy consumers, 
break down barriers (such as mistrust), and promote changes to more sustainable behaviours 
(as outlined in Chapter 6).  
It is acknowledged that energy efficiency not only includes the social housing sector, but 
also includes the private domestic sector and commercial sector as well. Owner-occupied 
and privately-rented houses are a growing sector and as highlighted by Figure 5.6 constitute 
a higher proportion of fuel-poor households, therefore tackling these households is important 
for urban areas. Whilst the Energiesprong and Greener Housing schemes have highlighted 
that Nottingham City Council has begun to address energy efficiency in the social housing 
sector, their ability to address this is restricted to that of council-owned assets, for example 
their own council estate and social housing. Almost one third of Nottingham’s homes are 
privately-rented, many of which are Victorian builds, solid walls, and as previously 




Trust, 2019). The poor standard and energy efficiency of private-rented housing is 
highlighted by St Ann’s Advice Centre as a particular issue of Nottingham residents:  
“I think the [Nottingham] City Homes and the social housing tends to be fairly well 
maintained and the tenants are well supported. I think the problem we’ve got, and 
it’s an increasing problem, is the private-rented accommodation and it’s a poor 
standard” (Interview with P14, St Ann’s Advice Centre).  
This therefore reaffirms firstly, the importance of municipal ownership for allowing the 
appropriate governing capacity for low carbon and equitable transitions for low carbon 
energy governance (Cumbers, 2012). Secondly, it reiterates the need for appropriate policy 
support for implementing low carbon housing. Thirdly, this highlights the barriers and 
complexities when working with other sectors, such as the private sector (as discussed in 
Chapter 6, Section 6.2.2), and the challenges faced when certain climate change policies are 
not mandated or legislated, for example, energy efficiency in housing.  
 
 





5.4.2. Provision of Low Carbon and Equitable Transport 
Focusing now on the transport sector, the operation and structure of the bus and wider 
transport network is a key factor in low carbon and equitable urban transitions, since 
transport accounts for the largest emitting sector of UK greenhouse gas emissions of 27 per 
cent in 2018 (BEIS, 2018). Not only does this have a detrimental impact on the environment, 
but exposure to poor air and noise quality can cause adverse health implications including 
premature death, long-term health problems and hospital admissions (Kingham et al. 2007). 
Transport must therefore contribute fully to achieving greenhouse gas reduction targets. 
However, energy use and emissions reduction within the transport sector is proving to be 
difficult to achieve due to: i) the high dependency fuelled by carbon-based travel and the 
subsequent lock-in this has created; ii) the lack of political will; iii) public support; and iv) 
(perceived) high restructuring costs (Banister, 2011; Gossling, 2016). Banister (2011) 
highlights that at the city level, some local governments have sought to engage in the 
reduction of carbon emissions in the transport sector, such as demand management (pricing, 
parking and access control, congestion charging, car free city centres); investing in public 
transport; priority for walking and cycling; and the concentration of urban development 
around accessible public transport. However, there is considerable variation between cities 
and these initiatives are generally in their infancy. 
Before 1985, the bus industry in the UK was dominated by public sector companies and 
subsidiaries of the state-owned National Bus Company in England and Wales, and the 
Scottish Bus Group subsidiaries in Scotland (Butcher, 2010). Yet, under neoliberalism and 
the new terms of the 1985 Transport Act, local authorities were encouraged to privatise their 
municipal bus companies in order to boost a deregulated and competitive market in public 
transport (Helm, 2009). The Conservative Government argued that this would improve the 
passenger experience by making buses and trains more efficient.  
Similar to the energy sector, despite a deregulated system, today’s bus network across the 
UK is criticised as being dominated by the ‘Big Five’29 operators which run monopolies in 
many areas and as such, deregulation has not necessarily encouraged healthy competition in 
the bus market. To illustrate, as of 2010 the Big Five controlled 70 per cent of the market, 
with an estimated 24 per cent being owned by foreign multi-nationals, and this figure is 
                                                 





expected to have increased. At present, there are eleven locally-owned bus companies across 
the UK (the largest being Lothian Buses in Edinburgh), and in 2017, the Bus Service Users 
Bill passed a clause which bans local councils from creating their own public bus companies 
(We Own It, 2019). This is despite the core principles of the Bill to tackle poor air quality 
and introduce new franchising powers with decisions at a local level (DfT, 2016). Again, not 
only does this demonstrate the uneven ownership in the transport sector, it highlights the 
contradicting rhetoric of localism of the current national government and the enduring legacy 
of privatisation on present-day transport systems.  
LOW CARBON BUS NETWORK 
Unlike most UK cities, Nottingham City Council retained ownership of its bus network by 
establishing the ALMO Nottingham City Transport in 1986 and retained 100 per cent equity 
of the company until 2000, after which Transdev PLC acquired an effective 18 per cent stake 
in the corporation (NCT, 2020; Transdev, 2019).  Nottingham City Transport (NCT) is the 
largest commercial operator in Nottingham, with the private company Trent Barton being 
second to this.  In terms of the transport network, the city has a very extensive and well-used 
bus network, with Nottingham notably ranking in the top three in the UK for bus usage 
(London being first and Brighton and Hove second). This is particularly important in a 
context of declining public transport usage across the UK (Figure 5.7), whereas in 
Nottingham, bus usage has remained relatively static (with decline only being due to the 
introduction of a second tram line) (Interview with P7, Nottingham City Council). 
Nottingham has a particularly low level of car ownership with 43.7 per cent of inhabitants 
having no car or vans in households in comparison to 25.8 per cent in England in 2011. 
Whilst the low level of car ownership can be indicative of low-income levels and subsequent 
high levels of social inequality in the city (Power, 2012), it might complement the high bus 
usage numbers and the good mobility across the city may reinforce the use of public transport 
over private car ownership. Despite this high public transport use, like many UK cities 
Nottingham still measures very high for air pollution, exceeding EU recommended safe 
levels with a reading of 12 for PM2.5 and 21 for PM1030 (WHO, 2016), therefore the high 
use of bus transport is an encouraging development for the city.  
                                                 
30  Both PM2.5 and PM10 refer to particulate matter as a result of human made air pollution from the 










Figure 5.7: Public transport usage in Greater Nottingham and comparator city areas 
(baseline 2009/10=100) (Received from Nottingham City Council, 06/06/2018).  
 
Today, NCT acts on both a commercial and non-commercial basis. With regards to the 
commercial bus operation, the municipal majority stake in the bus company is particularly 
beneficial for the transport system as profits can be reinvested into public transport services, 
with Nottingham City Council receiving a dividend from NCT of approximately £2 million 
per annum. The reinvestment of profits goes towards the non-commercial services, which is 
run by the contracted company CT4N, which uses electric buses and bio-methane buses 
owned by Nottingham City Council. The non-commercial services are predominantly the 
Linkbus network, which are networks which are deemed socially necessary, i.e. free services 
to support mass suburban areas, employment sites, hospital sites and to help the interchange 
between commercial bus services through Park and Ride services (Interview with P7, 
Nottingham City Council). Such services are not commercially viable since they are not high 
frequency and therefore do not have a high peak vehicle requirement, however, they are 
particularly important for mobility justice by increasing accessibility to residents to maintain 
leisure, retail, and health services.  
Not only is municipal ownership of assets important for reinvesting profits, generating a 
sustainable income and for providing good accessibility throughout the city, it also raises the 
profile and status of Nottingham City Council, placing the City Council as a key actor in the 
city and encourages a greater interest in the functioning and operation of sustainable 




“I think it helps that we own our own bus company as well as there has always been 
that investment in public transport in the infrastructure, whether that’s things like bus 
priority or the real-time system at bus stops which we have a really big system in 
comparison to most cities […] You have to look at things in and around 360-degree 
package of measures that make public transport use attractive to people in the city” 
(Interview with P7, Nottingham City Council).  
It can also be argued that a greater interest in bus operation has encouraged a greater quality 
of service, and consequently NCT is a multiple award-winning bus company, ranking 94 per 
cent in 2017 for passenger satisfaction, one of the highest in the country (NCT, 2020). As 
such, this can have a virtuous cycle on social behaviour and can further stimulate perceived 
opinion of public transport and encourage public use of sustainable transport (Burian et al. 
2018). This is beneficial for addressing social resistance to low carbon transitions which was 
raised as a significant barrier by local level urban actors (as discussed in Chapter 6, Section 
6.2.3).   
Such an interest and subsequent development in the city’s transport is also particularly 
attractive with regard to funding applications. There has been a big emphasis on 
sustainability in the bus network in the city within recent years, with the electric bus fleet 
and infrastructure receiving an investment of approximately £15.1 million since 2012 
(Interview with P7, Nottingham City Council). This has enabled the city to finance 58 
electric buses on 18 bus routes, one of the UK’s and Europe’s largest electric bus fleet. 
Municipal ownership of assets can encourage the local authority to contribute match-funding 
and invest in their own assets and programme, which can signal a stronger commitment and 
an incentive to deliver on time and within budget (Vaughan et al. 2013). As such, being 
successful with funding from both UK (e.g. Department for Transport) and wider EU bodies 
can have a positive knock-on effect, insomuch that the city becomes accountable for carrying 
out successful projects that they commit to, which allows them to make a stronger case and 
receive more funding (Interview with P7, Nottingham City Council). Such financial support 
has been crucial in facilitating the city’s drive towards low carbon transitions, and it is 
evident that municipal ownership of assets when planning projects can embed the city in 
strong environmental and social justice commitments:  
“If that grant funding hadn’t been available to purchase the infrastructure and buses, 
and if we didn’t have the Workplace Parking Levy money available to contribute to 
the cost of those buses, we probably wouldn’t have got into it as much as we did and 




Again, the governance of low carbon equitable transitions at the urban level is predicated on 
local authorities having sufficient funding available, which as discussed in Chapters 4 and 6 
has been subject to reductions particularly since 2010.  
From switching Nottingham City Council’s fleet to electric and bio-methane buses over a 
period of 6 years, it is estimated that this has reduced carbon emissions of at least 1050 
tonnes (Nottingham City Council, 2016b). Furthermore, according to Nottingham City 
Council there are improvements to local air quality, with NOx savings of 15 tonnes and 
PM10 reductions of at least 83kg, in comparison with equivalent Euro 5 diesel buses 
(Nottingham City Council, 2016b). Although there are no noise comparisons available from 
switching to electric buses and therefore the benefit of this is not quantifiable.  
The introduction of sustainable buses was not from an environmental motive, but from an 
economic one, and the Council has been very clear about this. Similar to motives behind the 
introduction of the WPL, this is due to the significant cost savings that are associated with 
switching from diesel to electric buses. For example, the fuel cost savings of an electric bus 
in comparison to diesel are approximately 85 per cent (including the 6p per km Department 
for Transport Low Carbon Emission Bus Incentive Grant). Furthermore, approximately 40 
per cent of costs are saved due to lower maintenance costs and no liability for Vehicle Excise 
Duty for electric buses. As a result, the replacement of electric buses has allowed the Council 
to save approximately £300,000 per annum, which is a significant cost saving in the context 
of budget pressures which have resulted in a reduction of £4 million per annum over the past 
three years (Nottingham City Council, 2016b).  Therefore, through the ownership of the bus 
network, the Council has been able to achieve two key objectives, which are, first, cost-
savings; and second, a more sustainable bus fleet, which would be difficult under a 
deregulated transport sector, as it restricts the ability to mandate bus fleets in the city:  
“The only other major bus operator in Nottingham is Trent Barton and they haven’t 
necessarily changed their buses like the way we have done with Nottingham City 
Transport buses because we aren’t funding it because they’re a private company. And 
this is where an issue comes in, where private companies have to get their own money 
and they have to be fiscally responsible, whereas we have more funding available to 
us and the fiscal responsibility is to the buses to keep the prices low, to reinvest and 
make the buses worth using in Nottingham” (Interview with P35, Nottingham City 
Council).  
This quote suitably reaffirms the different priorities and logic of council ownership versus 




responsibility, which in turn positively affects Nottingham City Council’s political capacity 
to drive sustainable transport forward.  
Not only has ownership of the bus network been successful, but ownership of land has been 
equally important to Nottingham City Council in order to implement a low carbon transition 
in the transport sector, as stated:  
“I think we were quite lucky that we had land available to install the infrastructure. I 
think if we had not had land available at our park and ride site, that would have been 
quite a significant issue for us as a local authority as we would have had to go out 
and purchase land and that would have added to cost and all the issues around 
planning” (Interview with P7, Nottingham City Council).  
Not only has land ownership resulted in a simpler planning application (since Nottingham 
City Council is responsible for planning), this has in turn allowed costs to be kept down, 
further benefitting the Council politically and financially.  
As highlighted by Matioli et al. (2017), inequalities related to transport are linked to the 
affordability of transport costs, which is dependent on income, prices and energy efficiency. 
In terms of equality in Nottingham’s low carbon transition, mobility/transport 
justice/transport poverty were not terms used explicitly by interviewees. However, it is 
evident that Nottingham City Council are conscious of justice dimensions in their low carbon 
transport strategy, as highlighted in Chapter 4. By plugging the gap between commercial 
services, Nottingham is able to serve the majority of its residents through its extensive bus 
network and therefore accessibility is high in the city, with a high proportion of residents (95 
per cent) living within 400m of a 30-minute peak service to the City Centre, which is 

















Figure 5.8: Accessibility to bus services in the city of Nottingham (Nottingham City 
Council, 2016a).  
 
Furthermore, with regard to transport justice, the majority of NCT buses have next stop 
announcements and audio and visual aids in place, which is very important to the Council in 
terms of accessibility for all: “Providing that [audio and visual aids] is the norm in 
Nottingham, but it’s not in a lot of places” (Interview with P7, Nottingham City Council; 
observational notes). Furthermore, as highlighted by one interviewee at Nottingham City 
Council, the fares of the tram are comparable with buses and are quite low in comparison to 




that NCT has taken care to ensure that transport in the city is accessible for all users and vital 
services are maintained. As previously noted, part of the low carbon bus network has been 
funded by the WPL, indicating the benefits of a wider integrated transport strategy for the 
city, as discussed next.  
WORKPLACE PARKING LEVY AND ELECTRIC TRAM   
An initiative which has attracted political attention is the Workplace Parking Levy (WPL) 
in Nottingham. To date, it is the first of its kind in the UK and Europe (Dale, 2017) and 
therefore can be considered as an ‘urban infrastructure regime and experiment’ (Bulkeley et 
al. 2012; Hodson et al. 2017).  This scheme was introduced by Nottingham City Council in 
April 2012 and builds on the Transport Act 2000, a policy instrument introduced in England 
and Wales to permit the creation of congestion charges. As such, it places a charge on 
employers who provide more than 11 parking spaces by implementing a Levy of 
approximately £402 per annum per additional car park space.  
The motivations behind this initiative were premised on firstly, a commitment to tackle 
congestion traffic problems in the city, which accounted for approximately £160 million per 
year during the AM peak period of which 70 per cent of the traffic was commuters (Hallam 
& Gibbons, 2017); and secondly, as part of a commitment to encourage economic growth in 
the city. Santos et al. (2020) importantly underline that the creation of the WPL in 
Nottingham has to some extent closed a political ‘loophole’, since local authorities do not 
have authority with regard to private non-residential parking spaces. This has therefore 
allowed local government actors in Nottingham to pursue an active agency for a low carbon 
initiative. 
However, it is worth noting here that this scheme caused much contestation and was 
perceived by businesses, politicians and civil society alike to be unnecessary business 
taxation and would discourage business investment, stunt economic growth and have 
minimal impact on traffic congestion (Dale, 2017). As previously asserted, Nottingham 
remains the only UK council to date with such a scheme, with the idea being rejected by 
councillors in cities such as Greater Manchester, Cambridge and Edinburgh (Edwards, 2019; 
Santos et al. 2020). Most recently, Birmingham City Council has proposed to introduce a 
similar WPL for 2024 alongside its Clean Air Zone, however this has already been met with 




London and Durham are therefore the only two UK cities that have implemented other forms 
of congestion charging (Santos et al. 2020). This clearly reaffirms the political and 
conflicting nature of environmental schemes, particularly which involve taxation and other 
economic interventions against dominant technologies, such as private, fossil fuel-based car 
transport.  
Perhaps most importantly, this scheme was implemented specifically to raise hypothecated 
funds (on average £12 million per year over a 23-year lifetime) for public transport 
improvements, specifically the city’s tram extension development NET Phase 2, which cost 
£570 million and was completed in August 2015. This doubled the size of the city’s existing 
tram network (Line One) which was built in 2004 by allowing the addition of two new 
tramlines from the City Centre to Toton and Clifton, linking the existing tramlines to Phoenix 
Park and Hucknall (Dale, 2017), as shown in Figure 5.9. Nottingham is one of 9 light-rail 
systems in the UK, having the fifth largest track length of 32km and 16 million passengers 














Not only has this scheme provided a secure income to pay off the public loans for the tram 
extension, the income generated from the scheme has been ring-fenced to fund other public 
transport aside from the tram, including a £50 million redevelopment of Nottingham Railway 
station of which £12 million was raised through the WPL from Nottingham City Council 
and £29.5 million from Network Rail (Catlow, 2018). This is in addition to funding 
Nottingham’s Linkbus electric bus fleet, which as noted fills in the gaps in the commercial 
network service by providing routes to key employment sites, hospitals, and Park and Ride 
services.  
Furthermore, the WPL’s generated revenue has been used as seed, grant or match funding, 
and it is estimated this has brought in an additional £200 million since 2012, or put another 
way, for every £1 raised by the Levy, this has helped to lever at least £3 of external funding 
(Interview with P32, Nottingham City Council).  An example of this is shown in Table 5.5.  
 
Funded schemes WPL local contribution (£M) External funds (£M) 
Tram extension 199 371 
Train stations 12 48 
Electric buses 5.8 9.2 
Bus stations 1.7 1.3 
Smartcard system 1.1 1.0 
Real time info system 1.2 1.0 
TOTAL 220.8 431.5 
Table 5.5: Match funding of Workplace Parking Levy (Hallam & Gibbons, 2017).  
 
This scheme has therefore successfully converged low carbon transitions and transport 
ownership for sustainable income streams, which are fundamental for overcoming barriers 
such as economic austerity and continuing political uncertainty towards climate change 
policy in the UK (as highlighted in Chapter 4 and Chapter 6).  
There are multiple important benefits because of the WPL. Although the WPL has not 
reduced congestion per se, it has indeed halted the rate of congestion, which was predicted 
to go up significantly had the Levy not been introduced. Hence, this is seen as a major 




Moreover, the WPL has encouraged behavioural change and modal shift, whether this has 
been an increase in public transport use (for example the tram receives nearly 18 million 
users of trips per year), active travel by bicycle or walking, and/or car sharing, and as such 
has been an important public engagement for the city council:  
“On a really basic level, a lot of people don’t know how to get on a bus because they 
are embarrassed, they haven’t done it before they don’t know how to pay, they don’t 
know where they’re going to go. They’re somehow afraid they’ll miss their stop and 
be carried on for miles and miles which isn’t the case. So, we’re providing this basic 
level of support and information to people” (Interview with P4, Nottingham City 
Council).  
In addition, to date there has been no employer which has received a sanction for non-
compliance. This demonstrates an element of behavioural change and social acceptability of 
the scheme across the city since the implementation of Levy and the effect it has changed 
opinion over time. It also is a good example to reaffirm that penalties for non-compliance 
have been avoided, which strengthens arguments from the council for the scheme to benefit 
and not simply ‘punish’ businesses, which is an on-going critique of parking levies made 
commonly by the business community (e.g. in the cases of proposals in Birmingham and 
Glasgow). As stated in the Nottingham example:  
“When the levy was first introduced, there were a lot of companies who were very 
anti [the Levy] and some of them still are, sometimes that’s on personal levels or a 
political level. No business likes having to pay any kind of tax which is what we have 
here, but most of them have just taken it as a cost of business - in fact some, if not 
most, have forgotten about it over the years, they are still paying it, but it’s just one 
more thing, it’s the business rates” (Interview with P32, Nottingham City Council, 
2018).   
Again, this benefits the urban area more generally by stimulating behavioural change and 
social acceptability of the scheme which was identified as a significant barrier for sustainable 
transitions by local level urban actors (Dale, 2017; Santos et al. 2020).  
Additionally, Nottingham City Council has proactively provided business support to 
approximately 300 companies to encourage modal shifts in transport use. This business 
engagement has been through running one-to-one workshops, hosting on-site events to share 
sustainable travel advice and information to staff, providing travel planning support, and 
personal journal planning (Interview with P4, Nottingham City Council). In conjunction, the 




in 2012/2013 to encourage the uptake of sustainable transport methods (such as bicycle 
shelters or showers) or put car park management schemes in place.  
Furthermore, the City Council has been working with local service providers, such as the 
local sustainable transport charity Ridewise, to offer cycle training which positively impacts 
the economic development of local businesses. As stated, even though there was a stipulation 
in the Act when the WPL was created to provide this service, advice is not restricted to those 
on the WPL:  
“If someone wants to know about cycle routes or wants to know what the local buses 
are or wants to encourage that sort of thing and they’ve got less than 10 people, so 
fall off the radar for the Levy, then I’ll still generally go talk to them and help them 
out if I can. They aren’t eligible for the grants that we provide for cycle shelters but 
I will go and talk to them (Interview with P4, Nottingham City Council, 2018).  
Clearly, this type of support from the local government and other third party actors has been 
particularly important in the implementation and operation of the WPL:  
“Quite often it’s the only positive engagement people have with the council, because 
otherwise it’s a body that you pay tax to which is how much people see councils. But 
if they actually have some kind of engagement with somebody who you can provide 
some kind of positive outcome for them, then that’s a really valuable thing” 
(Interview with P4, Nottingham City Council, 2018).  
Above all, such practical support is important for enabling low carbon transitions since it 
can build up trust and help with the social acceptance of the WPL across employers which 
can in turn improve the reputation of the council and success of decarbonisation strategies 
(Pfluger et al. 2017). Moreover, this can also benefit the city council’s relationship with local 
private and third sector actors more generally, which in turn can help overcome problematic 
local multi-actor engagement which was identified as a significant barrier to low carbon 
urban transitions (as addressed in Chapter 6).  
Like the case of the bus network, the WPL is an interesting initiative in particular for low 
carbon urban transitions as it was not implemented as an environmental measure, but was as 
a result of impacts from congestion and therefore premised from economic motives. To date, 
the City Council has made it very clear that the economic case took priority over the 
environmental in the WPL. It is most importantly and primarily considered as an income 




approximately £485,000 per year, which is proportionally lower than other road user 
charging schemes (Clayton et al. 2017).  
An important by-product of the scheme has been the considerable environmental benefits 
which has been favourable for the city in a time of increasing environmental consciousness, 
with a 33 per cent fall in carbon emissions since 2005, of which 13 per cent is estimated to 
be as a result of modal shift to public and active travel (Hallam, 2016). As stated however, 
the income revenue was the driving factor in the project:  
“A lot of officers have a lot of interest in the environmental side [of the WPL], and 
to be fair the Portfolio Holder who was in position when we first started it off was 
interested in that side of things as well. But ultimately it all comes down to the harsh 
economic reality at the time and that’s partly because things like the air quality 
agenda weren’t as much in the public consciousness as they are now. I think the 
environmental aspect of it has grown in importance over the past couple of years, 
particularly with regards to air quality” (Interview with P32, Nottingham City 
Council).  
The agency of individual and collective actors is reinforced here, in addition to the role of 
municipal ownership in converging with low carbon technologies to produce sustainable 
business models. Furthermore, this echoes findings by Hodson and Marvin (2013) of urban 
entrepreneurialism, whereby cities (such as Greater Manchester and Nottingham in the UK) 
have largely economic agendas and environmental interests remain peripheral, which re-
enforces the status quo of market-based urban development. As such, there is a narrative to 
include low carbon elements, although arguably this is not a significant and systemic 
transformation to radically transform society.  
In terms of social equity issues, there are a number of measures taken by Nottingham City 
Council to ensure that the WPL does not directly or indirectly cause issues of inequality. For 
example, Nottingham City Council is concerned about the disproportionate effect of the 
Levy on small to medium enterprises and therefore only charges those employers with 10 or 
more parking spaces. Out of the 42,000 workplace parking places that had been licensed, 
25,000 of these are chargeable, with 2,900 premises around the city. In other words, 42 per 
cent of the city’s workplace parking spaces are liable to pay the Levy, and 18 per cent of 
Nottingham’s employers pay the Levy (Nottingham City Council, 2020c). There are 
exemptions to the Levy as well, including disabled Blue Badge holders, emergency and NHS 




Furthermore, whilst the Levy was extremely controversial politically and there were counter-
arguments made that this would act as a deterrent for businesses, there is evidence that no 
businesses have moved nor not located in the area as a result of the WPL since the Levy has 
been introduced (Dale, 2017). Instead, the extension of the tram line and halt in congestion 
has been linked to positive development in the city, creating transport opportunities to a 
further 1,800 city workplaces to which 55,000 employees commute (Nottingham City 
Council, 2020c). According to Nottingham City Council (2020c), the tram extension has 
been an attractive factor for businesses locating to Nottingham, and it is estimated that since 
the WPL was introduced, new companies have created over 2,000 additional jobs. This is 
beneficial for the city, and for the citizens of Nottingham by providing new sources of jobs 
and therefore is positive in terms of recognition-based justice (Bulkeley et al. 2013).  
In terms of transport justice considerations, the social impacts of the project were required 
at public inquiry in the form of an Environmental Impact Assessment and therefore 
accessibility was a key factor in considering the final tram route, which was approved by an 
independent Inspectorate. For example, it was a fundamental component of the route plan to 
connect more deprived areas (such as the Meadows), or areas with low car ownership (for 
example Clifton) with the tram line to allow good accessibility to employment, health and 
other key services (Interview with P6, Nottingham City Council). As such, the scheme has 
benefitted the city in terms of mobility justice through increased accessibility, especially for 
those in traditionally lower-income and socio-economically deprived neighbourhoods. As  
previously stated, the fares are nationally low and in line with bus transport and therefore 
considered as ‘affordable’ for lower-income households.  
However, this research has shown that there are justice issues that have been overlooked as 
a result of the Levy. Primarily, Nottingham City Council do not specify how the money to 
pay the Levy is accrued, i.e. employers can either pay for the Levy directly out of the 
business, or the cost can be transferred onto employees. It is estimated that 80 per cent of 
companies pass the Levy onto employees, but this is ultimately at the choice of the employer 
(BBC, 2019). In this instance, there is a risk that this could disproportionately affect those 
on lower wages (Interview with P4, Nottingham City Council). Although this was not 
confirmed, potential reasons for this flexibility in policy may have been to encourage public 
acceptance (which was variable at the time as previously stated) (Dale et al. 2014), and 
because this has been the only model implemented in the UK, and therefore there were no 




unclear who is responsible for costs, i.e. the employer or employee, and therefore there are 
potential consequences for just transitions (Bulkeley et al. 2014).  
5.5. CONCLUSION  
The pursuance of low carbon and inclusive transitions at the urban level is highly dependent 
on effective governance in practice by multiple actors, especially local authorities. The 
governance of sustainable and inclusive urban transitions across England is not uniform, and 
this is due to the varying political, social and cultural differences of local councils to enable 
change. In this chapter, I have highlighted the ways in which political capacity has shaped 
the governance of Nottingham’s low carbon and inclusive transition. Following a multi-level 
and multi-sectoral perspective, I have demonstrated that ownership and municipal control 
across sectors are clearly critical to both decarbonisation and just transitions in urban areas.  
In the context of governing low carbon and inclusive transitions, political capacity is 
influenced by various elements. First, I have argued that political capacity is affected by the 
type of local authority located in the urban area (Kuzemko & Britton, 2020). A perhaps 
obvious, but nonetheless important finding is that the extent to which a local authority has 
responsibility significantly impacts political capacity, which is demonstrated by the example 
of Nottingham City Council as a unitary authority, in comparison to Nottinghamshire County 
Council as a two-tier authority. As a unitary authority, having responsibility internally has 
led to a greater engagement with sectors such as energy and affordable warmth due to the 
presence of this remit in the City Council. This has generated a greater autonomy for 
decision-making and familiarity within the City Council, in comparison to two-tier 
authorities which have responsibility of sectors spread differently across county and districts 
and boroughs and which may be subject to different political administrations (Bulkeley et 
al. 2013; Franzen, 2013). In addition, I have contended that the size of geographical 
administrative area has proved to have a consequence on local actor political capacity in 
Nottingham.  The smaller administrative boundary of Nottingham City Council has been 
advantageous by allowing value for money to be easier to obtain, which in turn can make 
projects more appealing for the city since they prove financially feasible. Consequently, 
there are benefits for justice, e.g. transport and energy justice, since there are smaller 
distances to cover and therefore infrastructure is on a smaller scale, in comparison to 
Nottinghamshire County Council which covers a larger rural area and therefore can lead to 




arguments frequently made of increased sustainability in compact cities (e.g. Ahlfedlt & 
Pietrostefani, 2017), but more importantly reiterates arguments of using a spatial and multi-
level lens in examining transitions (Bridge et al. 2013; Coenen & Truffer, 2012).  
Second, I have stressed that the agency of local government actors is fundamental for 
political capacity and enabling low carbon and inclusive urban transitions, which is produced 
through various forms of political contestation, both internal and external of local 
government. Not only is this agency restricted to individual actors, but this also extends to 
collective actors, such as those in the political administration and institution of local 
authorities (Affolderbach & Schulz, 2015; Coe & Jordhus-Lier, 2010). In the case of 
Nottingham City Council, the political stability of a Labour-run council since 1991 has 
allowed a stronger degree of political power since there is no immediate risk of change in 
administration. This has benefitted sustainable transitions by allowing for the ability to plan 
longer-term and progress initiatives which otherwise would be considered as politically 
controversial. This is complemented by a leadership which is ideologically environmentally 
and socially-conscious, and as a set of collective actors, the political administration can be 
viewed as forming a core alliance at the regime level, which has overcome political 
resistance to change from opposing political parties. This has therefore provided political 
capacity to establish low carbon and inclusive projects, even at the expense of political 
resistance and economic and political risk. Additionally, there is evidence of ‘climate 
champions’ by way of individuals at Nottingham City Council who are crucial for driving 
forward and governing sustainable transitions and their willingness to go against the status 
quo for the benefit of the environment and Nottingham’s residents. Not only is this restricted 
to councillors, but highlights the role of capable and skilled officers within the council, 
especially during times of national austerity. The role of individual actors is imperative by 
way of foresightedness, early project-planning and implementation of low carbon projects 
and have therefore progressed urban sustainable trajectories (Bulkeley & Kern, 2005; 
Wurzel et al. 2019).  
Third, I have contended that the political capacity to implement sustainable and inclusive 
transitions at the urban level is influenced by past agency of actors and the subsequent 
embedding of low carbon transitions by way of path creation, lock-in and positive self-
reinforcement (MacKinnon et al. 2019). This is apparent in the city’s district heating scheme 
which has provided the city with multiple benefits. For example, the district heating system 




system has sunken costs already in the city by way of infrastructure, this allows a base for 
expansion of the system. It is an important revenue for the city, since it can operate as a 
commercial service and generate sustainable income, particularly in a time of austerity and 
competition (Gibbs & Lintz, 2016; Gibbs & O’Neill, 2014; Jonas et al. 2011). Furthermore, 
this historical delivery has resulted in the development of learning and expertise in the 
energy sector for over three decades, again positively embedding knowledge and skills 
within the energy department of the City Council which is strongly connected to current 
energy transitions and commercial operations (Kuzemko & Britton, 2020). Similarly, the 
Nottingham Declaration has been a positive and historic development for the city. From 
being co-founded in the city and committing local authorities to tackle the causes and 
impacts of climate change at the urban level, it has drawn attention to Nottingham as a 
leading urban area with strong ambition and political willingness to govern and tackle 
environmental problems on urban and regional levels. The argument developed here is that 
this has resulted in a historical legacy and virtuous cycle for the city which reveals positive 
lock-in and self-reinforcing sustainable behaviours (Bulkeley & Kern, 2005; Rosenbloom et 
al. 2019).  
Finally, I have argued that the municipal ownership of Nottingham’s assets (e.g. social 
housing and transport) has been imperative for political capacity to enact sustainable 
transitions (Cumbers, 2018). From this municipal ownership, the City Council has been able 
to provide low carbon and affordable energy, firstly through the establishment of Robin 
Hood Energy, and secondly by social housing retrofitting projects. Despite this privatisation 
in September 2020, Robin Hood Energy is a compelling illustration of the benefits of 
municipally-owned energy in low carbon and just transitions for contesting the market and 
dominant political power (Johnstone et al. 2020; Kuzemko, 2015). The unique creation of 
Robin Hood Energy has demonstrated the city’s dedication to combatting fuel poverty, 
through its lean management and not-for-profit business structure, and in turn has pursued 
different priorities from the neoliberal logics of the ‘Big Six’. As such, the municipal-owned 
ESCo had multiple initiatives for decreasing fuel poverty, by way of: local discounted tariffs 
for Nottingham residents; provisions to reduce the number of prepayment meters for 
consumers; voluntarily offering Warm Home Discount Scheme; and the switching of void 
properties. These initiatives, in addition to supplying 100 per cent renewable energy from 
2018, resulted in an energy company which challenged incumbent actors and the status quo, 
albeit temporarily. More broadly, I argue that this agency demonstrates a revival of the 




transition which went against neoliberal logics (Burke & Stephens, 2017; Featherstone et al. 
2020). Moreover, the ownership of Nottingham’s 27,000 social houses has benefitted 
political capacity for energy efficiency programmes, by allowing Nottingham City Council 
to work in partnership with Nottingham City Homes to progress retrofit programmes. 
Consequently, this can address energy efficiency issues in social housing which constitute a 
significant portion of housing tenure (approximately 20 per cent) and can protect vulnerable 
citizens from fuel poverty. In addition, the energy efficiency developments allow the City 
Council to save costs internally, which can therefore be sustainably reinvested into the 
provision of services, for the benefit of the urban area. The eradication of fuel poverty is a 
significant issue for the City Council and Nottingham City Homes, and this commitment is 
demonstrated by employing a full-time fuel poverty officer, which is considered rare for a 
social housing organisation. As such, behavioural barriers can be overcome by supporting 
residents to switch and save and by referring to fuel debt services.  The collapse and 
subsequent privatisation of Robin Hood Energy in 2020 is further illustrative of the failings 
of a competitive energy market. 
Equally, I have argued that municipal ownership of Nottingham’s transport network has been 
crucial for political capacity for developing sustainable transport initiatives. Firstly, through 
local ownership, Nottingham City Council has formed an extensive bus network which 
operates both on a commercial and non-commercial basis. This has allowed the regeneration 
of profits back into the transport network, thereby leading the transport network to more 
sustainable bus fleets. As such, this has had a positive knock-on effect for the City Council, 
with public transport in Nottingham having the largest electric bus fleet, and having one of 
the highest usages in the UK. Furthermore, ownership of the land has been imperative for 
low carbon transport, as this has enabled the Council to save costs by installing electric 
charge points at existing sites, and also resulted in a simpler and faster planning process. 
Secondly, the implementation of the WPL has been significant by raising hypothecated funds 
for the extension of the city’s electric tramline and any surplus being ringfenced and 
reinvested into sustainable transport measures (e.g. the improvement of Nottingham’s main 
train station). This in turn has halted congestion in the city which has environmental benefits, 
and improved the overall connectivity of the city, thereby having social benefits. As such, I 
have argued that both Robin Hood Energy and WPL are examples of low carbon urbanism 
and experimentation (Bulkeley et al. 2012; Hodson et al. 2017), through municipally 
governed schemes which combine both long-term economic development and climate 




engaged the city in entrepreneurial practices for securing future financial income (North & 
Nurse, 2014; O’Neill & Gibbs, 2014; Whitehead, 2013). Yet, I argue that there are justice 
implications of the distribution of levy costs onto employees, which is worthy of 
consideration.  
Despite the developments discussed in this chapter, there are nonetheless significant barriers 
which have, and continue to hinder the implementation of low carbon equitable urban 







BARRIERS TO IMPLEMENTING LOW CARBON 




As examined in Chapter 4, a multi-level perspective on policy for sustainable and equitable 
transitions indicates that despite progress being made, there are significant policy barriers 
which are affecting the international, national and local governance of low carbon and 
inclusive transitions. Whilst the analysis of policy content from a multi-level perspective has 
been useful for understanding transition governance, sustainable transitions are rarely 
restricted to formal policymaking arenas. Instead, socio-technical transitions are made up of 
complex engineering practices, infrastructures, scientific knowledge and process 
technologies that are intertwined within society and evolving over time.  Such transitions are 
considered as co-evolutionary, thereby involving a system of wider practices and a diverse 
set of actors on the ground (Rutherford & Coutard, 2014). A multi-level perspective of socio-
technical transitions therefore considers the human and non-human dimensions of low 
carbon transitions across various scales, and Chapter 5 has sought to demonstrate this in the 
context of Nottingham.  
The lack of advancement to low carbon and inclusive urban trajectories in the UK 
appropriately raises questions about the barriers that are experienced at the local scale; that 
is, the obstacle, condition, or factor that can impede, obstruct, or delay the agency of actors 
and their individual and collective capacities to implement sustainable trajectories in urban 
areas. Since actors from different sectors and levels of government are questioned with 
regards to the barriers encountered, the perception and understanding of a barrier to urban 
low carbon transition may differ as it is subjective to the person, their field in question and 
wider contexts in which they operate.  For example, what may be a barrier to a third sector 
actor may not be relevant to a local government representative, and vice versa, and this can 




emphasise the multifarious perceptions and multi-scalarity of urban low carbon transitions 
with relation to barriers, and the numerous factors affecting implementation, including 
political, social, economic, technological, and legal dimensions.  
In keeping with a multi-scalar perspective, in this chapter I set out the barriers that are 
experienced by multiple urban actors when implementing low carbon and inclusive 
transitions in practice in Nottingham. As such, I consider the barriers primarily from a multi-
level nature, that is, national level factors which are impeding urban trajectories, and local 
level factors which are impeding urban transitions. This does not necessarily imply that these 
barriers are static, simply unidirectional, nor isolated in nature (Reckien et al. 2015). On the 
contrary, they are complex, interlinked and variable. A multi-level perspective thereby offers 
a deeper understanding of what the barriers are, the way in which they occur and when, by 
whom they are encountered, and where the root of such barriers stem from and impact in 
turn.  
The rest of this chapter is divided into three parts. In the first section, I argue that barriers 
experienced at the urban level are largely underpinned by broader national level policy and 
political action. This includes: first, the economic barriers as a result of national austerity; 
second, the institutional barriers because of insufficient tough regulation and government 
intervention on a national level; third, the political barriers due to uncertainty from central 
government; and fourth, socio-economic factors as a result of government ineffectiveness to 
tackle social inequality on a national level. As such, the agency and capacity of urban actors 
to govern low carbon and inclusive transitions in the city is hindered across sectors such as 
housing, transport and energy.  
In the second section, I contend that barriers arising at the local level are often manifested 
because of the specific urban area itself, such as its urban materiality and the diverse actors 
operating within this space. Therefore, barriers arising are more context-specific, and so the 
urban environment is a diverse socio-cultural and political arena for differing power 
constellations, political agendas and actors which can shape the direction, pace and scale of 
transitions that are constituted through flows, connections, locations and scales (Gibbs & 
Krueger, 2005; Murphy, 2015). Nevertheless, these may also present commonalities to other 
urban areas. As such, I argue that the barriers arising at the local level include: first, the 
economic and political barriers due to competing prioritisation within and between local 




and third, behavioural change barriers due to local societal resistance. Again, these barriers 
are experienced locally and in practice hinder urban actors’ agency and capacity to 
implement low carbon and equitable transitions across sectors, both within and out-with 
local government.   
In the third section, I conclude first that the national policies of austerity and de-regulation, 
which are typical of present-day neoliberal governance, have impacted low carbon and 
inclusive transitions in practice in Nottingham. This is witnessed through the economic, 
political and institutional barriers that are experienced by urban actors. Second, I argue the 
current inconsideration of inequality from a national level has resulted in an uneven and 
fragmented approach to inclusive transitions. Third, I stress that the local level issues reveal 
that there are socio-cultural barriers which are encountered at the urban scale. Therefore, in 
this chapter I highlight the obstacles experienced at the urban level as a result of national 
and local level issues; all of which are constraining the agency and capacity of urban actors 
to progress low carbon and just transitions.  
6.1. NATIONAL LEVEL FACTORS IMPEDING URBAN 
GOVERNANCE  
Financing low carbon and inclusive transitions has been subject to much debate, insomuch 
that energy finance has become a distinct field in sustainable transitions literature. Recent 
estimates by Hall et al. (2018) suggest that the total investment needed to fulfil the Paris 
Agreement is up to $61 trillion. Such large amounts of low carbon finance will need to enrol 
diverse forms of capital not only from state actors, but also non-state actors such as private 
and third sector bodies.  To catalyse sustainable urban transitions, it is important to consider 
the ways in which finance is sourced, the amount of finance that is required to be sourced, 
and which actors and institutions are involved in providing finance (McCauley et al. 2019).  
As highlighted in Chapter 4, the 2008 financial crisis and the election of a Coalition 
Conservative-Liberal Democrat Government in 2010 triggered a programme of austerity as 
a fiscal policy solution for deficit reduction which has continued for the rest of the decade, 
as shown in Figure 6.1. At the time of writing, the current Conservative Prime Minister 
Boris Johnson pledged to end austerity and continue international action against combatting 





Figure 6.1: Reduction in core government funding (LGA, 2018, p.3).  
 
In particular, the outbreak of Covid-19 has resulted in an albeit temporary yet significant 
transformation of the way in which society operates, and has had severe economic and social 
impacts. Nevertheless, this pandemic has led to (unintended) environmental benefits, such 
as the reduction of transport pollution in cities (e.g. Barbier, 2020; Le Quere et al. 2020). 
There have been wide-ranging discussions of how the outbreak is illustrative of how society 
can capitalise on the profound opportunities that the pandemic has presented and ‘build back 
better’ in terms of climate mitigation and societal changes (Barbier, 2020; World Resources 
Institute, 2020). However, concerns have also been raised of climate change becoming even 
further politically side-lined due to the Covid-19 outbreak and the potential austerity 
measures as a result of the pandemic (e.g. Hepburn et al. 2020; Woodcock, 2020).  
Government austerity is not a new phenomenon in the UK; however, the latest austerity 
agenda has resulted in the largest financial cuts since the Second World War (Oxfam, 2013). 
While it is acknowledged that there are multiple ways of measuring inequality, the UK has 




having the highest level of income inequality in the EU. In addition, the UK is one of the 
most regionally unbalanced countries in the industrialised world (House of Commons, 2018; 
McCann, 2019). Furthermore, even though the national deficit is now relatively low in 
comparison to its highest in 2010, public debt is approximately double the level relative to 
the size of the economy measured pre-financial crisis31 (Cribb & Johnson, 2018).  
The effects of austerity on urban society has become an emerging field of research, and 
contemporary austerity in cities is a growing theme in urban scholarship known as ‘austerity 
urbanism’ (Hastings et al. 2017). Additionally, the rise of UK cities progressing different 
kinds of urbanism in response to austerity and neo-liberalism has been introduced in 
transition studies. For example, the terms ‘entrepreneurial urbanism’ (North & Nurse, 2014; 
Whitehead, 2013) and ‘austerity urbanism’ (Peck, 2012) refer to a focus on economic 
development over environmental and social strategies, and more recent ‘low carbon 
urbanism’ (Bulkeley et al. 2012) is evolving to include climate change mitigation in 
economic development. Whilst some studies have acknowledged that austerity has allowed 
some cities e.g. Leicester and Manchester to become more entrepreneurial (Davies et al. 
2018; O’Neill & Gibbs, 2016), it is evident that financial cuts have had a detrimental impact 
for funding projects for low carbon and equitable transitions, as discussed next.  
6.1.1. Austerity Measures  
Local authorities in England receive funding from four main sources, that is, central 
government grants, business rates, council tax, and fees and charges (DCLG, 2013). 
Councils address the costs of their statutory and discretionary services through a 
combination of revenue expenditure (e.g. day-to-day spending) and capital expenditure (e.g. 
investment in assets). Such expenditure can vary geographically between local authorities 
due to the particular services each authority may provide and the distinctive nature of their 
local economies (National Audit Office, 2016), as highlighted in Figure 6.2.  
 
                                                 
31 This is excluding the latest impacts of Covid-19 on the budget which are yet to be fully determined since the 




Figure 6.2: Public spending per person, by country and region of the UK (£ per person, 
2017/28) (House of Commons, 2018).  
 
Like most other UK councils, Nottingham City Council has faced significant cuts in budgets 
from central government within recent years which in turn is affecting the council’s agency 
and capacity to implement low carbon and just transitions. Since 2013, the City Council’s 
main government funding has been cut by £127 million, meaning it received only £25 
million for 2019/20 (My Nottingham News, 2020). The City Council is quite distinctive in 
comparison to other English local authorities by having maintained ownership of its council 
assets including social housing and transport (discussed in Chapter 5), which enables the 
council to receive an income of approximately £20 million a year through its commercial 
activities, such as reducing energy bills and generating sustainable income from solar panels 
on council buildings (Nottingham City Council, 2018b). However, to balance the 2019/2020 
budget and secure the necessary £23 million pounds of savings to do so, a re-evaluation of 
Council services has been necessary. Such funding cuts overall are problematic for 
governing low carbon and equitable transitions as this reduces the capital funding received 
by local authorities for implementing projects (Bulkeley & Kern, 2004).  
Reduction in funding to local authority from central government not only has a detrimental 
effect on financing upfront costs of low carbon projects, but this also places stress on the 
longevity of existing projects which require on-going money for maintenance and the 
lifespan of schemes (i.e. revenue funding): 
“[Councils] can get capital money but they don’t have this day-to-day operational 
funding because the funding is being cut left, right and centre. So, it’s getting that 




This in turn places a greater pressure on the provision of local authorities to secure match-
funding or projects with continuous income streams, and also focus their capacities on 
providing the bare minimum in terms of meeting their legal responsibilities (NLGN, 2018).  
Whilst it is important for low carbon projects to have a sustainable business model, this can 
place an overemphasis on profitability for low carbon projects, rather than the wider 
incorporation of environmental and social priorities (Hodson & Marvin, 2015). This can be 
counterproductive for sustainable transitions since low carbon options tend to require greater 
up-front capital investments than fossil fuel options (Fankhauser & Jotzo, 2017).  
Moreover, a dominant and narrow economic interest (i.e. an overemphasis on profitability) 
can undermine serious enactments for transformative low carbon and inclusive transitions 
and subsequently re-enforce the status quo of urban economic activity and the symbolic 
representation of transition (Hodson & Marvin, 2010). Take for example the transition to 
lower carbon vehicles - despite the well-documented social and environmental benefits, the 
higher economic costs of implementing low carbon infrastructure continue to dominate.  
In addition, the establishment of the district heating network in 1973 (discussed in Chapter 
5) has been advantageous for Nottingham by providing a low carbon source of energy. 
However, this has also resulted in an ageing, high-maintenance energy network which 
requires ongoing capital investment (Interview with P15, Robin Hood Energy). Nottingham 
is often able to mitigate this barrier to a certain extent using its commercial services (as 
shown by the examples of the department for Energy Services and Workplace Parking Levy 
in Chapter 5), but the cost of maintenance is a drawback that is faced by local government 
which in turn places a pressure on financing new low carbon and just transition projects.  
In other countries, the finance gap for low carbon projects is overcome to a large extent 
through alternative financial institutions. For example, Germany has an established 
decentralised banking sector which enables more funding to be granted through local 
subsidiarity, common public benefit values and promotional lending, often over long-term 
time frames (e.g. 30 years) and with fixed low interest rates (Hall et al. 2016; Marois, 2017). 
In comparison, the UK’s centralised, market-led financial system is reliant on central and 
international sources of private capital. As a result, the UK has a disadvantageous system of 
investment which favours large projects by incumbent corporations and an environment 




Not only are reductions made to funding streams (e.g. capital and revenue funding as 
aforementioned) for low carbon projects, financial cuts also have a negative implication for 
resources and staff capacity. Such measures are particularly detrimental for implementing 
decarbonised transitions in urban areas as this causes there to be a lack of capacity and 
expertise at a local level to drive forward projects, particularly in the public and third sectors. 
In Nottingham, this has been particularly evident in the implementation of low carbon energy 
efficiency projects in the domestic housing sector:  
“[The issue] is the capacity of staff to deliver as it’s over and above their workload 
and we are having these issues all the time in that we are cutting staff and we have 
27,000 properties in our portfolio, so it’s really difficult” (Interview with P25, 
Nottingham City Homes).  
As highlighted, this creates a pressure on implementing just transitions, such as the fuel 
poverty reduction programme implemented by the City Council, and therefore there is 
mounting risk that reduced funding for staffing and resources can create setbacks for 
achieving local authority fuel poverty targets. This supports arguments by Hastings et al. 
(2017, p.2022) that in England, austerity urbanism ‘involves a dual regressive redistribution’ 
by targeting cities which in turn leads to targeting the poor, by attempting to resist the 
redistribution of austerity to the most economically marginalised. Furthermore, this lack of 
staff capacity in the housing sector is echoed by another participant, who comments on this 
barrier in the context of urban heat networks:  
“I think the issues of capacity to develop projects and get opportunities and integrate 
energy into wider strategic thinking at the local authority level is missing […] most 
energy people at the local authority these days are building managers who are looking 
at how they reduce their own carbon footprint. That’s a very different skillset to 
designing and putting in a heat network in a city. So actually, having access to all of 
the skills you need to do this is very difficult” (Interview with P9, BEIS).  
As indicated, the reduction in funding restricts the local authority by creating difficulties 
hiring staff with the required skillsets and expertise, and equally decreases the provision of 
training and broader lack of investment in human resources (Cumbers & Hanna, 2019). 
Furthermore, cuts in staffing also detrimentally impacts the local government by having a 
lack of staff continuity, which negatively affects the Council in terms of project momentum 
and security: “We have to bring people on using our capital funding on short-term contracts, 
so we tend not to have the continuity that we once did, so that’s a bit of a barrier” (Interview 
with P12, Nottingham City Council). As such, the reduction of staff on the whole places a 




In addition, the lack of specialist staff and staff on longer-term contracts can be particularly 
disruptive since low carbon and inclusive transitions are dependent on large-scale 
technological changes which can evolve over long periods of time (particularly at the niche 
and regime levels, as highlighted by the multi-level perspective on socio-technical 
transitions). Whilst it can be argued that the lack of specialist staff within the local authority 
opens up opportunity to engage with intermediaries (i.e. external actors which can provide 
specialist expertise) (Bush et al. 2017), this reduction (or lack) of longer-term, specialist 
staff within the local authority can be viewed as problematic for stimulating low carbon 
technological change as this requires a greater multi-actor engagement out-with the council 
which encounters barriers also (as discussed in Section 6.3)  (Johnstone et al. 2020).  
The lack of capacity and expertise resulting from funding cuts is not only experienced by 
local government but is stressed by other actors, such as third sector actors who are 
beneficiaries of grants and funding from central and local government, as highlighted by the 
charity Nottingham Energy Partnership (NEP):  
“At the height of operation, NEP had 23 members of staff, now we have 9 [members 
of staff]. It’s the ebb and flow of grants, funding from central government, there used 
to be regional governmental funding and now it’s gone and also local authority 
[funding is gone]” (Interview with P31, NEP).  
Lack of funding is further echoed by the charity National Energy Action in relation to fuel 
poverty: “The majority of health staff are overworked, there aren’t enough of them to do the 
job that needs doing and they are lacking in time, so encouraging them to do additional work 
that needs to be done is a challenge” (Interview with P24, NEA). As highlighted by a 
sustainable transport charity in Nottingham, insufficient funding has created a subsequent 
lack of staff capacity in the private sector:  
“15 years ago we used to have lots and lots of people in businesses with dedicated 
travel plans and more and more often you see that role being devolved and put on the 
side of somebody else there because businesses are really under pressure” (Interview 
with P16, The Big Wheel).  
Whilst the cuts to staffing may not be surprising nor unexpected given the context of 
austerity in the UK, this has had an overwhelming and notably detrimental impact on 
governing low carbon and just trajectories at the urban level, often being mentioned as the 
primary barrier by a range of actors. Cumbers and Traill (2020) importantly emphasise that 




hegemony has been particularly severe in the UK context. The economic barriers highlighted 
demonstrate how the insufficient funding is not only restricted to those within local 
government, but also within non-state sectors such as third and private sectors. Furthermore, 
as explained in the previous chapters, the UK’s Coalition Government strategy of localism 
and devolution was believed to strengthen and empower communities and instigate 
economic innovation (DCLG, 2011). However, in the UK context this has been flawed by 
the increased centralisation of budgets and reduction in local autonomy in cities (Eagle et al. 
2017). As such, successful devolution and localism is problematic without state government 
sustaining financial support, therefore central government has exercised increased 
dominance over municipalities through the funding system (Eckersley, 2017). In addition, 
structural support in terms of effective regulation and enforcement is prerequisite for urban 
climate change governance, as argued next.  
6.1.2. Ineffective Regulation and Government Intervention  
The role of regulation and enforcement in climate change governance has been subject to 
much on-going debate. Proponents of binding climate change targets believe that mandating 
change at the local level provides local authorities with the autonomy for implementing 
change, and binding legislation helps to hold the state to account amidst political variability, 
with a greater chance of success from this added pressure and accountability (Lockwood, 
2013). It is also argued that by removing mandates, national government is abdicating 
responsibility for climate change governance. However, counterarguments by opponents 
assert that statutory requirements from national government are interventionist, and that 
governance should be made at the local level and not by force or coercion of the state. 
Instead, opponents argue that central state intervention limits the ability for local authorities 
to adapt in their own terms (Giddens, 2009).  
The devolution of national climate change targets to a regional and local level has so far 
remained largely voluntary in a UK context and consequently, most cities have had limited 
energy decision-making functions (Bale et al. 2012). Whilst most UK cities have begun to 
set local climate change targets, aligning with the 2008 Climate Change Act is not a statutory 
duty and therefore not legally-binding nor mandated (Bulkeley & Kern, 2004). Local 
authority engagement with energy systems is very variable as a result, and as highlighted by 
Webb et al. (2016), although 82 per cent of local authorities surveyed in the UK were found 




were early on, in their implementation. These findings therefore reflect the uneven 
engagement of local authorities for climate change mitigation, which is deregulated and non-
mandatory. Furthermore, the rhetoric of localism in the UK amid the context of austerity 
further reflects the variegated engagement of local authorities and the lack of significant 
devolution of real power (Fudge et al. 2016). To a certain degree, the devolution of climate 
change responsibility to local authorities is a double-edged sword which may or may not 
stimulate local authorities to enact change.  
To illustrate, even though the 2008 Climate Change Act sets emission targets at the national 
level, these targets are not reinforced by mandate or legislation, which is in turn restricting 
transitions at the local level. For example, the Act mandated that devolved administrations 
(England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland) should create their own climate change 
policies and implement national targets. However, there are no provisions for councils, cities 
and the English regions (Fankhauser et al. 2018). For Nottingham as a city on the whole, it 
is evident that the role and responsibility for low carbon transitions at the local level is 
ambiguous:  
“We have really seen a transition in local authorities being, in the late 2005, 2006, 
2007, they were increasingly drawing [upon] local authorities and saying ‘you have 
got a role in this’. But now it’s almost like we haven’t got a role. So, whilst we still 
have our national targets around CO2 reductions, signing the Paris Agreement etc, I 
think local government is uncertain of how national government sees its role in 
contributing” (Interview with P18, Nottinghamshire County Council). 
In this instance, the absence of formal responsibility and statutory requirements on a local 
level is a barrier, with local authorities not being explicitly mandated to meet targets by 
national government (Bush et al. 2017).  This has negative consequences on the political 
argument for enabling low carbon and just transitions, since the lack of mandate diminishes 
the importance of climate change mitigation and prioritisation at a local level, as explained:  
“When it comes to prioritisation at the local level, a lot of the funding and resourcing 
is given over to the things that have to be done by the local authorities. Because that’s 
what they have to deliver and there is a lot left that they don’t have to statutorily 
deliver” (Interview with P9, BEIS).  
The refrainment of making climate change targets a statutory requirement for local 
authorities problematises their ability and capacity to implement projects, since it is not a 





Interestingly, Reckien et al. (2015) note the variation in climate change responsibilities 
across the EU, with 24 national governments out of the EU-28 not requiring the preparation 
of Local Climate Plans (LCPs) and 33 per cent of cities having no LCP at all. Their results 
show that factors such as membership of climate networks, population size, GDP per capita 
and adaptive capacity act as drivers of mitigation and adaptation plans. Perhaps surprisingly, 
only Denmark, France, Slovakia and the UK have national regulation for the compulsory 
adoption of LCPs, as shown in Figure 6.3. Therefore, it is clear that without national 
regulation, local authorities do not have capacity, or are reluctant to produce plans (Reckien 
et al. 2015).  
However, despite a statutory duty to include climate change issues in general local planning 
documents, this requirement is vague and acts as a barrier for local actors. For instance, the 
UK Government requires local planning authorities to include in their plans: ‘policies 
designed to secure that the development and use of land in the local planning authority’s 
area contribute to the mitigation of, and adaptation to, climate change’ (UK Government, 
2019d). However, this has been critiqued since firstly, the requirement of the LCP is 
dependent on the type of local authority (e.g. county council, district council, unitary 
authority); and secondly, the Climate Change Act did not set local authorities local carbon 
budgets, which ultimately has not helped local councils understand what is expected from 
them, nor helped them implement their own independent carbon reduction programmes 
(Britton, 2019; Friends of the Earth, 2019). Such findings therefore reinforce the nuances of 
mandated climate change policy, and the UK and Nottingham example highlights that 
despite having a statutory duty, this is ambiguous in practice, with no clear responsibility for 
carbon and demand reduction. Furthermore, it does not provide actors with the necessary 
agency and capacity (both financially and politically) to overcome barriers, and therefore 





Figure 6.3: Local climate plans across EU (Reckien et al. 2015, p.125).  
 
A good example of the consequences of this lack of a direct mandate is witnessed in the 
housing sector. The Code for Sustainable Homes was firstly introduced by the Labour 
Government in 2008 in the UK as a statutory requirement to help reduce domestic carbon 
emissions and create more sustainable homes. However, this statutory requirement was 
withdrawn by the Coalition Government in July 2015, following the Department for 
Communities and Local Government technical Housing Standards Review in 2014 and part 
of the government’s wider mission to ‘cut red tape’, which decreased housing regulations by 




claimed by the government as a less bureaucratic and easier to understand route for achieving 
zero carbon homes. However, this has been disputed and critiqued for further reducing 
minimum standards that must be met (O’Neill & Gibbs, 2020).  
Subsequently, the Code became voluntary for councils and it is therefore the decision of 
local authorities whether to put the Code in place. Following consultation, Nottingham City 
Council has prescribed homes to be built to Code for Sustainable Home Level 4 standards 
(Nottingham City Homes, 2015). However, this is notably not the most ambitious code 
(which is Code 6) and therefore it is arguable that under current deregulated conditions, local 
authorities are not encouraging the utmost sustainable development possible, reiterating the 
constraints posed by the current political settlement. Again, this raises the importance of 
statutory requirements in driving low carbon transitions evenly across urban areas, and the 
impacts this has on local government agency and wider urban infrastructure. Furthermore, it 
reinforces the fragility of legislation over time because of party politics, and the ways in 
which attempted transitions can encounter political resistance and policy dismantlement 
(O’Neill & Gibbs, 2020).  
The absence of regulations can be considered to lock-in incumbent technologies and stifle 
the diffusion of innovation or technological changes which in turn can hinder low carbon 
and inclusive transitions at the local level. An example of this can be witnessed in the 
housing sector, as highlighted:  
“We are still building homes now either not in the right volumes to be able to satisfy 
demand, but also not in the same level of energy efficiency to what we potentially 
could be. We are still building the homes of yesteryear and somehow expecting this 
low carbon transition future and we will be living in low carbon homes that will be 
retrofitted to being very energy efficient and that is totally the wrong way to do it” 
(Interview with P23, WPD).  
A lack of mandate can reinforce lock-in and inertia and hinder local state actors to invest in 
more sustainable technologies or materials, since there is no stimulus to do so. As 
highlighted in a study by Heffernan et al. (2015), legislation in the housing sector was 
identified as a driver for and barrier to the delivery of zero carbon homes, with actors being 
reticent to make steps to prepare for zero carbon homes in the UK until there is legislation 
in place. Indeed, the lack of consistency in legislation highlights the fragility of low carbon 





Turning to the transport sector, the lack of regulation is also witnessed regarding the 
provision of electric vehicle infrastructure. Whilst the UK has made targets to phase-out 
conventional vehicles by 2040 (2030 in Scotland), it can be argued that a lack of a mandate 
for electric vehicle infrastructure is hindering low carbon and inclusive transitions at the 
local level. As commented by a private distribution network operator:  
“When we are building new homes now, we don’t mandate provision of additional 
capacity for electric vehicles […], even though we have said that that is the future, 
so why are we making short-term investment now on infrastructure that isn’t fit for 
purpose when we know we need to do that in the long-term?” (Interview with P27, 
WPD).  
The quote suitably highlights that the neglect of statutory requirements does not encourage 
incremental measures to be put in place. This raises an important point with regard to 
transition pathways more generally (e.g. Foxon et al. 2010; Geels & Schot, 2007), with 
incremental transitions being heralded as a potential pathway since this can help mitigate 
negative consequences which are associated with abrupt transitions, such as job losses and 
additional stresses (Gambhir et al. 2019). Moreover, such mandated requirements can help 
establish processes of path creation, which can allow for systems to be put in place gradually 
and further facilitate low carbon trajectories (MacKinnon et al. 2019).  
Furthermore, the lack of alignment with EU regulation is further discouraging low carbon 
transitions, and ultimately brings into consideration the benefits and limitations of top-down 
climate change governance for urban areas. As stressed by the UK’s Committee on Climate 
Change (2018a, p.176), the recent EU Energy Performance of Building Directive requires 
charge-points and pre-cabling in new buildings (both residential and non-residential) and 
therefore UK local planning policies should align with this legislation to help facilitate the 
transition to electric vehicle use via housing sector measures and infrastructure. The UK’s 
withdrawal from the EU further calls into question the environmental regulations and 
legislations that will be replaced by former EU rules, since the UK will no longer be bound 
to apply to EU environmental laws (Directives and Regulations) (UK Government, 2019c). 
This changing political nature of the UK more generally brings to light the future uncertainty 




6.1.3. Lack of Political Direction and Uncertainty  
National policies are imperative for driving low carbon urban development in two ways. 
First, they allow for policies and incentives that directly or indirectly affect urban mobility, 
energy use or waste management to be established. Second, national policies allow for the 
creation of frameworks for sub-levels of government to develop, implement and align urban 
policies by providing policy direction and incentive structures, and building local capacities 
and resources (Broekhoff et al. 2018). Hodson and Marvin (2010) emphasise that agency at 
the city level cannot be solely reduced to the actors working at this scale, and highlight how 
a lack of interaction between multiple layers of governance can create barriers to effective 
low carbon trajectories.  
A changing political climate on a national level compounds uncertainty surrounding 
environmental policy, and this was particularly apparent during this research which was 
conducted during political events, such as the UK’s referendum of European Union 
membership in 2016 and the UK-wide general elections in 2017 and 2019. Such political 
changes on a national level can be particularly disruptive for implementing low carbon urban 
transitions and progressive action on climate change (Meadowcroft, 2011). A notable 
example is where one interviewee shared their views explicitly on the role of Brexit and 
future environmental policy:  
“I’m very, very concerned about Brexit and the impacts of Brexit. I don’t think they 
[the Conservative Party] can be trusted with our environmental policy at all but we 
are where we are. One of my motivations for campaigning hard for ‘remain’ locally 
was because of my fears about what they would do to workers’ rights and the 
environment” (Interview with Anonymous). 
Chapter 4 has demonstrated that there has been a general shift in climate change policy since 
a change in central government in 2010, which has led to unsupportive policy, a lack of 
ambitious climate change targets and reference to justice dimensions. This has resulted in 
implications for climate change policy at the local level, but also led to barriers experienced 
by a range of local actors when implementing low carbon transitions in the city in practice.  
The governance of climate change mitigation is particularly challenging, partially due to the 
complexity of the socio-technical systems that must be transformed to avoid climate change 
and the great uncertainties in outcomes, but also in terms of action (Roelich & Giesekam, 




transitions in practice, due to a lack of direction from central government. As highlighted in 
Chapter 4, this is reflected by shifting and unsupportive national government policy in terms 
of climate change within recent years. Notable examples include: unanticipated changes to 
the subsidy regime for renewable energy and energy efficiency; the scrapping of the zero-
carbon homes commitment; freezing of the carbon price floor; cancellation of funding for 
the carbon capture and storage commercialisation programme (Fankhauser et al. 2018); and 
more recently, scrappage of the electrification of the Midlands rail line (BBC, 2017). Despite 
climate change commitments, these measures question the reliability of such commitments 
across political parties, emphasise the continuous fragility of climate change policy, and 
highlight the powerful and incumbent actors frustrating transitions, with one respondent 
stating:  
“There is a need for more certainty at a national level around energy priorities so 
you’re operating within the framework, it’s not just about money, it’s about what the 
direction is. [For example, the 2008 Roadmap to Low Carbon] actually provides a 
really useful framework for low carbon transitions, but successive governments have 
come along and changed priorities within that” (Interview with P22, Municipia).  
Thus, it is apparent that there is a significant disconnect between rhetoric, climate change 
policy, and supportive measures, which in turn have impeded low carbon and inclusive 
transitions in practice. This echoes findings by Fudge et al. (2016) of barriers at the regime 
level for influencing energy agendas.   
Consequently, the shifting political landscape and consistent lack of political will on a 
national level significantly influences how decisions are taken at a more local, urban level 
(Fudge et al. 2016). Inconsistency has led to uncertainty and undermined confidence in 
government policy, which has a negative knock-on effect particularly by deterring investors 
across all sectors (CCC, 2018a). For instance, as stated by a respondent from a private 
distribution network operator:  
“We have a pretty good relationship with national government, obviously directly as 
a monopoly company we are regulated, and being part of the future Industrial 
Strategy means a lot relies on the electricity network. In fact, everything relies on it, 
so we are a very important cog in that future. But what we do seem to have a lack of 
is long-term vision mapped out to short incremental steps to be able to achieve that. 
So, there are certain things that I would always consider as a no brainer, and I can 
sympathise with the government that they are very hard to achieve, but we are not 




As emphasised in the above quote, although there is a generally good-working relationship 
between multiple actors to implement low carbon transitions, the lack of bold decision-
making, coherent long-term strategy and communication on this matter is causing 
uncertainty and blockages for transitions. This highlights that good-working relationships 
between multiple actors are not the sole elements for successful sustainable transitions, but 
also transparency and open communication is a key component of this process. The absence 
of a clear transition pathway and unified direction is particularly problematic between 
different levels of government, as observed by a respondent:  
“There isn’t sufficient joined up ambition between central government that is looking 
at the long-term strategy of [electric vehicle uptake] and the local government that is 
trying to deliver that” (Interview with P23, WPD).  
Hence, I would argue that this lack of transition trajectory, in conjunction with shifting and 
inconsistent policy, has had a detrimental effect in terms of governing low carbon transitions 
because of a lack of long-term and coordinated strategy. This is particularly important for 
low carbon transitions which can result in different pathways dependent on timing and 
technological deployment, and the nature of the multi-level interactions, for example, the 
extent of incremental, purposive adjustments, and disruptive, uncoordinated and emergent 
transformation (Geels & Schot, 2007). Although it is recognised that pathways are not 
completely unchangeable and may be altered by local dynamics, they are nonetheless an 
important factor for transition governance.  
The transition to a low carbon and equitable future is undoubtedly very dependent on 
changing infrastructure to more environmentally friendly technologies in the energy, 
housing and transport sectors, in particular. However, infrastructure investment can be 
problematic due to high costs which rely on investment and the prevalence of risk (Bolton 
& Hawkes, 2013). The lack of uncertainty at a national political level also exacerbates these 
economic barriers, since this can cause great instability and risk to investors, and thereby 
result in under-investment in infrastructure. To illustrate, this can be witnessed in the energy 
sector and the example of EVs:  
“I think one of the big challenges that we are going to have is the final end transition 
of a low carbon future. Once we’ve decided what that looks like, if that is going to 
be dominated by electricity supply, then we need a bigger network. We’ve done a lot 
of work on EV uptake and heat pump uptake, and the UK’s uniquely not suited to 
that particular future with its current infrastructure […] When we get to the latter 




start re-laying the low voltage network and that will be very, very expensive and time 
consuming. So, unless everyone is prepared to flex with their needs, then we are 
going to have to make some of that investment and someone is going to have to pay 
for it” (Interview with P27, WPD).  
The current neoliberal economic growth model pursued by the national Conservative 
Government is centred on the necessity of the private sector for investment (as emphasised 
in Chapter 4). However, the absence of direction from central government has created an 
atmosphere of uncertainty, which in turn is problematic and counterproductive for 
stimulating private sector investment. This has had implications on the rolling out of electric 
vehicle infrastructure:  
“There not being enough infrastructure was one of the biggest reasons why people 
are not buying ultra-low emission vehicles (ULEVs) and why manufacturers weren’t 
initially pushing for ULEVs because it was a chicken and egg situation - the 
infrastructure must come first or the vehicle must come first for the infrastructure to 
be there […] again it’s showing the need for infrastructure investment to be able to 
push the market further” (Interview with P5, OLEV).  
These statements demonstrate the ideational influence of neoliberal economics as a rationale 
for governing in the UK, with the logic that investments should be made by the private sector 
and left to market forces, and not supported by the state (Gillard, 2017). However, this again 
raises questions of whether the state should take a more interventionist role in transport 
planning (Banister, 2001). Furthermore, this spotlights the extent to which government 
intervention is required in a market-led approach to low carbon transport (Cooper, 2019), 
and raises issues of the uncertainty of responsibility with regards to who bears the costs for 
the electric vehicle infrastructure. The next section leads on to consider the justice 
dimensions that are not being addressed at the national level which in turn have an uneven 
effect of low carbon transitions at the urban level.  
6.1.4. Government Ineffectiveness to tackle growing social inequalities   
Particularly since 2010, social inequality has been growing in the UK which now has some 
of the highest levels of income inequality and regional inequality in comparison to other 
OECD countries (McCann, 2019). This has been exacerbated by austerity, welfare reforms 
and reduced public spending as a rhetoric to reduce the public deficit. In reality, these welfare 
cutbacks have had the most negative impact in the poorest areas, for example in places with  
higher concentrations of welfare claimants such as older industrial areas. This geographic 




In conjunction with this austerity and inattention to tackling social inequality from a national 
level, Bridge et al. (2013) highlight the significant geographical elements of low carbon 
transitions, and how factors such as location (absolute and relative), landscape, territoriality 
and spatial differentiation can generate new patterns of uneven development. Uneven and 
exclusionary funding from central government can lead to inconsistent and uneven finance 
for low carbon transitions for local authorities, which in turn has justice implications for 
cities. Like many cities, Nottingham is characterised by varying patterns of social inequality, 
with the highest percentage in Bulwell, as shown in Figure 3.2.   
 
Figure 6.4: Transport spending per capita across the UK from 2007-2018 (Raikes, 
2019, p.8).  
 
One explanation for uneven development, particularly between urban areas, is due to the 
centralisation of finance in the UK, with England having one of the most centralised finance 
systems amongst OECD cities (McGough & Bessis, 2015). For example, UK local 
authorities have currently 18 per cent of their revenues raised locally, in comparison to 




cent of their income (Friends of the Earth, 2015). Although the argument for greater 
autonomy for urban areas is not new, it is reiterated in the case for implementing low carbon 
and just transitions, as argued: “If there was much more devolution to reasonably-sized 
authorities around the country so they could actually work and develop their economies in a 
way that they saw fit, then that would be a much better way of doing it” (Interview with P4, 
Nottingham City Council). Whilst there has been some progress of fiscal devolution with 
the Cities and Local Government Devolution Act 2016, this progress is clearly not sufficient 
at this stage in Nottingham’s urban transition given the aforementioned limited fiscal 
decision-making and the wider context of austerity (Bulkeley et al. 2013; Robins et al. 2019).  
The regional disparities in England are long-standing and the notion of the ‘North-South’ 
divide, that is, between formal industrial areas and rural areas in the North and Midlands, 
and between South and the South East, is particularly salient in political debate and the 
addressing of social inequality (MacKinnon, 2017). This uneven landscape is of particular 
importance for just transitions and reveals a spatial dimension to problems of funding for 
low carbon futures. Historically, spending in London and the South East has been 
disproportionately higher per person, as shown in Figure 6.4 which illustrates that over the 
last decade, transport spending per capita has been more than twice as high in London than 
in the North. This disparity is projected to continue in planned transport spending, as 





Figure 6.5: Planned transport spending across the UK from 2018/19 onwards (Raikes, 
2019, p.13).  
 
Furthermore, these arguments are exacerbated by the recent scrapping of the Midlands 
mainline electrification, which received heavy criticism from the areas affected, such as the 
East Midlands Chamber of Commerce, Nottingham City Council and advocacy groups such 
as Nottinghamshire Campaign for Better Transport. As a result, the region is 
disproportionately impacted which can produce and reinforce inequalities. A common 
explanation for regional inequality is that the central government’s location in London has 
more centralised decision-making powers and control over prioritising development which 
is arguably focused in the south-east: “Because London is such an economic powerhouse it 
draws [in] so much of the funding and the people and the knowledge and expertise and the 
rest of the country is left almost on breadcrumbs” (Interview with P8, The Green Party). 
Therefore, the prioritisation of spending in London and the South East because of 
government centralisation, can result in a discontent amongst urban actors out-with these 
areas and echoes arguments that funding concentration to these areas act as a generator of 
deepening inequality (Massey, 2007). This can subsequently lead to greater problems of 




The cuts from central government to local government has led to ephemeral and 
unpredictable availability of funding, which consequently places an increased competition 
between local authorities (Gibbs & Lintz, 2016). For example, as discussed in detail in 
Chapter 5, Nottingham City Council has an income stream from the Energy Service 
Department and Workplace Parking Levy which helps fund some of its projects and also 
provides match-funding. However, Nottingham City Council is distinctive in this regard, 
and many English councils do not have such income streams as a result of privatising their 
assets. As part of funding conditions, many councils are required to provide match-funding 
to help facilitate the funding and to illustrate dedication, commitment, and a well thought-
through sustainable plan as funding recipients. Match-funding can be beneficial for these 
aforementioned reasons, yet in many instances its requirement can disproportionately affect 
some councils more than others, and as such, they can be competitively phased out across 
the national scale. Although there is no official evidence or studies undertaken of the 
disproportionate impact on other councils, one respondent remarked:  
“[How money is allocated] is a really difficult question to answer. European funding 
such as ERDF (European Regional Development Fund) which many councils use to 
drive the transition is calculated on a needs and scale base, and so varies both in terms 
of size and match required. Some cities have used Devolution Deals to leverage more 
[central] Government funding but that obviously only covers 7 or 8 places. The Local 
Energy Programme is not city-focused and has attempted to give equal opportunity 
to each area – which is not the same as equal funding – as there is not enough to meet 
all demand. Some areas have additional funding for pilots and demonstrators and 
again this is done through competition so theoretically it is equal opportunity but 
again some benefit more than others – based on ability to bid, political support locally 
etc” (Interview with P9, BEIS).  
It is clear from this comment that the disproportional allocation of funding for local councils 
is complex and warrants cause for concern as it is likely to exacerbate existing regional 
inequalities in the UK by providing some urban areas with increased (and more frequent) 
funding than others (Gray & Barford, 2018). For example, Hastings et al. (2015) note this 
disparity in England, with data between 2010/11 to 2014/2015 revealing that in 2015, the 
most deprived authorities received cuts of more than £220 per head compared with under 
£40 per head for the least deprived authorities.  
Moreover, many low carbon funding streams are determined by the capacity and capability 
of councils to deliver successful outcomes and their historical involvement with sustainable 
energy systems which to reiterate is a core argument of this thesis. This means that they may 




authorities. For instance, Nottingham has tended to benefit from this, since the City Council 
has received funding32 and has ensured the delivery of successful projects, in addition to 
having existing low carbon energy infrastructure such as a district heating network (as 
explored in Chapter 5), it performs competently from a funder perspective. Having had the 
opportunity to receive funding in the first instance has allowed a positive knock-on effect, 
but equally virtuous circle of funding to take place, which excludes other areas even more. 
Therefore, whilst there may be a rhetoric of equal opportunity, there is not a level playing 
field for local authorities, which can exacerbate inequalities, as Featherstone et al. (2012, 
p.179) highlight:  
Policy agendas that foster localism, but assume a level playing field exists by treating 
what are markedly unequal localities equally, risk deepening inequalities in material 
resources and social capital between and within communities.   
As such, there is a particularly uneven landscape of funding which can therefore be 
exclusionary and problematic not only at the city level, but which can also reinforce 
disparities on a regional level (Hastings et al. 2015, LGA 2020c).   
Streams of funding also remain unpredictable, ad-hoc and piecemeal, and this is because 
they are mostly dictated by political priorities at the time. As mentioned previously in the 
case of renewable energy, the scrappage of the Feed-in Tariff33 in 2019 has been particularly 
problematic in terms of renewable energy projects, since this can change the financial 
viability of projects:  
“Some people just think we’ve got no certainty about what the situation is going to 
be like in the next 12 months’ time, so why get into these kinds of schemes when we 
don’t know if the support in this case is going to be around to make it worthwhile” 
(Interview with P1, APSE Energy).  
This uncertainty and unpredictability of funding (and the broader lack of an effective 
renewable energy policy) is challenging governance for low carbon transitions at the urban 
scale since companies do not want to invest in ambiguous technologies or projects which 
                                                 
32 An appropriate illustration of this is that in January 2016 Nottingham was one of four successful cities in 
securing funding for the Go Ultra Low City Programme. This involved £6.12 million of funding from the 
national government’s Office for Low Emissions (OLEV) to support measures across Nottingham and Derby 
to support the uptake of Ultra Low Emission Vehicles.   
33 Introduced in 2010, the Feed-in Tariff is a government programme designed to promote renewable energy 




may change in the short-term. Moreover, this can be witnessed in the example of transport 
policy, and the ad-hoc and piecemeal nature of electric vehicle funding streams, as 
highlighted by one respondent:   
“There’s a suggestion that [funding for the Local Transport Plan] is going to be 
reduced further so it’s very difficult to implement measures. There are always pots 
of money and grants and initiatives that get announced […] it sometimes is difficult 
because you suddenly get clean bus grants, you get all these different pots all over 
the place, and you’re bidding into initiatives that suddenly come along. It’s very hard 
for us to put together our plan to say ‘Right, this is our coordinated, integrated 
transport strategy for the next 10 years, we are going to do this’. It’s very hard for us 
to do that.” (Interview with P6, Nottingham City Council).   
Whilst there has been a focus to develop electric vehicle infrastructure with targets set for 
almost every car and van to be zero emission by 2050 (DfT, 2018), the funding for electric 
vehicles has been criticised as ad-hoc and precarious, which as the quote emphasises makes 
it increasingly difficult for councils to plan ahead. Again, this can create difficulties with 
creating long-term strategy and planning, and echoes arguments of the lack of a coordinated, 
integrated strategy which resultantly stifles sustainable transport transitions (e.g. Banister, 
2001). Relying on different sources of income is not completely negative for the third sector 
since it offers more resilience with regards to funding scrappages (Interview with P14, St 
Ann’s Advice Centre). However, this uncertainty can be detrimental from a local 
government perspective, since it can encourage a system which is opportunistic, short-term 
and patchwork in nature, further rejecting the notion of clear, long-term decision-making 
and strategy.  
Furthermore, funding can be dependent on the location and attributes of an area, and 
therefore can be asymmetric and exclusionary in nature and hinder low carbon transitions. 
Energy-related funding calls are often dominated by techno-economic thinking and neglect 
a societal dimension, which can hamper the governance of sustainable and just transitions, 
as highlighted by Foulds and Christensen (2016) using the case study of Horizon 2020. This 
is also illustrated in the energy supply sector which is technology-specific:  
“What the [central] government tends to do is they will focus on a certain technology 
- at the moment it’s around heat networks […]. These are going to be in mostly big 
towns where there is a group of maybe a hospital, or a police station, a university or 
some big energy users close together […]. So they’ve cut the money for solar farms 
but they are making money for heat networks available […] of course not everybody 
has got a site which is appropriate for a heat network, so you’re not going to have 




might not even have those particular circumstances – they’re ruling people out which 
is another difficulty really” (Interview with P1, APSE Energy).  
As asserted, this type of funding pattern can be detrimental for exclusion, for example in 
areas which are less densely populated and less compact, and therefore would not be as 
viable for heat network funding: “Some of the funding that is available is not suitable for 
what we are looking at. So, things like off-gas priorities, and there are very few off-gas 
properties in the city” (Interview with P12, Nottingham City Council).  Whilst it can be 
argued that uniformity is unlikely due to the geographic nature of low carbon transitions 
(Bridge et al. 2013), this can nonetheless contribute to patterns of uneven development 
across the nation, further exacerbating inequalities and low carbon just transitions.  
The barriers and tensions that have been discussed therefore demonstrate the economic, 
institutional and political causes, for example from austerity, ineffective regulation, lack of 
direction, and government ineffectiveness to tackle social inequality, all of which stem from 
the national level and impede urban governance. The identification of these barriers 
reinforces important arguments by Geels and Schot (2007) that in the context of transitions, 
there is a need to examine the macro-level developments that take place at the landscape 
level, since macro-level political, economic and social developments allow for external 
pressures to be considered. Needless to say, there are also obstacles that arise from the local 
level, as discussed next.  
6.2. LOCAL LEVEL BARRIERS IMPEDING URBAN 
GOVERNANCE  
Within low carbon and equitable transitions in urban areas, there are many differing interests 
from a wide range of actors and stakeholders, many of whom have vested and conflicting 
interests and the chances of contestation and disagreement are high. Even when there may 
appear to be overall consensus for ambitions of lowering emissions, problems still exist in 
how this is achieved. Overcoming incumbent systems and transitioning to a low carbon 
society is conditional upon changes to technology and investment which are locked-into 
contemporary business models (Foxon, 2002).  As a result, low carbon projects require 
bolder and somewhat more controversial decisions to be made in terms of political backing, 
financial investment and risk in the face of higher levels of scrutiny and opposition (Geels, 
2015). Therefore, the role of human agency, capacity and politics cannot be understated for 




The investigation of the plurality of multiple actors within low carbon transitions has 
received much attention in transition literature. For effective multi-level governance and 
urban sustainable transition management, there should be equal engagement at the micro-
level, i.e. across and between actor networks. Effective coordination and interaction are 
paramount for network governance of urban low carbon transitions, without which can cause 
practical implications for successful transitions on local, national and international scales.  
For a successful transition 34 , it is therefore crucial to investigate the micro-politics of 
sustainable just transitions, i.e. the internal dynamics of actor-networks and the practical 
implications and management of network governance (Spath & Rohracher, 2015). This is 
shaped by socio-spatial and context-specific factors, whereby the rules, practices, and 
identities shape where the transitions are situated, and in turn the actors who determine the 
shape, pace, scope and direction of transitions. Therefore, context is considered territorial 
and relational which are constituted through flows, locations, connections and scales that 
transcend boundaries (Gibbs & Krueger, 2005; Murphy, 2015).  
I argue that the Nottingham example demonstrates that there are barriers experienced by 
multi-actor networks, and that a lack of political coordination, interaction, unequal dynamics 
of power, trust, and contestation are inhibiting network governance arrangements and the 
practicalities of implementing low carbon transitions at the local level, as highlighted next.  
6.2.1.  Contestation Within and Between Local Government  
Since the 1980s, the global political economy has been dominated by a neoliberal political 
and economic order of free markets and private property (Cumbers & Traill, 2020). 
Balancing the needs and interests of all users can be problematic at a time when there is a 
shifting emphasis upon achieving sustainable business models (While et al. 2013). Despite 
being part of the same local authority, there are conflicting prioritisations between local 
government sectors and antagonism between actors which are stifling transitions at the urban 
level. For example, as stated by one interviewee within local government:  
                                                 
34 It is acknowledged here that there are numerous ways of envisioning what may constitute a ‘successful’ 
transition, and that these perceptions can be influenced by multiple and contested social, cultural and political 
processes. For the purposes of this thesis, a successful transition is considered to be one which broadly achieves 
a low carbon trajectory, i.e. reduces carbon emissions, whilst also having transformative political, social 
economic benefits, i.e. having no disproportionate impacts on marginalised groups, whilst also reducing 




“There are some areas where specific councils have to work where there is no overall 
control, Labour is in bed with the Lib Dems [Liberal Democrats], and they are not 
sure that someone might cross the floor and go with the Tories [Conservatives]” 
(Interview with Anonymous).  
This comment suggests that a lack of common cross-party environmental agreements can 
lead to a degree of dissatisfaction, mistrust and caution within local government which are 
consequently challenging sustainable urban transitions. As highlighted in Chapters 4 and 5, 
the local government elections that occur within Nottingham (i.e. Nottingham City Council; 
Nottinghamshire County Council; and Nottinghamshire District Councils) all occur on four 
year cycles which are out-of-sync. Although this is the nature of a political democracy, since 
decision-making is often arguably planned and organised with electoral cycles and voters in 
mind (Meadowcroft, 2011), this can pose a notable challenge for cooperation and 
collaboration across different local authorities, which may in turn obstruct joined-up 
sustainable transitions at the local level.  
Not only does the reduction in revenue as a result of austerity affect the financing of low 
carbon projects alone, this also has a negative knock-on effect on other council services by 
increasing competition and prioritisation between departments with certain sectors receiving 
greater cuts over others (Interview with P17, Nottingham City Council; Bulkeley & Kern, 
2004). For instance, social care within local government has been relatively protected 
whereas cuts to services such as culture and environment and planning have been more 
severe, again reiterating a competing prioritisation in funding (Hastings et al. 2015).  
A useful example to illustrate contestation within local government is Robin Hood Energy, 
as discussed previously in Chapter 5. The ESCo model, which was set up by Nottingham 
City Council, has been followed in only white-label arrangements35 by other councils, but 
not been adopted in full by other councils, and the reasons for this are the financial and 
political risk aversions of councils:  
“It comes at a lot of cost and a lot of risk which I think is why we haven’t seen it 
widely adopted. At the moment we’ve got to consider that councils are being 
squeezed and squeezed in terms of budgets. It’s a very bold decision to make a large 
multi-million-pound investment to get a licensed energy supplier off-the-ground. 
You’ve got to have a lot of confidence to do that. So I think that’s why the model 
hasn’t been adopted more widely, I don’t think we are going to get where the market 
                                                 
35 In the energy market, a white-label provider is an organisation that offer energy tariffs as a partner supply, 




is completely flooded with councils operating fully licensed supply businesses, 
there’s too much cost and risk […]” (Interview with P15, Robin Hood Energy). 
This quote suitably illustrates that the financial and political risk aversion is problematic 
particularly in an energy market wherein municipalities must compete economically with 
multi-national, multi-million private companies, such as the ‘Big Six’. It also appropriately 
demonstrates the compromises made in municipal decision-making between the short-term 
(e.g. in the interests of the electorate) against the long-term (e.g. in the interests of the 
environment) (Meadowcroft, 2011). Furthermore, Robin Hood Energy was loss-making for 
the first 2 years and (until it was privatised in September 2020), it was still expected to be 
paying off loans which were required for the ESCo to launch (Interview with P15, Robin 
Hood Energy). Although it is arguable that this can be expected for a new energy entrant for 
the first 2 years or more, this is still an overwhelming deterrent for most councils, which are 
actively trying to keep as risk-averse as possible both politically and financially, in the 
context of austerity and political longevity.  
Furthermore, in October 2019 Robin Hood Energy secured an emergency £9.4 million loan 
in order not to have their license revoked due to a disputed failure to make outstanding 
payments for Renewables Obligation Certificates to the energy market regulator, Ofgem 
(Robin Hood Energy, 2019a). This was particularly controversial at the time, since Robin 
Hood Energy was a municipal company (therefore paid for by the public). These 
circumstances reiterate the financial risk of a young and small company being competitive 
in a complex energy market. Moreover, it underlines an on-going issue of dominant 
incumbents and the vulnerability of new entrants in the energy market (Poudineh, 2019), as 
highlighted:  
“I think there’s a problem at the minute with the reputation of smaller suppliers 
because there have been a lot of new entrants. Some [new entrants] are really good, 
really well run. Some of them are not, some of them have gone out of business and 
taken customers credit balances away with them […] some of which there is no real 
vetting before they come to market and which they have not been operating in an 
ethically and sustainable way. I think there are issues with appearing price 
competitive at all times because again, a lot of new entrants are heavily loss-leading, 
it’s not sustainable, we can’t do that it wouldn’t be right when we are funded by a 
public body loans money” (Interview with P15, Robin Hood Energy).   
This comment importantly raises attention of the increased number of small energy providers 
having gone out of business in the UK. Since these companies are operating within a highly 




capabilities, they have limited control and capacity over the larger private corporations and 
rising prices on wholesale energy markets, therefore suffer as a result (Cumbers & Traill, 
2020). This includes non-profit suppliers such as Our Power (which was owned by a 
coalition of Scottish housing associations) becoming insolvent, as well as smaller companies 
such as Economy Energy, Spark Energy and Extra Energy (BBC, 2019b; Cumbers & Traill, 
2020). In this regard, growth was a particular concern for Robin Hood Energy:  
“As the turnover increases there’s a bigger financial risk and we have to recruit and 
expand, and as soon as we hit that 250,000 account mark, a certain number of charges 
that come in that we have to add onto the customer’s bill, so we will have to take a 
step back in terms of competitiveness so it’s about how we cross that threshold 
without losing our competitive edge” (Interview with P15, Robin Hood Energy). 
As stressed, there are conflicting factors at play, such as the difficulties of new market 
entrants surviving amongst the incumbent companies with non-traditional business models, 
financial and political risk, and challenges of sustainable business growth and consumer 
reputation. Furthermore, this demonstrates that the current energy market in the UK treats 
incumbent energy companies and municipal ESCos as if they were equal (Interview with 
P15, Robin Hood Energy). However, this is evidently not the case as there is clearly an 
advantage for incumbents and not a level playing field, with different economies of scale, 
scope and sunk costs (Poudineh, 2019).  The motivations and business models of incumbent 
energy companies versus municipal ESCos are also different; for example, incumbent 
energy companies operate on a for-profit basis with limited social and environmental 
objectives in comparison to municipal ESCos which are owned by local government 
operating on a not-for-profit basis with social and environmental ethos. Ultimately, I argue 
that it is the functioning of the energy market more broadly that was the result of the failing 
sustainability of Robin Hood Energy.  
In addition, in 2019 the energy regulator Ofgem introduced stringent tests, for example, 
proof of sufficient funding for the first year of operation, in order to prevent the risk of 
supplier failure (Shrestka, 2019). Whilst this is arguably protecting consumers, this opens 
up the debate as to whether the UK’s energy regulations should be more supportive towards 
decentralised energy across the energy market, i.e. whether there should be a shift for more 
supportive and favourable regulatory measures for those with non-profit, environmental and 
social objectives. For example, this could be through a combination of local, community, 




infrastructure), as per arguments by Cumbers et al. (2013), Hall (2016) and Hawkey et al. 
(2014).  
Moreover, I argue that based on this research Nottingham has demonstrated that the need for 
a sustainable economic income is a priority whilst transitioning to a low carbon and equitable 
future, particularly from a local government perspective.  On the one hand, this is not 
surprising given the context of austerity and that Nottingham has been relatively successful 
with regard to its transport network; yet, on the other hand, the prevailing need for economic 
arguments can present obstacles.  
Turning now to the transport sector, an example of this contestation is evident in the bus 
fleet replacement programme in Nottingham, where it can be difficult to implement 
sustainable technological changes due to the economic and subsequent technological lock-
in of fossil fuel-based systems. According to Nottingham City Council, the programme of 
replacing diesel buses with electric buses must be done gradually, since the diesel buses are 
still functional and this would be of detrimental economic impact for the City Council: 
“Obviously [Nottingham City Transport] can’t just write off a load of perfectly good buses, 
they have to tie in with their fleet replacement programme” (Interview with P7, Nottingham 
City Council). This is therefore an operational challenge for the Council in terms of 
implementing low carbon transitions which although may be more sustainable, might have 
higher implementation costs, and the slower, incremental nature of change (in comparison 
to a faster, radical reorientation of new technology) adds a delay in timing. Such reluctance 
to invest immediately in sustainable solutions also transcends to private sector transport 
operators, as a result of competing commercial and technological reasons, and therefore 
decelerates efforts to transition to low carbon urban systems and exacerbates economic and 
technological lock-in.  
The competing prioritisations are experienced in the transport sector in Nottingham, with 
the pressure on multi-modal transport (such as walking, cycling and use of electric vehicles). 
This results in rivalling demands for the limited road space that is available, which can have 
significant implications for urban, transportation and mobilities justice (Nello-Deakin, 
2019). The provision of ‘fair’ distribution of road space can be inherently problematic, as 
highlighted:  
“We want high quality facilities which gives road space to the cyclists [and] with 




motorists, which can lead to conflicts as it’s less easy for them to travel around. The 
space could be used by public transport which is the thing you want to promote, like 
the tram for example, and trams and bicycles often don’t mix as of the tram tracks, 
as we know from Edinburgh’s experience” (Interview with P21, Nottingham City 
Council).  
With regards to the implementation and operation of Edinburgh’s tram installation, cycle 
tracks on roads were removed to allow sufficient space for the tram on the roads. However, 
there have been safety concerns regarding cyclists along tram routes, with instances of tyres 
getting stuck or slipping on the tram lines and resulting in injuries and fatalities (Spokes, 
2019). In Nottingham’s instance, there have been efforts to integrate multi-modal transport, 
but the competing interests encountered reiterates that progressing a low-cost, equitable 
urban transition in a moderate timeframe whilst balancing the needs of different road space 
users is a challenging task which should not be underestimated. An appropriate example of 
this is the current banning of bicycles on Nottingham’s trams due to the minimal space 
available once provisions for wheelchairs and pushchairs have been put in place (Interview 
with P32, Nottingham Express Transit). Whilst Nottingham’s policy is the same for trams in 
Manchester and Birmingham, Edinburgh has taken a different approach and allows bikes on 
trams out-with peak hours.  
These examples therefore firstly highlight the different priorities of various needs and users, 
and the antagonisms which may arise between these interests and groups in the energy and 
transport sectors within the local government. Secondly, this emphasises the somewhat 
controversial and fractured planning in local government, and the lack of coordinated 
strategy (Castan Broto & Westman, 2020; Fuchs & Hinderer, 2014). As a result, sectors 
operate in political siloes and are restrictive to their own economic priorities and interests, 
which can have a negative impact on low carbon and equitable transitions, for example 
sustainable transport.   
The variation in political structures across UK councils is a particular matter of contention 
for sustainable transitions. As emphasised, Nottingham City Council as a unitary authority 
has responsibility of all the services it provides. Whilst this can be viewed as positive in 
terms of decreasing the need to collaborate with other actors, this can also raise negative 
views as the City Council risks becoming too independent and not collaborating with other 




“[The City Council] can just do [projects] themselves as they are a unitary authority. 
So I’m not sure they are great at partnership working. As a County [Council] we have 
to collaborate with the Districts [Councils] more. There will be political differences 
that make that a bit more difficult” (Interview with P18, Nottinghamshire County 
Council).  
From the standpoint of the neighbouring two-tier authority Nottinghamshire County 
Council, the asymmetric responsibilities result in the councils having different and often 
opposing agendas which can consequently make city-wide implementation difficult. The 
devolution of responsibilities between Nottinghamshire’s district councils is also 
problematic, and can lead to barriers for networking (i.e. collaboration between actors), since 
political priorities can be diverse. Such networking issues between and within municipalities 
are concerning, particularly in terms of knowledge-sharing and collaboration, both of which 
are fundamental for low carbon and equitable transitions (Bush et al. 2017). Whilst there is 
no easy solution, it is acknowledged that the political make-up of councils in the UK (and 
therefore the differing electoral cycles that they adhere to) is particularly convoluted, which 
has also produced political barriers for low carbon transitions.  
The lack of networking by the City Council with other actors can also be identified in one 
of their schemes. Take for example the energy supply sector. As previously introduced in 
Chapter 5, Robin Hood Energy was an energy services company (ESCo) owned and 
delivered by Nottingham City Council in response to alleviate of fuel poverty, which is 
particularly high in the Nottingham area and affected 15 per cent (or 18,980 residents) in 
2016/2017. From being a wholly owned council initiative, the ESCo was not-for-profit and 
had a particularly strong social justice element in comparison to traditional energy utilities, 
before falling into administration in 2020.   
During research it was discovered that whilst Robin Hood Energy had successfully 
networked with several other councils across the UK in ‘white-label’ arrangements, e.g. 
Doncaster (as shown in Figure 6.6), it had not collaborated with its neighbouring authority 
Nottinghamshire County Council. As such, opportunities may have been missed:  
“In terms of the energy services company, I think that’s just something the city 
(council) have gone on and done […] I think there are opportunities which have been 
missed. For example, take Robin Hood Energy (RHE) (and this is a personal view), 
if you were to ask people which county is [RHE] associated with, it is associated with 
Nottinghamshire and that would include the city – so the brand of RHE actually 
would have traction outside of the city. But, it’s very much a city set-up company. I 




obviously there would be difficulties working jointly because it’s about are you 
willing to share that risk and investment? But I suppose if you look at it from the 
outside you might think, that’s a million people in Nottinghamshire that you could 
present something to, rather than a quarter of a million in the city” (Interview with 
P18, Nottinghamshire County Council).  
The exclusion of Nottinghamshire County Council is somewhat surprising given that 
Nottinghamshire County Council administrative area covers some of the city’s boundary. 
There are multiple benefits from collaboration such as a larger customer base, better local 
authority relationship, and a greater level of legitimacy with respect to energy governance 
since the local authorities may take credit for successfully delivered projects (Hannon & 
Bolton, 2015). However, whilst there is a degree of insulation from operating as a separate 
legal entity, an unsuccessful project can also be negative for the councils, as specified 
economically and politically.  
It is also questionable why an arrangement between county and city council could not be 
organised, for instance Fosse Energy is a white-label energy company by Leicester City 
Council and Leicestershire County Council, in partnership with Robin Hood Energy and can 
therefore be held up as an exemplar (Fosse Energy, 2020). Considering the collaboration of 
City Council and County Council in the example of Fosse Energy, this poses the question of 
why Nottinghamshire County Council had not been involved to date with Nottingham City 
Council’s Robin Hood Energy (Interview with P26, Great North Energy). A potential reason 
for the lack of collaboration as suggested is the political differences between the councils, 
with Nottingham City Council having a Labour leadership at the time, and Nottinghamshire 
County Council having a changing political leadership (as discussed previously in Chapters 
4 and 5). The role of intermediaries is a possible solution for the lack of engagement and 
knowledge-sharing between urban actors (e.g. Bush et al. 2017; Hodson & Marvin, 2010; 
Hodson et al. 2013). Yet, the possible role of intermediaries for a potential strategic energy 
plan is unclear in this example. Nevertheless, the lack of collaboration on this venture across 
the urban scale is an interesting critique which can be viewed as hindering low carbon and 





Figure 6.6: Robin Hood Energy white-label location map (Robin Hood Energy, 2019b).  
 
6.2.2. Problematic Local Multi-Actor Engagement 
When implementing low carbon and just transitions there is generally a shared interest and 
a common goal, although alignment is not guaranteed. Instead, there may be considerable 




(Hannon & Bolton, 2015; Spath & Rohracher, 2015). A degree of conflict is expected (or 
perhaps unavoidable to a certain extent) between different political parties, structures and 
actors. However, the existence of conflict between actors may hinder or suppress the 
capacities of actor networks to govern low carbon urban transitions (Sovacool & Brisbois, 
2019). It is therefore important to consider the ways in which these conflicts are understood 
and negotiated, as they can reflect the operational obstacles when implementing low carbon 
transitions across the urban area in practice.    
As discussed in Chapter 5, the political leadership at Nottingham City Council has been 
particularly stable since 1991 with a Labour administration. On one level this can be 
beneficial for long-term planning, but this can also produce negative consequences which 
affect networking as there is a pattern of consistency and stability which may cause 
resistance to change and the status quo:  
“The downside of [political stability] is I think, and a lot of people think, is that 
[Nottingham City Council] have become a bit complacent and set in their ways. 
There is a certain arrogance there that ‘we believe in things done our way and that 
people develop us’ or other bodies that come to Nottingham find the council a bit 
entrenched and find them a bit difficult to work with because it is often ‘you do it our 
way or you do not do it at all’” (Anonymised Interview).  
The lack of networking by the City Council is an opinion that is also experienced and 
expressed by one third sector community organisation: 
“Our own local authority [Nottingham City Council] at times have been difficult 
because they don’t like people doing things that they haven’t initiated. […] 
Nottingham City Council are very proud of what they’ve done, but they want to 
control it all. They’ve done some great stuff, it’s fantastic, but there is this mentality 
about a lot of things the City [Council] does, it’s not just energy, they don’t like 
people doing stuff off their own backs. And if these things are successful, they are 
suddenly claiming that it’s this thing they’ve developed” (Interview with P11, 
MOZES).  
As such, the above narrative reflects the perception and experiences of multi-actor 
coordination and possibilities of resistance to collaborative working (Sovacool & Brisbois, 
2019). This highlights the power dynamics between the differing actors and sectors of 
transitions and a degree of animosity across sectors.   
Moreover, the transition to low carbon transport is an interesting example to reflect the 




regulated in the UK. While local government actors attempt to work with the private bus 
operators, their influence on operators is limited to an extent, leading to a greater potential 
for disagreement and delay when decisions must be taken by a consortium of stakeholders 
in any given scheme (Scottish Executive Social Research, 2004). An illustration of this is 
the multi-operator transport card Robin Hood Network which is fully administered by the 
Council and is intended to allow multi-modal transport across a network of bus, tram and 
rail operators (Nottingham City Council, 2016b). Nevertheless, operator participation is 
voluntary, as highlighted: 
“At any point in time [the operators] can choose to withdraw [from the Robin Hood 
Scheme]. So, we have to work walking on eggshells. It’s an interesting relationship 
between us and the operators sometimes, because they do know effectively that they 
have power really. But we’ve done pretty well to get the Robin Hood as it is, and it 
is a fully smart scheme. Our issue with it is that there is a premium for interchange 
between bus and tram and different operating companies” (Interview with P7, 
Nottingham City Council).  
As reflected upon by Nottingham City Council, there have been difficulties implementing 
the multi-modal ticket, due to multi-modal tickets being more expensive than individual 
operator tickets, to encourage season-ticket purchasers for using one operator. This was also 
identified as a barrier by Turner and Smith (2001, in Scottish Executive Social Research, 
2004), who stated that the varying and irreconcilable fare policies and/or structures might 
deter a potential transport partner in the scheme from participating in multi-modal ticketing 
schemes. This is a drawback from a user perspective, with the inflexibility to accommodate 
different service operators on multi-modal tickets resulting in an increase in fares, and 
therefore has certain justice dimensions.  
Consequently, the degree of decision-making for the transport sector in Nottingham is 
limited for the City Council and suggests that compromises have been made in favour of 
private and commercial coordination. Furthermore, as highlighted by Go Ultra Low 
Nottingham, to avoid the confrontations of working with multiple stakeholders, the focus 
has been primarily on implementing charge-points within Council-owned car parks only:  
“[…] It’s so much harder to work with private sector business [in comparison to local 
authorities]. A lot of [private sector businesses] will already have ongoing contracts 
with major charge-point providers who may not be the one we’ve selected. But also 
they can have someone from [their] head office saying ‘oh yeh you should look at 
this charging’, but it’s still up to the managers of those locations to decide if they 
want it. And if they don’t see if it’s the future or they don’t see that they need it, then 




say ‘yes it’s council-owned so we can basically put it in’” (Interview with P35, 
Nottingham City Council).  
Again, this highlights the obstacles when working across sectors and stakeholders with 
different interests, priorities, assets and organisational structures (Jeffrey, 2019). It 
emphasises the importance of public ownership in terms of low carbon transitions outlined 
in Chapter 5, whereby cooperation and the harnessing of synergies play a major role in the 
context of re-municipalisation, and as witnessed for example in the German energy sector 
and the transition to more democratic forms of energy ownership (Cumbers, 2016; Wagner 
& Berlo, 2015). This is further reinforced by Table 6.1, which illustrates the uneven ratio of 
charging points to EVs and of distance to charging points across Nottinghamshire. It 
demonstrates that in some areas, owning an electric car is more than ten times easier in some 
parts of Nottinghamshire e.g. Gedling, Broxtowe and Mansfield, in comparison to others 
e.g. Bassetlaw and Newark and Sherwood. This therefore raises a justice dimension as some 
poorer communities may have to travel further to access charge points. Since charge points 
have mostly been installed privately, this variation and unevenness across the urban 
conurbation is likely to be due to networking barriers and other factors (e.g. grid capacity), 
therefore stifling transitions in different ways across space (Whitfield, 2019).  
 
Local authority No. of charging 
locations 
No. of licensed 
vehicles 






Ashfield 2 136 1.5 2.85 
Bassetlaw 10 153 6.5 4.48 
Broxtowe 3 185 1.6 1.07 
Gedling 7 191 3.7 0.41 
Mansfield 5 127 3.9 1.11 
Newark and 
Sherwood 10 218 4.6 4.34 
Nottingham 50 384 13.0 0.40 
Rushcliffe 3 262 1.1 4.16 
NOTTS 
AVERAGE 11 207 45.0 2.35 
Table 6.1: Electric vehicle charge points across Nottingham and Nottinghamshire 
(Whitfield, 2019) 
 
In addition to networking barriers with local government, there have also been criticisms of 
inadequate and unsatisfactory engagement, particularly from third sector organisations 




to repayments of fuel debt and breaking away from fuel poverty. As noted in the following 
quotes, the question of commitment by many of the private sector is speculated, and whether 
many of the campaigns are tokenistic or superficial because of the need for social corporate 
responsibility. For example:  
“I feel sometimes it’s a tick-box exercise, I do personally because of course they do 
want to come over as being caring […] even that simple thing that the fact why not 
allow them [residents in arrears] to pay 2 weeks if they get paid fortnightly? I’ve 
asked this time and time again, and nobody can give me a specific answer. It’s as 
broad as it’s long, but if that was the case and that was changed then that is a genuine 
method of being able to help somebody” (Interview with P25, Nottingham City 
Homes).  
It is important to reflect on these narratives, particularly because such opinions and 
interactions can create barriers which can hinder transitions. Similarly, feelings of mistrust 
and disengagement were echoed by the third sector:  
“We tried very hard at the beginning to work with British Gas and collaborate with 
them and do stuff, get them to involve themselves and we did some of their 
competitions and they did give us some money. But we found very quickly that they 
only wanted to get engaged [because] we were trialling what they could roll out 
commercially. They weren’t really interested in community stuff at all. So energy 
companies have been a problem, trying to deal with them […] they come to us 
wanting to be engaged in communities, it’s rubbish. You can’t trust them” (Interview 
with P11, MOZES). 
These narratives therefore reinforce the multi-actor conflict that is associated with low 
carbon transitions, and the multi-scalar level of (mis)trust in socio-technical transitions, for 
example, at the micro-scale (between individuals), at the meso-scale (between 
organisations), and at the macro-scale (due to structural factors within society, such as class 
and gender) (Murphy, 2015). Whilst these levels can overlap, the wider point is that they can 
manifest and make it difficult to re-direct trajectories towards more sustainable and equitable 
outcomes, and therefore act as a barrier. This political tension and contestation are key 
arguments here. It further highlights the need to re-examine the nuances of urban politics 
which are as a result of contestation between different groups and interests in the urban area, 
instead of simply assuming that climate policy is solely due to neoliberal rationalities (North 
et al. 2017). Furthermore, this emphasises the complexity of sustainable and equitable 
transitions, in that they are multi-faceted in practice. By promoting alternatives to business-




places and reconfiguration of power structure, institutions, and positionalities (Murphy, 
2015).  
As highlighted previously, the impact of austerity has had a significant impact on the 
capacity of urban staff to deliver low carbon and equitable transitions. This lack of capacity 
and resources across state and non-state sectors has had a significant impact on local level 
engagement, as highlighted:  
“15 years ago we used to have lots and lots of people in businesses with dedicated 
travel plans and more and more often you see that role being devolved and put on the 
side of somebody else there because businesses are really under pressure.…I think 
finding the right people to engage and then escalating that up to senior management 
is always very, very difficult” (Interview with P16, The Big Wheel).  
As such, it is important to recognise the impact of austerity on non-state actors in society, 
and the subsequent hindrances this can cause for low carbon and inclusive transitions. 
Featherstone et al. (2012) emphasise that austerity localism can decentralise power to certain 
people, instead of providing an equitable process of decentralisation. This leads to the same 
default actors becoming involved in the provision of resources, expertise and social capital, 
which in turn reinforces existing power relations, social marginalisation, and inequalities 
within communities. Therefore, it is increasingly difficult to engage with actors out-with the 
status quo, which can undermine low carbon and equitable urban transitions.  
Furthermore, when promoting energy efficiency in private domestic housing, a lack of 
engagement from private landlords is a particularly difficult barrier and can affect low 
carbon transitions at the local level. The uncertainty and unpredictability of funding also 
extends to energy efficiency in the private housing sector in Nottingham. There has been a 
significant increase in the private housing sector (rental and owner-occupied), which 
represents 20 per cent of the housing market in England in 2019, compared to 10 per cent in 
1999 (O’Neill & Gibbs, 2020). As highlighted by Emden et al. (2018), many landlords may 
be unwilling to pay costs of energy efficiency upgrades above the legal requirement cap of 
£2,500. This landlord-tenant problem is one of the market failures which affect efficiency in 
energy markets, and is commonly referred to a problem of ‘split-incentive’ whereby the 
benefits for energy efficiency investment will be financed by the landlord, however the 
benefits will be reaped directly by the tenant, without a direct influence on the rent the 
landlord can charge (Babie & Leadbeter, 2014). Therefore, this can lead to issues in the 




Victorian properties in the inner city (Interview with P31, NEP). This also brings in the 
notion of urban materiality as a constraint of low carbon transitions, as reinforced by one 
interviewee:  
“We’ve got to do [sustainable transitions] with the existing buildings we have here. 
Historically, Germany built and rebuilt a lot of its cities in the 50s and 60s. We still 
have cities with hundreds of thousands of Victorian houses, we can’t apply the same 
technology and outcomes to those, so we have to learn and adapt for the building and 
infrastructure and urban design, rather than saying ‘Oh look they’ve done it, so we 
can do it, we can just copy them’. Everything is the same in terms of the problem, 
but everything is different in terms of the solution” (Interview with P9, BEIS).  
This quote above appropriately demonstrates that the materiality of buildings and 
infrastructure and the lock-in of these systems is raised as a key barrier to urban transitions. 
Undoubtedly, in the case of buildings this can create problems and increased inequalities for 
certain populations, particularly those with vulnerable occupants such as disabled, elderly 
and minority groups, and lead to difficulties implementing uniform sustainable transitions.  
6.2.3. Local Societal Resistance  
The changing of behaviour at household (or individual) level is identified as a key issue for 
low carbon and equitable transitions, and has been referenced as an obstacle for pursuing 
sustainable and just transitions in Nottingham. One example highlighted by Nottingham City 
Council is the barriers encountered for reducing fuel poverty. Although Robin Hood Energy 
had taken steps to switching void properties, there were still non-switching customers which 
presented a challenge for the company to address. This could have been due to a lack of 
awareness or willpower from consumers; fuel-poor consumers are less likely than more 
active customers to switch to cheaper tariffs, leaving them left behind to pay the higher prices 
charged as large energy companies lose their market share, which in turn worsens the depth 
of fuel poverty they experience (TNS, 2016 in Emden et al. 2018).  
To overcome this drawback, Robin Hood Energy and Nottingham City Council stated that 
they had engaged with communities by hosting and attending local events and engaged 
directly with faith and worship groups and other community initiatives. However, this was 





“You might send a couple of people out into a local estate to engage with residents 
for a full day and get a very small number of switches back, so it’s not cost effective 
in that sense but that’s the way you have to engage with certain communities” 
(Interview with P15, Robin Hood Energy).  
Not only is the lack of change in behavioural and engagement represented by local 
government, but it also extends to those experienced by the charity sector, and the persisting 
problem of behavioural change for reducing fuel poverty:  
“I think changing behaviour is the biggest challenge as we need to ensure tenants are 
not in the same position next year. So quite often what can happen is that I will go 
and arrange to cut the debt to the back of the meter, they will make that arrangement 
until the energy trust has kicked in, and wiped the debt. Then when we go and do the 
gas service the following year, they’ve got no credit on the meter so they’ve not learnt 
that or taken on board the advice given. So that’s a big thing. Change in behaviour is 
a massive thing, it’s like to turn the titanic around, it’s so difficult” (Interview with 
P25, Nottingham City Homes).  
This reinforces the lack of awareness of the causes of fuel poverty, which in turn can create 
a vicious cycle for those living within these circumstances (Emden et al. 2018). As 
highlighted by Kearns et al. (2019), occupant behaviour can be counterproductive for 
reducing fuel poverty and energy efficiency interventions as this may cause what is termed 
a ‘rebound effect’, whereby some households may decide to ‘take-back’ some of the gains 
of energy efficiency measures by increasing the use of energy to raise thermal comfort, and 
subsequently not change their own behaviours. As such, the motive of consumers and their 
engagement with fuel poverty is an important consideration for enabling low carbon urban 
transitions. The lack of awareness could be caused by lack of education on the matter, and 
as Bailey and Hodgson (2017) argue, there is evidence particularly in the UK of a dominant, 
negative cultural narrative of energy providers and their customers having high levels of 
mistrust. 
The lack of engagement in energy efficiency is not only observed in individuals and 
households, but also by private landlords and the private housing sector. This is particularly 
detrimental for the city since there is a high proportion of privately-rented accommodation 
from landlords and letting agencies in Nottingham, with latest statistics from 2011 revealing 
this to be 21.6 per cent of households by tenure, in comparison to 15.4 per cent in England 
as a whole (ONS, 2011). As mentioned previously, since landlords in the domestic private-
rented sector are only willing to meet minimum legal requirements for energy efficiency as 




enforce, reiterating a sense of inertia due to a lack of legal mandate (Embden et al. 2018). 
As a result, those in privately-rented accommodation are three times more likely to suffer 
from issues of fuel poverty, in comparison to those living in social housing.  
As aforementioned, Nottingham City Council has committed to addressing the issue of 
energy-efficiency in private-rented housing through the Minimum Energy Efficiency 
Standards (MEES) legislation, which was brought in by the UK Government Clean Growth 
Plan for all UK homes to have an Energy Performance Certificate (EPC) band C by 2035 
and for fuel poor homes by 2030, and the Housing Act 2004 including selective licensing 
(Nottingham City Council, 2018a; 2018c).  MEES has been criticised for its lack of 
enforcement from a council perspective across England and Wales, however this has been 
linked to the lack of capacity at a local authority level (Ebico Trust, 2019). Furthermore, 
although this scheme is the first of its kind in terms of introducing minimum standards in the 
sector, it has limited potential due to many exemptions (Ebico Trust, 2019). Again, like many 
different UK environmental policies, the longevity of this regulation is questionable, as 
highlighted: 
“It is something that was launched for a particular timeframe for a particular purpose 
and will be reviewed. It was to try and make sure the (energy efficiency) standards 
are there, and bring standards and regulations into the spotlight, and enforcement as 
a way of getting minimum standards up” (Interview with P12, Nottingham City 
Council).  
This reiterates arguments of the dismantling of legislation for the housing sector in the UK 
within recent years, and the challenges this causes for governing low carbon and inclusive 
urban transitions (O’Neill & Gibbs, 2020).  
Turning now to the transport sector, the lack of changing behaviour at individual level is 
also recurrent, for example in the encouragement of electric vehicle usage. The shift to 
electric vehicles is particularly contentious for low carbon transports and has been widely 
criticised in sustainable transitions debate. Whilst proponents argue that over the lifecycle 
of the electric vehicle the technology is more sustainable than that of conventional internal 
combustion engines, opponents dispute this due to increased electricity requirements and the 
sourcing of fragile raw materials of batteries such as lithium (e.g. Liaw & Pistoia, 2018; 
Sovacool et al. 2019). Furthermore, electric vehicles arguably do not encourage a modal 
shift in transport use and can cause an increase in inequality due to high costs of electric 




interviewee highlighted that electric vehicles are very much the focus of Nottingham City 
Council’s transport transition, with cycling regarded as a lower priority, behind the tram and 
bus network:  
“We have a culture [in the UK] where cycling is not aspirational at all. We could 
give away bike after bike to people who are here in the country because either they 
have achieved refugee status or they are seeking asylum. We could give so many 
bikes away. But trying to encourage people who have been born in this country to do 
that because they’ve grown up in this culture, is way more challenging. People 
associate it with images of poor people, the aspiration is for everyone to own a car, 
because that’s ‘cool’… […] It’s trying to push that cultural shift, there’s just this 
cultural resistance” (Interview with P21, Nottingham City Council).  
This also potentially relates to automobile drivers and their attitudes towards cycling:  
“Transport is a secondary thought, they jump in their cars because they don’t give it 
any thought, it’s habitual, it’s just there, it’s natural that you just get in your car and 
go. I think there’s a massive issue there about breaking that cycle” (Interview with 
P16, The Big Wheel).  
Again, the issue of the lack of education on the health and environmental benefits of active 
travel is present in these barriers (Interview with P13, anonymous third sector). As 
aforementioned regarding the contestation between tram line and cycling space, concerns 
for safety may also compound public resistance to engage in cycling as a method of transport 
(Hopkins & Higham, 2016). This suitably links back to the concept of urban materiality and 
the reciprocal, interlinking and complex nature between both human and non-human agents. 
This stresses the importance of considering the strong emotional and personal investments 
of urban spaces and materials, which in turn can alter individual and collective agency (Coe 
& Jorhus-Lier, 2010; Rutherford, 2014).  
Insufficient engagement and participation by the local community is a significant roadblock 
for implementing urban transitions. This includes blockages in the social acceptance of low 
carbon technologies and measures, such as cycling with regards to safety concerns as 
mentioned previously. As suggested by Vladimirov and Galev (2017), passive agreement is 
not enough; instead, the active participation of whole social groups, both on collective and 
individual levels is necessary to facilitate the large-scale transformation to low carbon cities. 
This reiterates arguments for greater community engagement in decision-making, which can 
not only lead to increased awareness and participation, but increased democracy and 
decision-making, an important component for equitable transitions by ensuring all voices 




inclusive future is not simply a technical or financial matter but requires the willpower and 
behavioural change of society which is an evident and significant barrier from the 
Nottingham example.   
6.3. CONCLUSION 
To transition towards low carbon and inclusive urban futures, it is important to investigate 
barriers experienced by a range of actors in practice. In this chapter I have highlighted the 
complex, multi-faceted, fluid and interlinked nature of low carbon transitions experienced 
at the urban level, through the lens of Nottingham’s trajectory, by considering the tensions 
and obstacles encountered by actors across private, third, and multi-level public sectors. 
Using a multi-level and multi-dimensional analysis has enabled low carbon governance to 
be at the forefront of enquiry by highlighting the different roles of actors across multiple 
scales, and barriers affecting the agency and capacity of urban level actors.  
I argue that there are a number of economic, political, institutional and social barriers facing 
urban actors in facilitating the low carbon transition. First and perhaps most critically, 
national level policy and agenda has had negative effects which is detrimentally impeding 
low carbon urban governance in the UK at all scales. For example, the current political 
system in the UK is heavily centralised (despite a rhetoric of localism), and the current 
austerity agenda which has been implemented by the Coalition Government since 2010 has 
provoked a programme of austerity which is continuing to present-day (Cribb & Johnson, 
2018; Cumbers & Traill, 2020). This has resulted in significant cuts in budgets, which in 
turn affect the financial revenue available to invest in new and existing low carbon transition 
projects. Moreover, the lack of national level funding available for local authorities has a 
knock-on effect for overall local budget spending, and therefore there is a significant impact 
on resources and staff capacity. This detrimentally affects the sustainable and inclusive 
transition process by reducing agency and capacity of local government, and the continuity 
of low carbon project delivery. The financial burdens from austerity are also experienced by 
third sector actors, such as charity organisations, and private sector actors. Institutional 
barriers, such as ineffective regulation and government intervention also exist and are 
thwarting low carbon urban transitions. I argue that the lack of mandate and responsibility 
for climate change for local authorities has resulted in the diminished importance of climate 
change mitigation and prioritisation at the local level (Bush et al. 2017; Fankhauser et al. 




making power, resulting in local authorities only progressing in areas where they have 
statutory requirements and remits, and having restricted action out-with these areas. The lack 
of mandate has consequently resulted in lock-in and inertia for driving low carbon and 
inclusive projects.  
Second, I contend that political barriers are experienced at the local level because of lack of 
national strategic direction from central government, which in turn has caused uncertainty 
and an unstable climate change policy (Fudge et al. 2019). This uncertainty and lack of long-
term strategy is particularly detrimental from an investor perspective, especially the private 
sector which engage in business models that are predominantly short-term, profit-seeking 
and risk averse. Moreover, the lack of national political commitment to addressing inequality 
has accentuated socio-economic barriers at the urban level, which is having a negative 
impact on transitions to a just society. The absence of justice dimensions is witnessed in the 
provision of uneven and exclusionary finance which is disproportionately impacting urban 
areas by favouring local authorities that have already made progress over more deprived and 
less resilient places (e.g. MacKinnon, 2017; Massey, 2007). Again, this raises questions of 
conflict over what kind of transition is envisioned i.e. by whom and for whom. For example, 
funding is determined by staff capacity to implement successful projects. However, since 
some local authorities do not have this capacity, this can lead to a vicious and uneven cycle 
of investment which can contribute to inequality locally and nationally. Thus, it is arguably 
fostering competitions rather than collaboration (Gibbs & Lintz, 2016). It is clear therefore 
that unless these issues are addressed on a national level, urban areas are somewhat limited 
in their position to fully surpass these issues due to their uneven financial, political and 
institutional dependency on central government.  
Third, by considering the barriers at the local level, I have highlighted the localised, day-to-
day barriers experienced in practice. Balancing the needs and interests of all local users can 
be problematic, and a particular set-back for progressing low carbon and inclusive transitions 
is the competing prioritisations which are at play, specifically within the local government. 
This is evident in the provision of low carbon housing, transport and energy, all of which 
operate in political siloes and are restrictive to their own economic priorities and interests 
(Hastings et al. 2015; Meadowcroft, 2011). As such, there is a risk that sustainable solutions 
which are environmentally, financially and socially beneficial in the long-term are side-lined 
in favour for locked-in fossil fuel-based systems which have existing sunken costs. 




attributed to the differing share of responsibilities across the city, and the reluctance to 
network because of political complexities. Again, this reinforces a competitive and 
segregated aspect to sustainable transitions across one urban area rather than encouraging 
greater collaboration, integrated policy, and sharing of knowledge and resources (Castan 
Broto & Westman, 2020; Fuchs & Hinderer, 2014). Furthermore, I draw attention to the 
problematic engagement of local actors which has resulted in socio-cultural barriers, with 
perceptions of unequal power dynamics, animosity, mistrust and disengagement between 
actors; all of which are hindering strategic collaboration and coordination for transforming 
the urban area.  
Finally, I have identified that a common barrier is the lack of behavioural change due to 
societal resistance. This reinforces the importance of active participation of whole social 
groups, both on collective and individual levels in facilitating large-scale low carbon and 
inclusive transitions (e.g. Featherstone et al. 2012; Vladimirov & Galev, 2017). The lack of 
engagement from the public can reinforce elements of injustices (such as lack of switching 
energy tariffs, or sustainable behavioural changes which can reinforce cycles of fuel 
poverty), in addition to sustaining technologies based on the status quo (such as the 
unwillingness of landlords to invest in energy efficiency, and the public’s continued reliance 
on private internal combustion engine cars instead of a shift toward more active and 
sustainable forms e.g. cycling, public transport). Furthermore, this appropriately raises the 
concept of urban materiality i.e. the reciprocal, interlinking and complex nature between 
both human and non-human agents, and stresses the importance of considering the strong 
emotional and personal investments of urban spaces and materials, which in turn can alter 
individual and collective agency (Coe & Jorhus-Lier, 2010; Latham & McCormack, 2004; 
Rutherford, 2014). 
Taking the aforementioned points into consideration, I draw attention to the fact that barriers 
can manifest themselves in numerous ways, on different scales, across multiple sectors and 
between various actors. Whilst there is no ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach to urban sustainability, 
the Nottingham example reinforces the numerous difficulties encountered at the urban level 
and the ways in which these can be context-specific. They are also representative of the 
wider inefficiencies and shortcomings at the national level for encouraging low carbon urban 




The next chapter brings the thesis to a close by reiterating the main objectives achieved in 









The main purpose of this thesis was to critically investigate the governance of sustainable 
and equitable transitions in cities in advanced economies. It has examined the ways in which 
low carbon and just transitions are being implemented in practice within urban areas, using 
the example of Nottingham in the UK. The Nottingham case study has proven to be a 
compelling example which highlights the multi-faceted, fluid and interlinked nature of low 
carbon transitions experienced at the urban level.  
In this research, I have identified the key governing actors involved and their agency; the 
barriers encountered in their pursuits; and the approaches and pathways undertaken for 
progressing low carbon and equitable urban transitions. I have examined these factors using 
an analytical approach (refer to Table 3.1) which conceptualises cities as complex 
arrangements of socio-technical systems that are comprised of and co-produced by social 
and technical elements, including technology and material, technical systems, political and 
legal institutions, processes of design and social practice.  
I have utilised a multi-level perspective across multiple levels and scales of governance 
(local, national and international) to analyse the city’s integrated strategy as a whole to 
challenge the often siloed governing and policy arrangements which separate energy supply 
and urban form. This has allowed me to constructively look beyond the local in isolation and 
avoid considering transitions simply using one scale of politics. Instead, I have taken into 
consideration the wider political and economic conjuncture from a scalar perspective and 
the ways in which relations, articulations, contestations and politics are shaped in different 
urban spaces and sustainable transitions. The argument developed here is that these 
processes shape and alter the dynamics of contemporary urban governance.  In addition, I 
have constructively engaged with notions of local agency and political capacity for 
implementing transitioning on an urban level, and how path creation and ownership have 




To achieve the aim of investigating governance of low carbon and inclusive urban 
transitions, I pursued the following research objectives:  
1. To identify the key governing actors (state and non-state actors) engaging with low 
carbon and equitable urban transitions. 
2. To investigate the main tensions and barriers which are encountered by multiple 
actors in the pursuit of low carbon and equitable urban transitions.  
3. To explore the key factors (e.g. initiatives, measures, conditions) in Nottingham 
that have helped in the implementation of low carbon and just transitions ‘in 
practice’.  
4. To examine the key policies on local, national and international levels which are 
progressing and hindering low carbon and equitable urban transitions. 
In this chapter, I provide a summary and synthesis of the main research findings before 
finally providing suggestions for policy intervention. I end this chapter with my final 
reflections.  
7.1. SUMMARY AND SYNTHESIS OF MAIN FINDINGS  
To achieve the aforementioned research aim and objectives, there were two broad concerns: 
firstly, the main factors which are constraining local actor governance of sustainable and 
equitable urban transitions; and secondly, the factors that are influencing low carbon and 
equitable urban governance. A multi-level perspective has been vital to examine these 
factors which transcend across different scales (i.e. international, national and local) and 
multiple actors and sectors (i.e. both state and non-state). My arguments to these two broad 




7.1.1. Constraints on Local Actor Governance of Sustainable and 
Equitable Urban Transitions  
AMBIVALENT AND UNSUPPORTIVE CLIMATE POLICY 
A core contribution from this research is that there is inadequate and unsupportive multi-
level policymaking for low carbon and equitable urban transitions and this research has 
demonstrated the inherent reliance of local government on national and international 
institutions for adequate policies and supporting mechanisms for low carbon and just 
transitions. My analysis of international, national and local level policy has found that that 
there are overarching commonalities across all levels; that is firstly, there is a weakness of 
climate targets and subsequent fragmented and uneven climate policy across all levels; and 
secondly, there is inadequate attention to justice elements across all scales. It is evident from 
these findings that low carbon and equitable transitions cannot be effectively implemented 
without supportive, timely policy (Gambhir et al. 2019). Despite attempts for international 
climate change governance e.g. Paris Agreement, the targets for climate change 
commitments are weak, uneven and fragmented. An illustration of this is the voluntary 
nature of the Paris Agreement pledges and global SDGs, which lack clarity on targets, 
measurements and accountability. These are also unevenly localised on international, 
national and local levels, making a global coherent approach difficult to govern in practice 
(e.g. Bodansky, 2016; Hickel, 2015; Liverman, 2018).   
I have emphasised that despite some progress in emissions reductions, the UK has weak 
targets and inconsistences in its national environmental policy (e.g. Clean Air Strategy, 
2019; Road to Zero Strategy, 2018; and Clean Growth Strategy, 2017). I have stressed that 
this has been exacerbated by changes in central government administrations and different 
political party stances and priorities on climate change. This is notable particularly since 
2010 where there was a Coalition Government, and subsequently during the Conservative 
Government (2015 to present), where there has been an overall decreased willingness and 
commitment for climate change and social equality policy strategies (Gillard, 2017). In 
addition, I have argued that the complex division of powers and responsibilities across the 
UK (and England in particular) is illustrative of the patchwork nature of devolution and 
subsequent uneven approaches to low carbon transitions. Through this research, I have 




climate policy, and therefore commitments to an inclusive transition remain implicit from a 
national level, reiterating the lack of political consensus, vision and commitment. 
Local level action is particularly limited in its capacity without national policy support. I 
have illustrated that at a local level, Nottingham City Council has set some of the most 
ambitious targets for combatting greenhouse gas emissions from a UK council, and the 
policy and strategy generally reflect these ambitions. Yet, I have argued that this is again 
inconsistent, for instance, even though there is reference made within Nottingham City 
Council strategy to justice dimensions, this is uneven. Therefore, City Council attempts to 
facilitate a just transition within the transport sector are fragmented, implicit and not uniform 
across policy arenas. I asserted that the uneven strategy across different local authorities can 
be attributed to the patchwork nature of responsibility in English councils more generally 
(Hirsch, 2018; Robins et al. 2019). The Nottingham example clearly illustrates this, with the 
neighbouring local authority Nottinghamshire County Council having very limited policy 
and strategy for emissions reductions and tackling social inequality. Such inconsistencies of 
climate policy are damaging for low carbon and inclusive urban transitions in cities, 
particularly which span two differing local authorities (like Nottingham), and highlight the 
different and conflicting approaches to low carbon and inclusive transitions and the lack of 
a unified approach (Meadowcroft, 2011). Again, this emphasises that social justice remains 
largely peripheral and excluded from wider urban national agendas (Bulkeley & Fuller, 
2014; Castan Broto & Bulkeley, 2013; McKendry, 2015). Importantly, these findings 
emphasise the ‘messy’ politics of urban responses, and that these responses are continuously 
reworked and redefined (Cochrane, 2019; Hodson & Marvin, 2012). The argument here is 
that without such institutional, political and economic support from national and 
international levels, it is evident that there are numerous knock-on (or ‘domino’) effects 
which constrain the implementation of low carbon and inclusive urban transitions in practice 
(such as reduced political capacity and austerity), as described next. 
DISRUPTIVE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT MEASURES 
In addition to ambivalent and unsupportive climate multi-level policy, I have highlighted 
how the effect of national government measures are disrupting effective low carbon and 
equitable urban governance, which is a core contribution of this research. I found that 
national austerity measures were a primary barrier for implementing low carbon and 




(despite a rhetoric of localism), and the current austerity agenda which has been 
implemented by the Coalition Government since 2010 has provoked a programme of cuts to 
local government spending and other areas which continues to the present-day (Featherstone 
et al. 2012). This has resulted in significant reductions in budgets, which in turn affect the 
financial revenue available to invest in low carbon transition projects. Moreover, the lack of 
funding available for local authorities has a knock-on effect for overall local budget 
spending, and therefore this has a significant impact on resources and staff capacity 
(Cumbers & Hanna, 2019). I argued that the lack of sustained financial and structural support 
from state government has detrimentally impacted the low carbon and inclusive transition 
process by reducing agency and capacity of local government (Eckersley, 2018). The 
financial burdens from austerity are also experienced by third sector actors (such as charity 
organisations), which in turn hinder actors’ agency and block sustainable transitions.  
I also argued that ineffective regulation and lack of government intervention on the national 
level are thwarting low carbon urban trajectories. In particular, the lack of mandate and 
responsibility for climate change for local authorities has resulted in the diminished 
importance of climate change mitigation and prioritisation at the local level. This is 
compounded by national agendas, like austerity and a lack of political decision-making 
power, resulting in local authorities only progressing in areas where they have statutory 
requirements and remits, and being restricted out-with these areas. The lack of national 
strategic direction from central government has caused uncertainty and an inconsistent 
climate change policy (Amundsen et al. 2010; Broekhoff et al. 2018; Bush et al. 2017), as 
is witnessed by the examples of the Feed-in Tariff and Code for Sustainable Homes. This 
uncertainty is particularly detrimental from an investor perspective, especially the private 
sector, which operates on business models that are predominantly short-term, profitable and 
risk averse.  
Furthermore, I argued that the national government ineffectiveness in addressing growing 
social inequality has resulted in socio-economic barriers at the urban level, which is having 
a negative impact on transitions to a just society. Clearly, the absence of justice dimensions 
(which is reflected in policy) is also witnessed in an uneven and exclusionary financial 
landscape, and thereby disproportionately impacting urban areas. For example, funding is 
determined by staff capacity to implement successful projects, however since some local 
authorities do not have this capacity, this can lead to vicious and uneven cycles of investment 




and nationally. From this, it is evident that social justice remains peripheral (e.g. Bulkeley 
et al. 2014), and unless these issues are addressed on a national level, urban areas are 
somewhat limited in their position to fully surpass these issues due to their uneven financial, 
political and institutional dependency on central government (Jaglin, 2013). The 
identification of these barriers importantly reinforces that in the context of transitions, there 
is a need to examine the macro-level developments that take place at the landscape level, 
since macro-level political, economic and social developments allow for external pressures 
to be considered (Geels & Schot, 2007), even though they play out in multifarious ways at 
the local level.  
CONTESTATION AND RESISTANCE AT LOCAL LEVEL 
Another core contribution of this research is that contestations and resistance that are 
occurring at the local level are subsequently hindering the governance of sustainable urban 
transitions, and I have illustrated this using the Nottingham example. The competing 
prioritisations that exist between and within local authorities is a fundamental barrier for 
implementing low carbon and inclusive urban transitions in practice. It is evident that 
balancing the needs and interests of all local users can be problematic, specifically within 
the local government and hence there is a contested local politics of climate change 
(Meadowcroft, 2011). I have argued that this is apparent in the provision of low carbon 
housing, transport and energy, all of which operate in political siloes and are restrictive to 
their own economic priorities and interests (and again financial cuts exacerbate these 
pressures). As such, there is a risk that sustainable solutions which are environmentally, 
financially and socially beneficial in the long-term are side-lined in favour of locked-in fossil 
fuel-based systems which have existing sunken costs. Additionally, I have emphasised that 
there are political barriers encountered between local councils, which can be attributed to 
the differing share of responsibilities across the city, and the reluctance to networking 
because of political complexities. Again, I have argued that this reinforces a competitive and 
segregated nature to sustainable transitions across one urban area (instead of one which is 
coherent, joined up and collaborative) and therefore restricts the pursuit of a long-term and 
cohesive transition strategy as a whole (Fuchs & Hinderer, 2014; Gibbs & O’Neill, 2016; 
Nello-Deakin, 2019).  
The problematic engagement of local actors has resulted in socio-cultural barriers and 




disengagement (Sovacool & Brisbois, 2019). I have argued that such perceptions are 
detrimental for transitions by inhibiting coordination and overarching consensus for 
transforming the urban area. Not only is this experienced within and between state actors, 
but this is also experienced amongst non-state actors working with state actors, for example, 
with perceptions from the third sector that handling fuel poverty measures causes 
antagonism with the private sector. These findings echo arguments that social relations in 
urban areas are bound up and entwined, with unequal structures of power, capital, discourse 
and groups (Bridge et al. 2013; Coenen & Truffer, 2012; McFarlane, 2011). As such, this 
reinforces the notion that cities need to be conceptualised as urban assemblages made up of 
infrastructures, politics, communities and economies which are constantly open to 
manipulation and contestation (Bulkeley et al. 2013; Rutherford, 2014).   
A commonly held argument is the lack of behavioural change due to societal resistance, 
which emphasizes the importance of active participation of whole social groups, both on 
collective and individual levels in facilitating large-scale low carbon and inclusive 
transitions. This importantly links back to the concepts of lock-in and urban materiality i.e. 
the reciprocal, interlinking and complex nature between both human and non-human agents. 
This stresses the importance of considering the strong emotional and personal investments 
of urban spaces and materials, which in turn can alter individual and collective agency (Coe 
& Jorhus-Lier, 2010; Latham & McCormack, 2004; Rutherford, 2014). I have stressed that 
this lack of engagement from the public can reinforce justice dimensions (such as fuel 
poverty), in addition to technologies based on the status quo (for example, the continued 
reliance on private internal combustion engine cars). Using the Nottingham example, I have 
built arguments regarding the blockages to low carbon and inclusive transitions, and 
highlighted the complex and context-dependent experiences of a multitude of actors and 
sectors, and the ‘messy’ politics of urban responses, which are continuously negotiated, 
reworked and redefined (Cochrane, 2019; Hodson & Marvin, 2012).  
7.1.2. Influences on Local Actor Governance of Low Carbon Equitable 
Urban Transitions 
LOCAL AUTHORITY AGENCY AND POLITICAL CAPACITY  
I have investigated the key factors that have helped the implementation of low carbon and 




disruptive national government measures and contestation and resistance experienced by 
local governing actors. The pursuance of sustainable and inclusive transitions at the urban 
level is highly dependent on effective governance in practice by multiple actors, especially 
local authorities (Bulkeley & Castan Broto, 2013; Kern & Alber, 2008). A key contribution 
is that the governance of low carbon and inclusive urban transitions across England is not 
uniform, and I have stressed that this is due to the varying political, social and cultural 
differences of local councils to enable change.  
In the context of governing low carbon and inclusive transitions, political capacity is 
influenced by various elements. First, I have argued that political capacity is influenced by 
the type of local authority located in the urban area, and the Nottingham example clearly 
illustrates this. The extent to which a local authority has responsibility significantly impacts 
political capacity (e.g. Eckersley, 2017; Kuzemko & Britton, 2020), which is demonstrated 
by the example of Nottingham City Council as a unitary authority, in comparison to 
Nottinghamshire County Council as a two-tier authority. As a unitary authority, having 
responsibility internally has led to a greater engagement with sectors such as energy, 
affordable warmth and housing, due to the presence of this remit in the City Council. This 
has generated a greater autonomy for decision-making in the City Council, in comparison to 
two-tier authorities which have responsibility of sectors spread differently across the county 
council, districts and borough councils, and which are commonly subject to different 
political administrations. An example of this is the planning and housing sector which is 
within the City Council responsibilities alone, but distributed between district and county 
council. Consequently, energy-related issues (such as fuel poverty and energy efficiency) 
are arguably easier to implement within the City Council due to this mandate.  
In addition, I have noted that the size of geographical administrative area has proven to have 
a consequence on local actor political capacity. For example, the smaller administrative 
boundary of Nottingham City Council has been advantageous by allowing value for money 
to be easier to obtain, which in turn can make projects more appealing for the city since they 
prove financially feasible. Additionally, there are benefits for transport and energy justice; 
in the City Council administrative boundary there are smaller distances to cover which 
necessitates infrastructure on a smaller scale, in comparison to Nottinghamshire County 
Council which covers a larger rural area and therefore can lead to greater distances, costs, 
and result in exclusion and isolation. As aforementioned, whilst the density and geographical 




important and worthy contributor for implementing low carbon and urban just transitions 
from a City Council perspective. This supports arguments of the benefits of a ‘compact city’ 
approach for achieving sustainable city objectives and improving social equity and spatial 
mobility (Ahlfedlt & Pietrostefani, 2017; Neuman, 2005). However, this also clearly 
demonstrates the spatial unevenness of transitions, since it is acknowledged that the 
hierarchy of jurisdictions binds them to geographical space, and therefore political capacity 
out-with these municipal areas is somewhat limited (Franzen, 2013), highlighted by the 
Nottinghamshire County Council example. This reinforces that the low carbon energy 
transition as a fundamentally geographical process which involves reconfiguring current 
spatial patterns of economic and social activity (Bridge et al. 2013).  
I have argued that the past and present agency of local government actors heavily influences 
low carbon and equitable transitions in practice. In the case of Nottingham City Council, the 
political stability of a Labour-run council since 1991 has allowed a stronger degree of 
political power since there is no immediate risk of change in administration. This has 
benefitted sustainable transitions by allowing for the ability to plan longer-term and progress 
initiatives which otherwise would be considered as politically controversial. In the case of 
Nottingham, this is complemented by a leadership which is ideologically environmentally 
and socially conscious. As a set of collective actors, the political administration can be 
viewed as forming a core alliance at the regime level, which has overcome political 
resistance to change from opposing political parties and acted as path advocates (MacKinnon 
et al. 2019). This has therefore provided political capacity and legitimation to establish low 
carbon and inclusive projects, even at the expense of political resistance and economic and 
political risk.  
Additionally, there is evidence of ‘climate champions’ by way of individuals at Nottingham 
City Council who are crucial for driving forward and governing sustainable trajectories and 
their willingness to go against the status quo for the benefit of the environment and 
Nottingham’s residents, even if they are dealing with conflicting sets of meanings or 
organisational behaviour (Vringer et al. 2020). This is not only restricted to councillors, but 
highlights the role of capable and skilled officers within the council. The role of individual 
actors is imperative by way of early project-planning and implementation of low carbon 
projects and have therefore progressed urban sustainable trajectories (Bulkeley & Kern, 
2005; Van der Heijden, 2019). Not only does this demonstrate the role of individual agents, 




and scales that actors inhabit in an uneven and cultural differentiated world (Coe & Jordhus-
Lier, 2010). It is noteworthy reflecting here that such findings are contradictory of other 
cities, such as Glasgow, which have had long and stable Labour leaderships but resulting in 
political inertia, corruption and complacency. I have contributed to debate on the effect of 
individual and collective agency in negotiating local government policy, a willingness of 
urban actors to break with some of the characteristic neoliberal politics, and the 
distinctiveness of Nottingham City Council for local political transformation (Featherstone 
et al. 2020, Millie & Murrie, 2006). 
PATH CREATION 
Using the Nottingham example, I have argued that political capacity to implement low 
carbon and inclusive transitions at the urban level is influenced by past agency of actors and 
the subsequent embedding of low carbon trajectories via path creation, lock-in and positive 
self-reinforcement (e.g. MacKinnon et al. 2019; Unruh, 2000). This is apparent in the city’s 
district heating scheme whose pre-existence has provided the city with multiple benefits in 
implementing its sustainability objectives not available to many other UK cities, which is a 
core contribution of this thesis.   
I have used Nottingham’s distinct district heating system as an appropriate example of 
energy infrastructure which has embedded and locked-in the production of clean energy 
from waste. As the largest district heating system in the UK, this system has sunken costs 
already in the city by way of infrastructure, which allows a base for expanding the system. 
It is an important revenue for the city, since it can operate this as a commercial service and 
generate sustainable income, particularly in a time of national austerity measures and 
increased competition (Gibbs & Lintz, 2016; Jonas et al. 2011). Furthermore, this historical 
legacy of delivering the district heating in the 1970s has resulted in the development of 
learning and expertise in the energy sector for over three decades, again positively 
embedding knowledge and skills within the energy department of the City Council which is 
strongly connected to current energy transitions and commercial operations. Again, this is 
important for sustainable urban transition understanding by emphasising the strong 
relationship of urban materiality, the embeddedness of energy systems and its effects on 





Similarly, the Nottingham Declaration has been a positive and historic development for the 
city. From being co-founded in the city and committing local authorities to tackle the causes 
and impacts of climate change at the urban level, it has drawn attention to Nottingham as a 
leading urban area with strong ambition and political willingness to govern and tackle 
environmental problems. I have argued that this has resulted in a historical legacy and 
virtuous cycle for the city which reveal positive lock-in and self-reinforcing sustainable 
behaviours. The point here is that this also affects actor agency, with collective visions and 
leadership initiating, legitimising and anchoring certain sustainable trajectories at local and 
regional scales (MacKinnon et al. 2019; Yu & Gibbs, 2019). By drawing upon the concepts 
of path-dependency, lock-in and path creation in particular, I have contributed to debate on 
the important consideration of these processes and how they can impact present-day 
transitions in practice.    
MUNICIPAL OWNERSHIP OF ENERGY AND TRANSPORT SYSTEMS 
A significant contribution of this thesis is that municipal ownership has a key role in 
implementing low carbon and equitable urban transitions (e.g. Cumbers, 2012; Cumbers & 
Becker, 2018). Municipal ownership of Nottingham’s assets (e.g. social housing and 
transport) has been imperative for political capacity to enact sustainable transitions. From 
this municipal ownership, Nottingham City Council has been able to provide low carbon and 
affordable energy, firstly through the establishment of Robin Hood Energy, and secondly by 
social housing retrofitting projects.  
I have argued that the unique (but albeit temporary) creation of Robin Hood Energy 
demonstrated the city’s dedication to combatting fuel poverty, through its lean management 
and not-for-profit business structure. As such, the municipally owned ESCo had multiple 
initiatives for decreasing fuel poverty, by way of: local discounted tariffs for Nottingham 
residents; provisions to reduce the number of prepayment meters for consumers; voluntarily 
offering Warm Home Discount Scheme; and the switching of void properties. I have argued 
that these initiatives, in addition to supplying 100 per cent renewable energy from 2018, 
resulted in an energy company which challenged incumbent actors and the status quo and in 
turn progressed (albeit temporarily) a ‘disruptive’ form of low carbon and inclusive urban 
transition. More broadly, this demonstrates a revitalisation of the political imagination and 




Moreover, I have demonstrated that the ownership of Nottingham City Council’s 27,000 
social houses has benefitted political capacity for energy efficiency programmes by allowing 
Nottingham City Council to work in partnership with the ALMO Nottingham City Homes 
to progress retrofit programmes. Again, it is worth noting here that this is contrary to most 
UK councils which sold off their assets as a result of privatisation, and again highlights the 
local transformative political capacity of Nottingham City Council. Consequently, this 
ownership has allowed the addressing of energy efficiency issues in social housing which 
constitute a significant portion of housing tenure (approximately 20 per cent) and can protect 
vulnerable citizens from fuel poverty. In addition, the energy efficiency developments enable 
the Council to save costs internally which can be sustainably reinvested into the provision 
of services, for the benefit of the urban area. The eradication of fuel poverty is a significant 
issue for the City Council and Nottingham City Homes, and this commitment is 
demonstrated by employing a full-time fuel poverty officer (notably outlasting austerity and 
budget cuts) and which is considered rare for a social housing organisation. As such, 
behavioural barriers can be overcome by supporting residents to switch and save and by 
referring to fuel debt services.    
Likewise, I have contended that the municipal ownership of Nottingham’s transport network 
has been crucial for political capacity for developing sustainable transport initiatives. Firstly, 
through local ownership, Nottingham City Council has formed an extensive bus network 
which operates both on a commercial and non-commercial basis. This has allowed the 
regeneration of profits back into the transport network, thereby leading the transport network 
to more sustainable bus fleets. I have argued that this has had a positive knock-on effect for 
the City Council, with public transport in Nottingham having the largest electric bus fleet, 
and having one of the highest usages in the UK. Furthermore, ownership of the land has been 
imperative for low carbon transport as this has allowed the Council to save costs by installing 
electric charge points at existing sites, and also resulted in a simpler and faster planning 
process.  
Secondly, I have argued that the implementation of the WPL and Electric Tram has been 
significant by raising hypothecated funds for the extension of the City’s electric tramline and 
any surplus being ringfenced and reinvested into sustainable transport measures (e.g. 
improvement of the main train station). This in turn has halted congestion in the city which 
has environmental benefits, and improved the overall connectivity of the city, thereby having 




(Bulkeley et al. 2012), through a municipal scheme which combines both long-term 
economic development and climate change objectives. Furthermore, this can be an example 
of ‘austerity urbanism’ (North & Nurse, 2014), which has engaged the city in entrepreneurial 
practices for securing future financial income (Gibbs & O’Neill, 2017; Yu & Gibbs, 2019). 
Yet, there are justice implications of the distribution of levy costs which may produce and 
reinforce inequalities and therefore need to be considered. Nevertheless, the example of low 
carbon energy and sustainable transport provision are compelling illustrations of the ways 
in which local government has engaged with urban infrastructure regimes and ‘experiments’ 
to facilitate climate change governance in attempts to lead sustainable trajectories (Bulkeley 
et al. 2012; Coenen & Truffer, 2012; Hodson et al. 2017). This thesis has made important 
empirical contributions by highlighting the critical role of municipal ownership in 
transitions, and the ways in which this can facilitate political capacity and agency for low 
carbon and just urban trajectories. 
I have demonstrated that the case study of Nottingham has proven to be a distinctive and 
powerful example which highlights the complex, multi-faceted, fluid and interlinked nature 
of low carbon transitions experienced at the urban level. Using a multi-level and multi-
dimensional analysis has enabled low carbon governance to be at the forefront of enquiry, 
and highlights in particular the different roles of actors across multiple scales and barriers 
affecting agency and capacity of urban-level actors. Not only has it demonstrated the barriers 
that are encountered by actors across private, third, and multi-level public sectors, but it has 
also included the ways in which the city of Nottingham has overcome these in a context of 
national austerity and ambivalent climate change and social equity policies in contemporary 
Britain. As such, I have contributed to debate of these processes and the effects on low 
carbon and inclusive urban transitions. There is no ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach to urban 
sustainability, and Nottingham’s experience, reported here, provides examples which may 
indeed be context-specific to the city and are not exactly replicable in this respect. Yet, they 
are notable for the implementation of sustainable trajectories in other urban areas on both 
national and international scales. The point here is that the Nottingham example offers new 




7.2. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR POLICY AND FINAL 
REFLECTIONS 
As time passes, there is a profound urgency for addressing the detrimental and uneven 
impacts of climate change. Following a multi-level perspective and pragmatic approach to 
this research, I have modestly put forward a number of policy recommendations based on 
the research findings in the hope to contribute to improvements in policy and decision-
making. I appreciate the complex nature of policymaking in practice, and therefore these are 
intended as preliminary suggestions and to promote further discussion within context-
specific cases, rather than viewed as a whole system and definitive approach.  
As highlighted by this research, policy must align with climate change targets, across 
international, national and local levels. In this thesis I have argued that a supportive policy 
environment is essential for climate change mitigation, and this is by no means a new 
argument (e.g. as highlighted by Castan Broto & Westman, 2020).  
It is the responsibility of the global community to produce ambitious climate targets, to 
ensure national governments are held to account. As shown by the Paris Agreement and 
Silesia Declaration, there is already a step-change in the right direction. However, the just 
transition should feature more heavily within this, and targets should be ambitious. Without 
this, it is increasingly difficult to approach the climate emergency in a coherent and joined-
up manner, and the just transition will become increasingly side-lined. Advanced economies 
have a responsibility to work collaboratively with developing economies to help the 
transition to low carbon and inclusive futures, in terms of the provision of adequate finance 
and supporting mechanisms, e.g. knowledge and expertise.  
In turn, the UK Government must provide a consistent and supportive policy environment 
for implementing low carbon and equitable transitions at the local level. This is by means of 
the provision of adequate funding, which is currently unacceptable, given the increased 
rhetoric of Localism since 2011 and introduction of the Cities and Local Government 
Devolution Act in 2016. There needs to be a clearly set-out national direction and 
responsibilities for all levels of government, in order to prevent political unwillingness, risk 
aversiveness and short-termism, and to instead promote greater cooperation between 
multiple actors with differing interests, needs and views. A clear national policy can open 




experiments and engagement, such as those shown in the Nottingham example. In addition, 
there must be clearer regulations in the housing, energy and transport sector, which again 
will help with the national decarbonisation strategy and certainty in decision-making. 
Finally, binding climate and social equity targets are vital, particularly which cannot be 
subjected to the unravelling and dismantling of subsequent governments, both on national 
and local levels.  
The recent departure from the EU presents the UK at an important crossroads with 
opportunity to pioneer sustainable trajectories, and one way of achieving this is primarily 
meeting (and exceeding) the environment strategies laid out by the EU in the UK’s own 
policy post-Brexit (which is yet still to be definitively addressed).  
Additionally, there is an absence of joined-up strategies between urban areas, demonstrated 
in Nottingham’s example which has had success, but this is limited in scope by its own 
municipality. I believe the appetite for this is there in urban areas; however the political and 
economic uncertainty often in low carbon and fair schemes results in a competitive (and 
exclusive) environment between urban areas. The long shadow cast by austerity has also 
detrimentally impacted on urban council’s ability to act in a sustained way too. Again, a 
clear and consistent national vision and policy environment can help achieve this 
coordination between multiple actors across sectors and space.  
Finally, from a personal perspective I am disheartened at the collapse of Robin Hood Energy 
and join calls for the reclaiming of ‘common goods’, such as energy, transport (and in some 
circumstances social housing) back into forms of public ownership to allow a reform of the 
energy market. This is an important strategy for shifting away from the dominance of profit-
seeking multi-nationals, and towards non-profit sustainable business models, which in turn 
address social equity issues, as Robin Hood Energy tried to do.  
To end on a more personal reflection, we are living in exceptional times and within an 
economic and political system which is detrimentally harming our environment, natural 
resources and humanity. Particularly during the writing of this thesis, we have witnessed 
growing environmental movements on a global scale. This is enlightening to witness, 
particularly from the global youth population and from city leaders around the world. The 
(very narrow) re-election of Democratic President Joe Biden in 2020 is somewhat 




next four years will witness more progression in this area by the USA and global community. 
At the same time, the Covid-19 pandemic has led to unprecedented circumstances, which 
have had, and undoubtedly will continue to have distinct changes on the ways in which 
society functions. However, to add a silver-lining to these challenging times - what is clear 
is that it has demonstrated what can be achieved by local, national and international 
governance in a short period of time, and the environmental benefits of such changes.  
With appropriate environmental governance and the right supportive resources, the UK (and 
international community more broadly) must work together to implement a decarbonised 
and equitable transition - to prevent the enduring warnings of catastrophic climate change 
and to fundamentally address the deepening inequality that our global economic system 
facilitates, and which will only worsen with a rapidly growing global population.  Such 
changes will not only have short-term benefits, but ones which are long-term and result in 
the path creation of a sustainable system which will be embedded for future generations to 
build on. To echo many who have, and continue to advocate for sustainable and equitable 
transitions, time is too short and the Earth’s planetary boundaries are too fragile, to settle for 
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APPENDIX A: INDIVIDUALS INTERVIEWED PER ORGANISATION/SECTOR 
Actor type 
Organisation/Entity Number of individuals 
interviewed 
National Gov (n=2) 
Department for Energy, Business, Industrial Strategy 
Office for Low Emission Vehicles 
1 
1 
Local Gov (n=5) 
Doncaster Council/Great North Energy 
Green Party 
Nottingham City Council 
Nottingham City Homes 






Third Sector (n=12) 
Anonymous Charity 
APSE Energy 
Campaign for Better Transport Nottingham 
Global Justice Nottingham 
Great North Energy 
Meadows Ozone Energy Services (MOZES) 
National Energy Action 
Nottingham Energy Partnership 
Pedals 
Robin Hood Energy 
St Ann’s Advice Centre 













Private Sector (n=3) 
LEVEL 
Municipal 




















Sector Organisation/Entity Number of 
individuals 
interviewed 
Energy (n=11) APSE Energy (Not-for-Profit) 
Department for Energy, Business, Industrial Strategy (UK Government 
department) 
Energy and Carbon Management (Nottinghamshire County Council) 
Energy Services (Nottingham City Council) 
Global Justice Nottingham (Not-for-Profit) 
Great North Energy (Doncaster Council) 
Meadows Ozone Energy Services (Charity/Not-for-Profit) 
Municipia (Private Consultancy) 
Nottingham Energy Partnership (Not-for-Profit) 
Robin Hood Energy (Nottingham City Council/Not-for-Profit) 















Transport (n=10) Anonymous Charity (Charity) 
Campaign for Better Transport (Charity) 
Cycle City (Nottingham City Council) 
Electric buses (Nottingham City Council) 
Go Ultra Low (Nottingham City Council) 
LEVEL (Private Consultancy) 
Nottingham Electric Trams (Nottingham City Council) 
Office for Low Emission Vehicles (UK Government department)  
Pedals (Charity) 
The Big Wheel (Charity) 












Housing (n=6) Energy Services/REMOURBAN (Nottingham City Council)  
Fuel Poverty (Nottingham City Homes) 
National Energy Action (Charity) 
St Ann’s Advice Centre (Charity) 
Strategic Housing Assets (Nottingham City Council) 














APPENDIX B: INTERVIEW QUESTION GUIDE  
Theme Indicative Questions 
Organisation/Department 
 
 What is the purpose of the organisation and why was this organisation 
established?  
 What is your role within organisation?  
Low carbon and 
equitable initiatives and 
approaches 
 What in your opinion are the problems that cities face in terms of 
environmental sustainability? 
 What in your opinion are the problems that cities face in terms of 
equality?? 
 What are the main initiatives/approaches by the organisation and how 
are these addressing climate change and social inequality?  
 What are the main motivations for initiatives and what criteria do you 
look for when identifying initiatives? i.e. location, social criteria, cost-
effectiveness, etc.  
 What are the processes for developing these initiatives, i.e. how was 
this implemented, who was consulted?  
 Is equality considered explicitly in these initiatives/approaches i.e. 
targeting lower-income neighbourhoods? If yes then how? If not, then 
why not?  
Financial structure  How is the organisation and/or initiative funded?  
 What is the financial model for the organisation and/or initiative i.e. 
for profit/not for profit?  
Business/Ownership 
structure 
 What is the operational structure of organisation and/or initiative? E.g. 
municipally-owned? Community-owned? Private 
shareholders/investors? 
Actors  What other actors/entities (state and non-state) are involved in the 
organisation/initiative and how are they involved?  
 What is their motivation for being involved in the organisation/ 
/initiative? 
 How important are the other actors’ involved? i.e. how dependent is 
the organisation/initiative on their involvement and has their 
involvement changed?  
Successes/barriers  What is the impact/effectiveness of the organisation/initiative to date? 
 What are the successes encountered to date?  
 What are the barriers encountered to date, and what is your approach 
to overcome these?  
Future considerations  What are the timescales for the project?  
 What are the future issues in the medium/long-term?  
 What improvements can be made to the organisation/initiative?  
 What improvements/changes should be made to the wider national 
policy arena? 











APPENDIX C: PROGRAMME FLYER FOR GO ULTRA LOW FESTEVAL 
 
 
Source: Visit Nottinghamshire, 2020. What’s On [online] Available at: https://www.visit-
nottinghamshire.co.uk/whats-on/go-ultra-low-nottingham-electric-vehicle-festeval-
















































Political [Local]; [National]; [International] 
Social 
Cultural 
Economic [UK (national)] [International (EU-level/Global] 
Other 
Influence Existing Infrastructure 




Actors State [Local Authority]; [UK Government]  
Non-state [Private]; [Third Sector]  
Relationship [Networking]  
Motivation 
Narrative [Vision]; [Priority] 
Future Issues (TRANSFER INTO BARRIER CODE) [Short-term] ; 
[Medium-term]; [Long-term] 























APPENDIX G: PARTICIPANT INFORMATION SHEET 
 
Information Sheet for Participants 
 
PhD Thesis 
Governing Transitions towards Low Carbon and Equitable Cities 
 
My name is Katherine Sugar and I am a PhD student from the University of Glasgow. I am conducting a 
research project for a PhD degree in Geography which examines sustainable and equitable transitions towards 
low carbon cities, using the case study Nottingham in the United Kingdom. 
 
The overall aim of this project is to examine the ways in which city actors are implementing low carbon 
transitions, which are pursuing just and equitable dimensions. 
 
The main focuses of this project are:  
 The UK national priorities, policies and plans to transition to low carbon and equitable futures.  
 The establishment of schemes implemented within the city of Nottingham to achieve a transition 
towards low carbon and equitable urban futures.  
 The successes, obstacles and challenges such schemes have experienced for low carbon and equitable 
urban transitions.  
 The governing actors and stakeholders in the city’s pursuit to transition to a low carbon and equitable 
future.  
 
This information will be collected primarily by interviews and secondary data literature analysis. I would be 
grateful if you would allow your participation in my thesis research. This will involve taking part in an 
interview on questions relating to the city and the city’s intended transition to a low carbon city. It is anticipated 
that the interview will take 60-90 minutes, subject to your availability.  
 
The information collected will be used in the presentation of data for this thesis. If agreed to, information will 
be collected by note-taking and/or Dictaphone. This information will only be made accessible to me and the 
lead supervisor, Dr David Featherstone. If requested, you can remain anonymous and your material 
confidential. You have the right to stop the interview at any time, and withdraw your participation from the 
dissertation project at any stage. If required, you can request to review the notes, transcripts or other data 
collected during the research pertaining to your participation. This data will not be shared with other 
organisations or for commercial purposes. Therefore no royalties or payments from the research project will 
be made.  
 
The dissertation will be completed by November 2021 and submitted to the School of Geographical and Earth 
Sciences at the University of Glasgow. It will be assessed by my supervisor, and read by other staff members 
within the School of Geographical and Earth Sciences and out-with the School from another UK university.  
 
Thank you for taking the time to read this information sheet. If you have any questions, please contact me 
directly on (+44) XXXXXXXXXX and k.sugar.1@research.gla.ac.ik. You can also contact my lead supervisor 
Dr David Featherstone at David.featherstone@glasgow.ac.uk for further information. This project has been 
approved by the University of Glasgow.  
 
Participant Name and Signature:........................................................................................................................ .. 
Participant Contact Details:................................................................................................. ................................. 









APPENDIX H: PARTICIPANT CONSENT FORM 
 
Consent Form for Participants 
 
PhD Thesis 
Governing Transitions towards Low Carbon and Equitable Cities 
 
I would be grateful for your consent to allow myself, Katherine Sugar, to conduct an interview with you as part 
of a PhD thesis project for a PhD in Geography from the University of Glasgow on ‘Governing Transitions 
towards Low Carbon and Equitable Cities.’  
 
It is estimated this interview will last between 60 – 90 minutes, subject to your availability. Please note you 
have the right to stop the interview or withdraw from the research at any time. Ethical procedures for academic 
research undertaken from UK institutions require that interviewees explicitly agree to being interviewed and 
how the information contained in their interview will be used. The information you provide will be used subject 
to your permission with this consent form.  
 
If you have any questions regarding this form, please contact Katherine Sugar directly on (+44) 
XXXXXXXXXX and k.sugar.1@research.gla.ac.uk and if required, the lead supervisor of this project Dr 
David Featherstone at David.featherstone@glasgow.ac.uk.  
  
Please read the following below and tick where applicable in the designated space.  
 
( _____) I have read and understood the accompanying Information Sheet.  
 
(______) I understand that I am voluntarily taking part in this project and that I can stop and withdraw my 
participation and the information I provide, at any time throughout the interview and the dissertation project.  
 
(______) I understand that I am free to contact the researcher with any questions I may have.  
 




( _____) I grant permission for the information I provide to be analysed by Katherine Sugar as research 
investigator.  
 
Please choose one of the two options below: 
 
(______) I agree to be quoted directly if my participation remains anonymous and a pseudonym is used.  
 
(______) I do not wish to be quoted at all.  
 
Participant Name and Signature:.......................................................................................................................... 
Participant Contact Details:................................................................................................. .................................  
Researcher’s Signature......................................................................Date...........................................................  
 
 
 
 
 
